The nuclear facilities at Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) have generated a variety of organic liquid radwaste and radiation levels are also varied. At KAERI, the organic liquid radwaste has been stored at Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (RWTF) temporarily due to the absence of the recognized treatment technique while inorganic liquid radwaste can be treated by evaporation, bituminization, and solar evaporation process. The organic liquid radioactive waste such as spent oil, cutting oil, acetone, ethanol, etc. was generated from the nuclear facilities at KAERI. Among the organic liquid radioactive wastes, spent oil is particularly significant. According to the nuclear safety act, radioactive waste can be cleared by incineration and landfilling if it meets the criteria of less than 10 μSv/h for individual dose and 1 person – Sv/y for collective dose. Dose assessment was performed on some organic liquid radioactive waste with a very low possibility of radioactive contamination stored in RWTF at KAERI. As a result, it was confirmed that some wastes met the regulatory clearance standards. Based on this, it was approved by the regulatory body, and this became the first case in Korea and KAERI for permission for regulatory clearance of organic liquid radioactive waste by landfill after incineration.

KAERI has developed a Radioactive Waste Information Management System (RAWINGS) to manage the life-cycle information from the generation to the disposal of radioactive waste, in compliance with the low- and medium-level radioactive waste acceptance criteria (WAC). In the radioactive waste management process, the preceding steps are to receive waste history from the waste generators. This includes an application for a specified container with a QR label, pre-inspection, and management request. Next, the succeeding steps consist of repackaging, treatment, characterization, and evaluating the suitability of disposal, for a process to transparently manage radioactive wastes. Since the system operated in 2021, The system is enhanced to manage dynamic information, including the tracking of the location of radioactive waste and the repackaging process. Small packages of waste could be classified as either radioactive or clearance waste during pre-inspection. Furthermore, waste generated in the past has already been packaged in drums, and a new algorithm has been developed to apply the repackaging when reclassification is required. All radioactive waste with the unique ID number on the specific container is managed within a database, the total amount and history of waste are managed, and statistical information is provided. This system is continuously be operated and developed to oversee life-cycle information, and serve as the foundational database for the Waste Certification Program (WCP).

As the acceptance criteria for low-intermediate-level radioactive waste cave disposal facilities of Korea Radioactive Waste Agency (KORAD) were revised, the requirements for characterization of whether radioactive waste contains hazardous substances have been strengthened. In addition, As the recent the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission Notice (Regulations on Delivery of Low- Medium-Level Radioactive Waste) scheduled to be revised, the management targets and standards for hazardous substances are scheduled to be specified and detailed. Accordingly, the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) needs to prepare management methods and procedures for hazardous substances. In particular, in order to characterize the chemical requirements (explosiveness, ignitability, flammability, corrosiveness, and toxicity) contained in radioactive waste, it must be proven through documents or data that each item does not contain hazardous substances, and quality assurance for the overall process must be provided. In order to identify the characteristics of radioactive waste that will continue to be generated in the future, KAERI needs to introduce a management system for hazardous substances in radioactive waste and establish a quality assurance system. Currently, KAERI is thoroughly managing chelates (EDTA, NTA, etc.), but the detailed management procedures for hazardous substances related to chemical requirements in radioactive waste in the radiation management area specified above are insufficient. The KAERI’s Laboratory Safety Information Network has a total periodic regulatory review system in place for the purchase, movement, and disposal of chemical substances for each facility. However, there is no documents or data to prove that the hazardous substances held in the facility are not included in the radioactive waste, and there are no procedures for managing hazardous substances. Therefore, it is necessary to establish procedures for the management of hazardous substances, and we plan to prepare management procedures for hazardous substances so that chemical substances can be managed according to the procedures at each facility during preliminary inspection before receiving radioactive waste. The procedure provides definitions of terms and types of management targets for each characteristic of the chemical requirements specified above (explosiveness, ignition, flammability, corrosiveness, and toxicity). In addition, procedure also contains treatment methods of radioactive waste generated by using hazardous substances and management methods of in/out, quantity, history of that substances, etc. As the law is revised in the future, management will be carried out according to the relevant procedures. In this study, we aim to present the hazardous substance management procedures being established to determine whether radioactive waste contains hazardous substances in accordance with the revised the notice and strengthened acceptance criteria. Through this, we hope to contribute to improving reliability so that radioactive waste could be disposed of thoroughly and safely.

