In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a distributor who sells vertically differentiated, i.e. high and low brand products. We derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games among the distributor, the high brand product manufacturer and the low brand product manufacturer. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy for the distributor heavily depends on the relative quality and price level of the low brand product comparing to those of the high brand product. It is also shown that, for more bargaining profit, the distributor has strong motivation to prefer a low brand product which has lower quality level per unit price.

1. 서 론
 2. 분석 모형
  2.1 협상 모형
  2.2 수요 모형
 3. 협상 균형해
  3.1 동시 협상
  3.2 순차 협상 : 저급 브랜드 제조업체와 먼저협상하는 경우
  3.3 순차 협상 : 고급 브랜드 제조업체와 먼저협상하는 경우
 4. 협상 균형해 분석
  4.1 유통업체의 최적 협상방식
  4.2 θ 및 pl/ph 이 유통업체의 수익에 미치는 영향
 5. 결론 및 추후 연구 방향
 References

• 조형래(경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) | Hyung-Rae Cho
• 이민호(경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) | Minho Rhee Corresponding Author
• 임상규(경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) | Sang-Gyu Lim