Net neutrality, which has not been a problem, has recently become a problem for ISPs (Internet Service Providers), and their complaints have been paid by domestic platform companies, but overseas global IT companies such as Google and YouTube, generate huge revenues from domestic markets. In this situation, domestic IT companies claim that it is natural to impose more expensive charges or restrict speed on users who generate huge traffic. On the other side, however, the telecommunication network has become an essential public good that is essential to our everyday life, and because it has been given a monopoly position by a private company to efficiently respond to the explosive demand for telecommunication services, It is necessary to provide equal and universal service and fulfill public duty. In this paper, we deal with the network neutrality problem, focusing on the price elasticity between the CP (Contents Provider) and the ISP, rather than the user who is one side of the two-sided market for the already saturated satellites communication market. We present a game model that determines the optimal price for each platform by Nash equilibrium and analyze how the net neutrality affects CP according to the change of exogenous variables through the proposed game model.

1. 서 론
 2. 기존연구 고찰
 3 기본 모형
  3.1 CP의 효용함수
  3.2 CP 모형
   3.2.1 망중립성 정책 유지하지 않는 경우
   3.2.2 망중립성 정책 유지하는 경우
 4. 망중립성 정책의 가격 탄력성 비교
  4.1 플랫폼 QoS에 대한 가격탄력성 비교
  4.2 CP의 수준에 대한 가격탄력성 비교
  4.3 최종사용자 수에 대한 가격탄력성 비교
 5. 결 론
 Acknowledgement
 References

• Hyung Sool Oh(Depart. of Industrial & Management Engineering, Kangwon National University, 강원대학교 공학대학 산업경영공학과) | 오형술
• Jae Ha Lee(Depart. of Business Management, Nam Seoul University, 남서울대학교 상경대학 경영학과) | 이재하 Corresponding Author