In light of recent significant seismic events in Korea and worldwide, there is an urgent need to reevaluate the adequacy of seismic assessments conducted during facility construction. This study reexamines the ongoing viability of the Safety Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) criteria assessment for the Combustible Radioactive Waste Treatment Facility (CRWTF) site at the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), originally established in 1994. To validate the SSE assessment, we delineated 13 seismic structure zones within the Korean Peninsula and employed two distinct methodologies. Initially, we updated earthquake occurrence data from 1994 to the present year (2023) to assess changes in the site’s horizontal maximum earthquake acceleration (g). Subsequently, we conducted a comparative analysis using the same dataset, contrasting the outcomes derived from the existing distance attenuation equation with those from the most recent attenuation equations to evaluate the reliability of the applied attenuation model. The Safety Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) criterion of 0.2 g remains unexceeded, even when considering recent earthquake events since the original evaluation in 1994. Furthermore, when applying various assessment equations developed subsequently, the maximum value obtained from the previously utilized ‘Donvan and Bornstein’ attenuation equation is 0.1496 g, closely resembling the outcome derived from the recently employed ‘Lee’ reduction equation of 0.1451 g. The SSE criteria for CRWTF remain valid in the current context, even in light of recent seismic occurrences such as the 2016 Gyeongju earthquake. Additionally, the attenuation equation employed in the evaluation consistently yields conservative results when compared to methodologies used in recent assessments. Consequently, the existing SSE criteria remain valid at present. This study is expected to serve as a valuable reference for confirming the SSE criterion assessment of similarly constructed facilities within KAERI.

To effectively assess the inventory of radionuclides generated from nuclear power plants using a consistent evaluation method across diverse groups, it is imperative to analyze the similarity in radioactive distribution between these groups. Various methodologies exist for evaluating this similarity, and the application of statistical approaches allows us to establish similarity at a specific confidence level while accounting for the dataset size (degrees of freedom). Initially, if the variance characteristics of the two groups are similar, a t-test for equal variances can be employed. However, if the variance characteristics differ, methods for unequal variances should be applied. This study delineates the approach for assessing the similarity in radioactive distribution based on the analytical characteristics of the two groups. Furthermore, it delves into the results obtained through two case studies to offer insights into the assessment process.

Various types of solidifying materials are used to stabilize and solidify low and intermediatelevel radioactive dispersible waste. Portland cement is generally used to solidify various radioactive wastes because its facilities and processes are simple, less dangerous, and it has excellent compressive strength after curing compared to other materials. However, it is difficult to use Portland cement in radioactive waste containing highly water-soluble harmful substances such as sodium fluoride because it is prone to leaching harmful ingredients in immersion tests due to its low water resistance. In this study, solidification was achieved using an organic-inorganic hybrid solidifying binders consisting of inorganic binders such as Portland cement, blast furnace slag powder, silica fume, and organic binders such as epoxy resin. This material was then compared with a solidification material made of Portland cement alone. The mixing ratio of inorganic binders, water, and organic binders to simulated waste is 35%, 20%, and 25%, respectively. The mixing ratio of inorganic binders and water when using only Portland cement for simulated waste is 100% and 80%, respectively. The mixed paste was poured into a cylinder mold (Φ 5 × 10 cm) to seal the upper part, cured at room temperature for 28 days to produce a solidification specimen, and then subjected to various tests were performed, including compressive strength, immersion compressive strength, hydration peak temperature, length change, and immersion weight change. The compressive strength of the organic-inorganic hybrid solidification test was 13-17 MPa, the immersion compressive strength was 15-18 MPa, the hydration peak temperature was 33-36°C, the length change rate was -0.086%, and the immersion weight change rate was –2.359%. The compressive strength of the Inorganic solidification test using only Portland cement was 16-18 MPa, the immersion compressive strength was 20-21 MPa, the hydration peak temperature was 23-25°C, the length change rate was -0.150%, and the immersion weight change rate was -5.213%. The compressive strength and immersion compressive strength of the organic-inorganic hybrid solidification materials were slightly lower compared to those of Portland cement solidification materials, they still met the compressive strength standard of 7-12 MPa, taking into consideration the strength reduce and economic feasibility of the core drill process. Furthermore, it indicates that the rates of change in length and immersion weight decreased to about 1% and 5%, suggesting an improvement in water resistance. The above results suggest that applying the organic-inorganic hybrid solidification method to radioactive waste treatment can effectively improve water resistance and help secure long-term stability.

