到2000年为止, 中国政府正在与40多国家和地区缔结或进行FTA谈判。中国现在以地区均衡发展为目标，全国性的更换和采购了社会间接设备。尤其是随着2008年北京奥运会，2010年上海世博会，广州亚运会等国际型的活动即将到来，对韩国企业来说,　参加中国政府采购市场的非常好的机会。 因此，为了进军中国政府采购市场了解中国招标投标制度是非常重要的。 关于政府采购市场的市场接近(Market Access)方面，中国一直采取了建设以及机械设备市场的进入壁垒，而且中央和地方政府都有着不同的特点和管理机制。比如，不同的申报和许可制度，地方保护主义等。中国政府已经制定和实施了2000年 <招标投标法>，2003年 <政府采购法>。　 因此，本论文是研究和分析中国<招标投标法>，<政府采购法>实施以后，在招标投标过程中的透明度和规范化方面的问题和变化。为了进一步分析其问题和变化采取了案例调查方法。　 本人搜集了庞大的有关资料以及亲自到中国去进行实地考察。 在中国进行招标投标时，大部分政府和企业之间的行为。一般来说，有中国特点的招标机制上不是按照有关法律和政策来决定，而是大部分按照个人的人情和关系网来决定中标的可能性较大。 本论文的特点是第一，有关研究中国投标招标的制度的非法性，非合理性方面，可以说头一次进行实地考察。第二，在韩中FTA谈判方面给韩国政府提供了实质性的资料。与此同时，给韩国企业提供了战略性的进军方案。

Korea Criminal Act(KCA) Art. 315(Interference with Auction or Bidding) reads as follows: “A person who interferes with the impartial conduct of an auction or a bid through fraudulent means or by the threat of force or by other means, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than two years or by a fine not exceeding seven million won.” So when a person(or a bidder) unlawfully manipulates computer programs of the agency calling for bids in order to obtain information about a minimum bidding price so that he can win the contract for sure. In the present case handed down by the Suprem Court of Korea, the defendants(bidder and manipulators) are found not guilty of Fraud by Use of Computer, etc(Art. 347-2 KCA) because a directness between a data processing and a property taking. The present paper agrees with the opinion of the Court, and moreover denies the violation of Fraud(Art. 347 KCA) in that the conduct does not make pecuniary loss to the agency. A bid-rigging is punishable by the Art. 315, and a violation of the Korean Anti-monopoly law and Construction law as well.

The purpose of this study is to analyse whether the capability assesment index to perform services as well as creditratings for the governmental procurement bidding influence earnings management behaviour using discretionary accrualsand real earnings management in the construction waste disposal industry. For this study, out of the 530 population(interimdisposal service companies for construction waste) across the country, the final sample of 144 companies is selected foran analysis period of six years, starting from 2008 to 2013. The modified Jones model (1995) is used to measure earningsmanagement and the Kothari et al. model (2005) reflecting return on total assets (ROA) is also applied to produce thediscretionary accruals. In addition, earnings management through real activities is measured by the model developed byRoychowdhury (2006) and the method developed by Cohen et al. (2008) is adopted to calculate the measurement ofintegration of real earnings management. Overall, our empirical results of the analysis show that the capability assessmentindex to perform services as well as credit ratings significantly influence earnings management behaviour in theconstruction waste disposal industry. First, the managers of companies having higher assessment index report increasedprofits through adjusting both discretionary accruals and real earings management. Second, the managers of speculativeenterprises which rank lower credit ratings use higher income-increasing discretionary accruals. These research findingsimply that the regulatory authorities should properly consider the earnings management behavior of the construction wastedisposal service industry in setting the qualification standards for the governmental procurement bidding. The usefulnessof this study results can be highlighted by alerting the industry managers that improper earnings management practicesnot only decrease the successful bidding chances of the companies involved but also deteriorate long-term firm valuesin the market.