In this study, we examined the antagonistic effects of sprout-borne lactic acid bacteria (LAB) on Salmonella enterica serovar Enteritidis. This antagonism is promoted as a means of controlling contamination during sprout production and provides additional LAB for consumers. We isolated a total of 24 LAB isolates in nine species and five genera from seven popular vegetable sprouts: alfalfa (Medicago sativa), clover (Trifolium pratense), broccoli (Brassica oleracea ssp. italica), vitamin (B. rapa ssp. narinosa), red radish (Raphanus sativus), red kohlrabi (B. oleracea var. gongylodes), and Kimchi cabbage (B. campestris var. pekinensis). Based on 16S rRNA gene sequences, the LAB species were identified as Enterococcus casseliflavus, E. faecium, E. gallinarum, E. mundtii, Lactococcus taiwanensis, Leuconostoc mesenteroides, Pediococcus pentosaceus, and Weissella cibaria, and W. confusa. A total of 16 LAB isolates in seven species including E. faecium, E. gallinarum, E. mundtii, L. taiwanensis, L. mesenteroides, P. pentosaceus, and W. cibaria showed antagonistic activity toward S. enterica. The growth inhibition of sprout LAB on S. enterica was confirmed by co-culture. Unexpectedly, sprout LAB failed to suppress the growth of S. enterica in alfalfa sprouts, whereas all LAB strains stimulate S. enterica growth even if it is not significant in some strains. The findings of this study indicate that S. enterica-antagonistic LAB are detrimental to food hygiene and will contribute to further LAB research and improved vegetable sprout production.

The development of advanced nuclear facilities is progressing rapidly around the world. Newly designed facilities have differences in structure and operation from existing nuclear facilities, so Safeguards by Design (SBD), which applies safeguards at the design stage, is important. To this end, designers should consider the safeguardability of nuclear facilities when designing the system. Safeguardability represents a measure of the ease of safeguards, and representative evaluation methodologies are Facility Safeguardability Analysis (FSA) and Safeguardability Check-List (SCL). Those two have limitations in the quantification of safeguardability. Accordingly, in this study, the Safeguardability Evaluation Method (SEM), which has clear evaluation criteria based on engineering formulas, was developed. Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA), a key element of Safeguards, requires the Material Balance Area (MBA) of the target facility and performs Material Balance Evaluation (MBE) based on the quantitative evaluation of nuclear materials entering or leaving the MBA. In this study, about 10 factors related to NMA were developed, including MBA, Key Measurement Point (KMP), Uncertainty of a detector, Radiation signatures, and MUF (Material Unaccounted For). For example, one of the factors, MUF is used in MBA to determine diversion through analysis of unquantified nuclear materials and refers to the difference between Book Inventory and Physical Inventory, as well as errors occurring during the process in bulk facilities, errors in measurement, or intentional use of nuclear materials. This occurs in situations such as attempted diversion, and accurate MUF evaluation is essential for solid Safeguards implementation. MUF can be evaluated using the following formula (MUF=(PB+X-Y)-PE). The IAEA’s Safeguards achievement conditions (MUF < SQ) should be met. Considering this, MUF-related factors were developed as follows. (􀜵􀜧􀜯 = 1 − 􀯆􀯎􀮿 􀯌􀯊 ) In this way, about 10 factors were developed and described in the text. This factors is expected to serve as an important factor in evaluating the safeguardability of NMA, and in the future, safeguardability factors related to Containment & Surveillance (C&S) and Design Information Verification (DIV) will be additionally developed to conduct a comprehensive safeguardability evaluation of the target facility. This methodology can significantly enhance safeguardability during the design stage of nuclear facilities.

This study was aimed to isolate bacterial inoculants producing chitinase and evaluate their application effects on corn silage. Four corn silages were collected from four beef cattle farms to serve as the sources of bacterial inoculants. All isolates were tested against Fusarium graminearum head blight fungus MHGNU F132 to confirm their antifungal effects. The enzyme activities (carboxylesterase and chitinase) were also measured to isolate the bacterial inoculant. Based on the activities of anti-head blight fungus, carboxylesterase, and chitinase, L. buchneri L11-1 and L. paracasei L9-3 were subjected to silage production. Corn forage (cv. Gwangpyeongok) was ensiled into a 10 L mini silo (5 kg) in quadruplication for 90 days. A 2 × 2 factorial design consists of F. graminearum contamination at 1.0104 cfu/g (UCT (no contamination) vs. CT (contamination)) and inoculant application at 2.1 × 105 cfu/g (CON (no inoculant) vs. INO (inoculant)) used in this study. After 90 days of ensiling, the contents of CP, NDF, and ADF increased (p<0.05) by F. graminearum contamination, while IVDMD, acetate, and aerobic stability decreased (p<0.05). Meanwhile, aerobic stability decreased (p<0.05) by inoculant application. There were interaction effects (p<0.05) on IVNDFD, NH3-N, LAB, and yeast, which were highest in UCT-INO, UCT-CON, CT-INO, and CT-CON & INO, respectively. In conclusion, this study found that mold contamination could negatively impact silage quality, but isolated inoculants had limited effects on IVNDFD and yeast.

Nuclear fusion energy is considered as a future energy source due to its higher power density and no emission of greenhouse gas. Therefore, various researches on nuclear fusion is being conducted. One of the key materials for the nuclear fusion research is tritium because the D-T reaction is the main reaction in the nuclear fusion system. However, that tritium can also be used for non-peaceful purposes such as hydrogen bombs. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the safeguards system for tritium. In that regards, this study analyzed the possibility of applying safeguards to tritium. To achieve this objective, the tritium production capacity through the light water reactor was analyzed. Tritium Production Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR) was modeled through the MCNP code, and tritium production was analyzed. The TPBAR is composed of a cylindrical tube with a double coating of aluminum and zirconium, filled with a sintered lithium aluminate (LiAlO2) pellet to prevent the release of tritium. Tritium is produced by the reaction of Li-6 in the TPBAR with neutrons, and it is extracted and stored at the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF). As a result, the tritium production increased as the burnup and Li-6 mass increased. In addition, when the tritium produced in this way was transferred to TEF and extracted through the process, the application of safeguards measures was analyzed. To this end, various safeguards measures were devised, such as setting an Material Balance Area (MBA) for TEF and analyzing Material Balance Period (MBP). As there is no designated Significant Quantity (SQ) for tritium, cases were classified based on the type and form of nuclear weapons to estimate the Sigma MUF (Material Unaccounted For) of the TEF. Finally, the comprehensive application of safeguards to tritium was discussed. This research is expected to contribute to the establishment of IAEA safeguards standards related to tritium by applying the findings to actual facilities.