Radioactive liquid waste generated during the operation of domestic nuclear power plants is treated through a somewhat different liquid radwaste system (LRS) for each plant. Prior to the introduction of standard nuclear power plants, LRS used a concentrated water dry system (CWDS) to evaporate liquid waste and manage it in the form of dry powder. The boron-containing radioactive liquid waste dry powder was solidified using paraffin from 1995 to 2010, and about 3,650 drums (based on 200 L) of paraffin solidified drums are currently stored in nuclear power plants. Paraffin solidification drums do not meet the acceptance criteria for radioactive waste repositories because it is difficult to secure the homogeneity of the solidified body and there are concerns about leaching of radioactive waste due to the low melting point of paraffin. In order to solve this problem and safely permanently dispose of paraffin solidification drums, the characteristics of dry powder paraffin solidification drums containing boron-containing radioactive liquid waste must be analyzed and appropriate treatment technology utilizing the results must be introduced. This study analyzes the physical properties of paraffin, the chemical properties of boron-containing radioactive waste dry powder, and the physicochemical properties of paraffin solidification powder, and proposes an appropriate alternative technology for treating boron-containing radioactive waste dry drum. When disposing of the paraffin solidification drum with boron-containing radioactive liquid waste dry powder, the solidification body must be effectively withdrawn from the drum and the paraffin must be completely separated from the solidification body. When disposing the drum, the solidified material must be effectively extracted from the drum and the paraffin must be completely separated from the solidified material. Afterwards, the paraffin must be self-disposed, and the radioactive waste must be disposed of in accordance with acceptance criteria of repository. We looked at how each characteristic of the paraffin solidification drum with boron-containing radioactive liquid waste dry powder can be utilized in each of the above treatment processes.

Plasma torch melting technology has been considered as a promising technology for treating or reducing the radioactive waste generated by nuclear power plants. In 2006, IAEA announced that the technology is able to treated regardless of the type of target wastes. Because of the advantage, many countries have been funding, researching and developing the treatment technology. In this study, oversea plasma torch melting facilities for radioactive wastes treatment are reviewed. Also, plasma torch melting facility developed by KHNP CRI is briefly introduced.

Most of the radioactive wastes generated during the nuclear fuel processing activities conducted by KEPCO Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. are classified as the categories of intermediate and low-level radioactive waste. These radioactive waste materials are intended for permanent disposal at a designated disposal site, adhering strictly to the waste acceptance criteria. To facilitate the safe transportation of radioactive waste to the disposal site, it is necessary to ensure that the waste drums maintain a level of criticality that complies with the waste acceptance criteria. This necessitates the maintenance of subcritical conditions, under immersion or optimal neutron moderation conditions. This paper presents a criticality safety assessment of concrete radioactive waste under the most conservative conditions of immersion and moderation conditions for waste drums. Specifically, In order to send radioactive waste, which is the subject of criticality analysis, to a disposal facility, pre-processing operations must be performed to ensure compliance with waste accepatance criteria. To meet the physical characteristics required by the accepance criteria, particles below 0.2 mm should not be included. Thus, a 0.3 mm sieve is used to separate particles lager than 0.3 mm, and only those particles are placed in drums. The drums should be filled to achieve a filling ratio of at least 85%. A criticality analysis was conducted using the KENO-VI of SCALE. The Criticality Safety Analysis Results of varying the filling ratio of concrete drums from 85% to 100% presented in an effective multiplication factor of 0.22484. Additionally, the effective multiplication factor presented to be 0.25384 under the optimal moderation conditions. This demonstrates full compliance with the USL and criticality technology standards set as 0.95.

The decommissioning of Korea Research Reactor Units 1 and 2 (KRR 1&2), the first research reactors in South Korea, began in 1997 and the decommissioning status is currently proceeding with phase 3. It is expected that more than 5,000 tons of dismantled wastes will be generated as the contaminated building is demolished. Since these dismantled wastes must be disposed of in an efficient method considering economic feasibility, it is desirable to clearance extremely low-level wastes whose contamination is so minimal that the radiological risk is negligible. In Korea, in order to approve the clearance of radioactive waste, it must be proven that the nuclide concentration standards are met or that the dose to individuals and collectives is below the allowable dose value. At the KRR 1&2 decommissioning site, dismantled wastes have been steadily being disposed of through clearance procedure since 2021. Clearance was approved by the Korean Institute of Nuclear Safety (KINS) for one case of concrete waste in 2021 and two cases of metal waste in 2022. In 2023, the clearance of metal waste and asbestos waste has been approved so far, and in particular, this is the first case in Korea for asbestos waste. In this study, we compared the dose assessment methods and results of clearance wastes at the KRR 1&2 decommissioning site from 2021 to present. Dose assessment was conducted by applying the landfill scenario for concrete and asbestos and the recycling scenario for metal waste. The calculation codes used were RESRAD-onsite 7.2 and RESRAD-recycle 3.10. The dose conversion factors (DCF) for each age group (infant, 1y, 5y, 10y, 15y, adult) of the target nuclide used the values presented in ICRP-72, and in particular, geo-hydrological data of the actual landfill site was used as an input factor when evaluating landfill scenarios. As a result of the dose assessment, when landfilling concrete wastes in 2020, the personal dose and collective dose were evaluated the most at 2.80E+00 μSv/y and 4.83E-02 man·Sv/y, respectively.

