Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), one of the international multilateral export control systems, has designated Trigger List Item and Nuclear Dual-Use Item as control items. The Trigger List Item includes the “Especially Designed or Prepared (EDP)” term as control context. This term is very subjective and vague. Why this ambiguous term reflected in the control context? The EDP term is one of the essential elements of multilateral nuclear export controls since the NPT came into effect in 1970. The EDP concept is the basis of the rules in the Trigger List of NSG Part 1. NSG control items and contexts are decided through consensus among Participate governments, and there are three main reasons for reflecting EDP term in the guideline. First, it is to expand the control network by preventing the diversion of concerned traders. Secondly, technology development is faster than the regulatory speed, and it is tough to put all the items on the list. And last, it is to control other sensitive information such as concerned traders’ shopping list. To reduce the ambiguity of EDP, the US, UK, and Canada presented their interpretation methods at LEEM, a sub-group of the NSG. The United States and Canada have four location criteria (inside the containment building, RCS system or control, RCS system attachment, outside the containment building) and three purpose criteria (custom-made for nuclear power, whether it is an item according to the nuclear industry standard, not made to order) to determine the EDP items. The United Kingdom considers the original design intent and the purpose for which the item was originally designed. They also think about the nature of any specific or unique design features in terms of an item’s “fit,” “form,” and “function” that determine EDP item. Currently, in the case of KINAC, although it is not a controlled item in Korea, items designated by other countries are controlled as EDP items, and detailed standards for parts are prepared and controlled as EDP items. The interpretation of TL’s EDP differs from country to country, and differences are allowed between member states to some extent. Suppose Korea, like the US, UK, and Canada, examines measures to control EDP and reflects it after benchmarking. In that case, it is expected that it will contribute to reducing the export control loopholes for advanced technologies in the future and improve nuclear transparency through strict implementation of Korea’s export controls.

From 1970 to 1990, North Korea’s trade mainly carried out maritime trade through ports for countries around the world. This trend is due to UN sanctions against North Korea, and after the third nuclear test in 2016, North Korea gradually became isolated from the outside world as it expanded to include maritime sanctions in the form of comprehensive sanctions targeting an unspecified majority of North Korea. The logistics structure of North Korea is due to the logistics infrastructure left during the Japanese colonial period in the 1950s and the political structure of the country, with railroads being the main source of logistics and passenger transportation, and roads being secondary. North Korea faced rapid deterioration and lack of facilities after 1990 due to the lack of investment in facilities and improvement of the operating system despite the advanced logistics infrastructure and operating system compared to the South. In particular, the power shortage in North Korea hindered the operation of the railroad and accelerated the aging of the railroad facilities, which has continued to this day. In the 2010s, 96% of cargo transportation in North Korea’s logistics infrastructure depended on railroads and roads, and ports that were developed until the 1980s have deteriorated with little investment since the economic crisis of the 1990s. Although some ports have been developed since 2010, North Korea’s east and west coasts are separated and there is no function of shipping to connect ports, so it did not have a significant impact on enhancing the nation’s port capacity. As North Korea’s trade dependence on China has increased, North Korea has largely relied on land transport, except for some cargoes that are advantageous for marine transport, such as coal. This structure again leads to a decrease in investment in ports, and the current vicious cycle of causing problems with North Korean port facilities is repeated. In this study, North Korea’s land and marine trade logistics system such as railway, road, and shipping and the trend of foreign trade due to sanctions against North Korea were analyzed. Through this analysis, it is planned to be used as a basis for developing the routes and scenarios through which major nuclear items can be transferred in the event of denuclearization of North Korea in the future.

In the previous study, the types of North Korea’s strategic items, foreign trading partners, and export items were investigated. From North Korea’s typical trade paths, it is possible to predict the paths through which North Korea’s strategic items are illegally exported upon denuclearization. Trading partners of North Korea are the potential importing countries or end-users of strategic items, which can be disguised or concealed as if it is general export items during typical export procedures. So, in this study, transfer paths of North Korea’s export items are examined by utilizing KOTRA statistics, including item type HS code and its total price. Also, AnyLogic, a comprehensive simulation modeling tool, the simulation will be conducted to identify the paths for illegal transfer and calculate the time required. The information on North Korea’s trading partners and items is used for establishing export scenarios in which strategic items are transferred to other countries through North Korea’s ports, airports, railroads, and roads. To be specific, China, Russia, and South Korea, countries that share a border with North Korea, export items transported only by land; the items will arrive first in the referred three countries. Since the types of items, North Korea transacts with each country are different, the total amount and frequency of transactions are different; the probability of strategic items being included in general export items and transferred during customs clearance also varies. Even if it does not border North Korea, North Korea can export items through ports to countries adjacent to the coastline, and North Korea can even export items to any country by airspace even if it is not adjacent to the coastline. So, all publicly open ports, airports, railways, and roads are surveyed. Their geographic information, such as EPSG 4326 and EPSG 3857 coordinate system, are applied to confirm and visualize valid export paths starting from North Korea. In conclusion, effective export paths in North Korea are identified based on North Korea’s each major transportation hub by using AnyLogic simulation. It is possible to predict the paths through which North Korea’s strategic items will be transferred by combining information on major export items and countries that North Korea mainly transacts with.

Investigating major trading partners and items with North Korea is informative in terms that it can predict the path through which North Korea’s strategic items will transfer to non-nuclear-weapon states when North Korea denuclearizes. By analyzing North Korea’s trading partners and the items, it is possible to identify the relevant countries through which items arrive from the first importing country to the end-user in the process of exporting items and to predict the way how North Korea disguise or conceal their strategic items among general items during normal export procedures. As of 2020, North Korea’s major trading partners are China, Russia, Vietnam, India, Nigeria, and Switzerland. Compared to 2019, Mozambique, Tanzania, Ghana, and Thailand entered the top 10, while Brazil, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and South Africa pushed out of the top 10. North Korea’s trade dependence on China accounts for 88.2%, making it the largest trading partner for years, and it shows that North Korea is mainly conducting trade with Asian and African countries. North Korea’s most important export items are mineral products (HS 25-27) and steel & metal products (HS 72-83) and the most significant import items are mineral products (HS 25-27) and oils & fats & prepared foods (HS 15-24). In 2017, due to UN Security Council sanctions for North Korea’s international ballistic missile (ICBM) test-fire, North Korea’s exports from 3 billion dollars fell by 90% to less than 300 million dollars. This is the result of most of North Korea’s major export items included in the export ban, and changes have occurred in its export items. In 2020, export fell to less than 100 million dollars due to border lockdown measures to prevent the spread of COVID-19, which also affected the change of North Korea’s major export items. Although North Korea does not officially publish its foreign trade statistics, in order to review North Korea’s trade information, KOTRA statistics are utilized. KOTRA statistics provide only two digits of HS code number, so it is challenging to identify detailed item classification. Moreover, these statistics are based on the export amount, so it is difficult to determine the exact quantity of export items. It is expected that information on North Korean trading partners and items will be used to predict potential transferable export methods of North Korea’s strategic items when North Korea denuclearizes.