Bentonite is a potential buffer material of multi-barrier systems in high-level radioactive wastes repository. Montmorillonite, the main constituent of the bentonite, is 2:1 type aluminosilicate clay mineral with high swelling capacity and low permeability. Montmorillonite alteration under alkaline and saline conditions may affect the physico-chemical properties of the bentonite buffer. In this study, montmorillonite alteration by interaction with synthetic alkaline and saline solution and its retention capacity for cesium and iodide were investigated. The experiments were performed in three different batches (Milli-Q water, alkaline water, and saline water) doped with cesium and iodide for 7 days. Alteration characteristics and nuclide retention capacity of original- and reacted bentonite was analyzed by X-ray diffraction (XRD), Fourier Transform Infrared (FTIR) spectroscopy, Scanning Electron Microscope (SEM), Nuclear Magnetic Resonance (NMR) and Cation Exchange Capacity (CEC) analysis. From the results, cesium retention occurred differently depending on the presence of competing ions such as K, Na, and Mg ions in synthetic solutions, while iodide was negligibly removed by bentonite. Montmorillonite alteration mainly occurred as cation exchange and zeolite minerals such as merlinoite and mordenite were new-formed during alkaline alteration of the montmorillonite. CEC value of reacted bentonite increased by formation of the zeolite minerals under alkaline conditions.

Currently, there are 25 nuclear power plants (NPPs) in operation in Korea, including 22 pressurized water reactors (PWRs) and three pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs). Two NPPs, including Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1, are permanently shut down and awaiting decommissioning. If Kori Unit 2, which is expected to be permanently shut down soon, is included, the number of decommissioning NPPs will be increased to three. Spent fuels (SFs) are continuously generated during the NPP operation, which are stored in an SF storage pool in NPPs to cool down the decay heat emitted from SFs. For safe NPP operation, SFs must be regarded as waste, and a disposal site must be selected to isolate SFs. However, an appropriate site has yet to be selected in Korea. SFs contain long-lived nuclides with a high specific activity. For disposal, it is important to characterize the nuclides in the fuels and delay the migration of the nuclides to the environment when SFs are placed in a future disposal facility. If the disposal container is broken, the nuclides in the fuels escape from the filling material, such as bentonite. These escaped nuclides are dissolved in groundwater and migrate to the surface of the earth. Thus, it is possible to assess the radiological impact, such as the exposure dose during and after the disposal, if the types and characteristics of nuclides in SFs are known. This study investigated the nuclides in SFs and identified exposure scenarios that may occur in the disposal process of SFs and migration characteristics when the nuclides leak into groundwater to propose a dose assessment methodology for workers and the public.

The Korea Laboratory Accreditation Scheme (KOLAS) is the national accreditation body responsible for providing accreditation services to testing and calibration laboratories. The primary objective of KOLAS is to promote the quality and reliability of laboratory testing by providing nationally and internationally recognized accreditation services. Laboratories accredited by KOLAS are required to meet rigorous international standards set by the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) and are subject to regular assessments to ensure ongoing compliance with the standards. KOLAS accreditation is highly regarded both domestically and internationally, and is recognized for providing high-quality and reliable testing services. The nuclear analysis laboratory at KINAC has been working to establish a quality management system to ensure the external reliability of analytical results and to secure its position as an authorized testing agency. To achieve this, a detailed manual and procedure for nuclear material analysis were developed to conform to the international standards of ISO/IEC 17025. This study presents the preparation process for establishing the management system, focusing on meeting technical and quality requirements for the implementation of the ISO/IEC 17025 standard in the KINAC nuclear analysis laboratory, specifically in the field of chemical testing (dosimetry, radioactive, and neutron measurement subcategories). The preparation process involved two tracks. The first track focused on satisfying technical requirements, with Thermal Ionization Mass Spectrometer (TIMS) and Inductively Coupled Plasma-Mass Spectrometer (ICP-MS) selected as the major equipment for analysis. Analytical methods for determining isotope ratios and concentrations of nuclear materials were determined, and technical qualification was ensured through participation in proficiency test programs, inter-experimenter comparison tests, and uncertainty reports. The second track focused on developing the quality system, including quality manuals, procedures, and guidelines based on the requirements of the ISO/IEC 17025 standard. Various implementation documents were produced during the six-month pilot period, in accordance with the three levels of documents required by the standard. Implementation of ISO/IEC 17025 is expected to have a systematic quality management process for the analysis lab’s operations and to increase confidence in KINAC’s nuclear analysis.

The domestic representative nuclear fuel cycle facilities are post-irradiation examination facility (PIEF) and Irradiated Examination Facility (IMEF) at KAERI. They have regularly operated since 1991 and 1993, respectively. Due to the long period of use, the facilities are ageing, and maintenance costs are increasing every year. The maintenance methods have mainly been breakdown maintenance (BM) and partially preventive maintenance (PM). They involve replacing components that have problems through periodic inspections by on-site inspectors. However, these methods are not only uncertain in terms of replacement cycles due to worker’s deviation on the inspection results, but also make it difficult to respond accidents developed through failures on the critical equipment that confines radioactive material. Therefore, an advanced operation and maintenance studied in 2022 through all of nuclear facilities operated at KAERI. Advancement strategy in four categories (safety, sustainability, performance, innovativeness) was analyzed and their priorities according to a facility environment were determined so a roadmap for advanced operation and maintenance could be developed. The safety and sustainability are higher importance than the performance and innovativeness because facilities at KAERI has an emphasis on research and development rather than industrial production. Thus, strategy for advancement has focused even more on strengthening the safety and sustainability. To enhance safety, it has been identified that immediate improvement of aged structures, systems, and components (SSCs) through large-scale replacement is necessary, while consideration of implementing an ageing management program (AMP) in the medium to long term is also required. Facility sustainability requires strengthening operation expertise through training, education, and cultivation of specialized personnel for each system, and addressing outstanding regulatory issues such as approval of radiation environment report on the nuclear fuel processing facilities and improvement work according to fire hazard analysis. One of the safety enhancement methods, AMP, is a new maintenance approach that has not been previously applied, so it had to be thoroughly examined. In this study, an analysis was conducted on the procedure and method for introducing an AMP. An AMP for nuclear fuel cycle facilities was developed by analyzing the AMP applied to the BR2 research reactor in Belgium and modifying it for application to nuclear fuel cycle facilities. The ageing management for BR2 has the objective to maintain safety, availability and cost efficiency and three-step process. The first step is the classification of SSCs into four classes to apply graded approach. Secondly, ageing risk is assessed to identify critical failure modes, their frequency and precursors. Final step involves defining measures to reduce the ageing risk to an acceptable level in order to integrate the physical and economic aspects of ageing into a strategy for inspection, repair, and replacement. Similar approach was applied to the nuclear fuel cycle facility. Firstly, the SSCs of nuclear fuel cycle facilities have been classified according to their safety and quality classifications, as well as whether they are part of the confinement boundary. The SSCs involved in the confinement boundary were given more weight in the classification process, even if they are not classified as safety-class. A risk index for ageing was introduced to determine which prevention and mitigation measure should be chosen. By multiplying the health index and the impact index, the ageing risk matrix provides a numerical score that represents guidance on the prevention and mitigation of ageing effect. The health index is determined by combining the likelihood of failure and engineering evaluation of the current condition of SSCs, whereas the impact index is calculated by taking into account the severity of consequences and the duration of downtime resulting from a failure. This ageing management has to be thoroughly reviewed and modified to suit each facility before being applied to nuclear fuel cycle facilities.