Solenopsis invicta, known as the red imported fire ant, is an insect native to South America. This species was unintentionally introduced into Australia, New Zealand, several Asian countries, Caribbean countries, and the United States. It shows a high survival rate and settlement potential in human-habitable and non-living areas such as tropical rainforests, disturbed areas, deserts, grasslands, and roads. In Korea, invasions of red fire ants have been reported every year since 2017, and two invasions were discovered in 2023. Quarantine agency analyzing the haplotype and colony social type of S. invicta for surveillance and control. Population genetic analysis using Microsatellite Alleleic data of 66 loci to trace the origin of the invasion. Through research cooperation with the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), we have received samples and expanded our genetic information database. This study analyzed genetic differences between 15 invasive populations and 44 reference groups. As a result of microsatellite analysis, the domestic invasive population showed a genetic structure similar to those in Guangzhou, China, and Florida, USA.

The Severe Disaster Punishment Act had recently been established in order to promote safety and health (OSH) management system for severe accident prevention. OSH management system is primarily designed based on risk assessments; however, companies in industries have been experiencing difficulties in hazard identification and selecting proper measures for risk assessments and accident prevention. This study intended to introduce an accident analysis method based on epidemiological model in finding hazard and preventive measures. The accident analysis method employed in this study was proposed by the U.S. Department of Energy. To demonstrate the effectiveness of the accident analysis method, this study applied it to two accident cases occurred in construction and manufacturing industries. The application process and results of this study can be utilized in improving OSH management system and preventing severe accidents.

Recently pathogenic E. coli is one of the main foodborne pathogens resulting in many patients in Korea. To understand the characteristics of pathogenic E. coli outbreaks in Korea, the epidemiological investigation reports of pathogenic E. coli outbreak in 2009 (41 reports) and in 2010 (27 reports) were collected in the web site of the Korea Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, reviewed and analysed in this study. The main places of the pathogenic E. coli outbreaks were food catering service area (64.8%) and restaurants (25.0%). The main type of the pathogens were EPEC (44.7%) and ETEC (34.2%). EAEC and EHEC was responsible for 10.5 and 9.2%, respectively. Eight of 68 outbreak cases were caused by more than 2 types of pathogenic E. coli which implicates the complicated contamination pathways of pathogenic E. coli. The incidence rate of pathogenic E. coli was 33.6 ± 30.5% and the main symptoms were diarrhea, stomach ache, nausea, vomiting, and fever etc. The two identified food sources were identified as frozen hamburger pattie and squid-vegetable mixture. To improve the food source identification by epidemiological investigation, food poisoning notification to the agency should not be delayed, whole food items attributed the outbreak should be collected and detection method of the various pathogenic E. coli in food has to be improved. In conclusion, the characteristics between the EHEC outbreaks in the western countries and the EPEC or ETEC outbreaks in Korea needs to be distinguished to prepare food safety management plan. In addition, the development of the trace back system to find the contamination pathway with the improved detection method in food and systemic and cooperative support by the related agencies are necessary.

Since there had been the first human outbreak of novel influenza A/H1N1 in Mexico, it has become pandemic throughout the world. In the Republic of Korea, the first human case was on May, 2009 and National Veterinary Research and Quarantine Service (NVRQS) has started monitoring novel influenza A/H1N1 on domestic swine farms. The first positive case was detected on 14, Dec, 2009 and until now, we have had total 17 positive cases. From the first case, we did epidemiological investigation on introduction and transmission of virus to pigs. We have concluded that virus had been introduced from humans to pigs, possibly from October to November, 2009 in our country. There were direct and indirect factors including the vehicles transporting veterinary medicine, feed, etc. related to transmission of virus from farm to farm. However, breeding pigs seem to be extrinsic to transmitting factors. Upon the epidemiological investigation, the off-limits of visitors to farms and the disinfection is thought to be critical for blocking the introduction and transmission of novel influenza A/H1N1. In addition, collecting and analyzing the genetic informations of influenza virus is important for predicting and handling the new pandemic influenza in the future.

The main problems contributing to food poisoning outbreaks in institutional settings and a home were reviewed and analyzed through the epidemiological investigations of food poisoning. The major documented factors included improper holding temperatures, inadequate cooking, poor personal hygiene, cross-contamination and contaminated equipment, food from unsafe sources, failure to follow food hygiene policies, and lack of education, training, monitoring and supervision. Usually more than one factor contributed to the development of an outbreak. (1) Use of improper holding temperatures was the single most important factor contributing to food poisoning. They included improper cooling, allowing a laps of time (12 hours or more) between preparing food and eating it, improper hot holding, and inadequate or improper thawing. Food thermometers were not used in most of the instances. (2) In inadequate cooking, the core temperature of food during and after cooking had not been measured, and routine monitoring was limited to recording the temperature of plated meals. Compared with conventional methods of cooking, microwave ovens did not protect against food poisoning as effectively. Centralized food preparation potentially increased the risk of food poisoning outbreaks. (3) Poor personal hygiene both at the individual level (improper handwashing and lack of proper hygienic practices) and at the institutional level (poor general sanitization) increased the risk of transmission. Person to person transmission of enteric pathogens through direct contact and via fomites has been noted in several instances. (4) Obtaining food from unsafe sources was a risk factor in outbreaks of food poisoning. Food risks were high when food was grown or harvested from contaminated areas. Possibilities included contamination in the field, in transport, at the retail site, or at the time it was prepared for serving. (5) Cross-contamination and inadequate cleaning/handling of equipment became potential vehicles of food poisoning. Failure to separate cooked food from raw food was also a risk factor. (6) Failure to follow food hygiene policies also provided opportunities for outbreaks of food poisoning. It included improper hygienic practices during food preparation, neglect of personnel policies (involvement of symptomatic workers in food preparation), poor results on routine inspections, and disregarding the results and recommendations of an inspection. (7) Lack of formal and in-service education, training, monitoring, and supervision of food handlers or supervisors were critical and perhaps neglected elements in occurrences of food poisoning.