Every engineering decision in radioactive waste management should be based on both technical and economic considerations. Especially, the management of low-level radioactive waste (LLW) is more critical on economic concerns, due to its long-term and continuous nature, which emphasizes the importance of economic analysis. In this study, economic factors for LLW management were discussed with appropriate engineering applications. Two major factors that should be taken into account when assessing economic expectations are the accuracy of the results and its proper balancing with ALARA philosophy (As Low As Reasonably Achievable). The accuracy of the results depends on the correct application of alternatives within a realistic framework of waste processing. This is because the LLW management process involves variables such as component type, physical dimensions, and the monetary value at the processing date. Two commonly used alternatives are the simplified lump sum present worth and levelized annual cost methods, which are based on annual and capital costs. However, these discussions on alternatives not only pertain to the time series value of operational costs but also to future technical advancements, which are crucial for engineers. As new research results on LLW treatment emerge, proper consideration and adoption should be given to technical cost management. As safety is the core value of the entire nuclear industry, the ALARA philosophy should also be considered in the cost management of LLW. The typical cost of exposure in man-rem has ranged from $1,000 to $20,000 over the past decades. However, with increasing concerns about health and international political threats, the cost of man-rem should be subject to stricter criteria, even the balancing of costs and safety concerns is much controverse issue. Throughout the study, the importance of incorporating proper engineering insights into the assessment of technical value for the financial management of LLW was discussed. However, it’s essential to remember that financial management should not be solely assessed based on the size of expenses but rather by evaluating the current financial status, the value of money at the time, and anticipated future costs, considering the specific context and timeframe.

At the end of 2022 there were 439 nuclear power reactors in operating around the world, including 25 nuclear power reactors of Korea. Domestic nuclear power plants (NPPs) continuously produce low and intermediate-level radioactive waste (LILW) and spent nuclear fuel (SNF). As amount of radioactive waste is increasing and interim storage facilities meet limitation of their capacity, radioactive waste need to be transported. Consequently, the demand for radioactive waste transportation is increasing and the importance of Radiation Risk Assessment Codes (RRACs) for radioactive waste transportation is also on the rise. Considering the domestic situation where all NPPs are located on seaside, the radioactive waste transportation by ship is inevitable and the its risk assessment is very important for safety. Although various researches on radioactive waste transportation risk assessment is being actively conducted, research on domestic radioactive waste maritime transportation is insufficient. In this study, MARINRAD and KM-RAD were used to review on the radioactive waste transportation risk assessment. The result of reviewing shows that MARINRAD used SNF as transporting radioactive materials and ‘SAND87-7067 (1987)’ as nuclide database, whereas KMRAD used LILW and ‘IAEA Technical Report Series-422 (2004)’. To complement these limitations, we present an modernized integrated database by updating data and covering the radioactive materials from LILW to SNF. These results are expected to contribute to the development of RRACs for domestic radioactive waste maritime transportation.

Among the nuclear power plant facility improvement projects, out of a total 10 replacement reactor vessel closure head (RRVCH), five have been replaced, starting with Gori Unit 1, and five, including Hanul Unit 1, Hanbit Units 5 and 6, and Hanul Units 3 and 4 will be replaced in the future. This paper presents the method of treating Latch Housing among radioactive waste generated during the replacement of Hanul Unit 2 (February 2023). Latch Housing controls the control rod by receiving magnetic force from the CRDM’s Coil Stack. Located in the Old Reactor Vessel Head (ORVH) Hot Spot, the range of measured radiation dose rate was 0.3 to 0.8 mSv h-1 (up to 4.5 mSv h-1). The amount of radioactive waste generated was 35.8 Baler-Drum (based on 200L), and the order of treatment was to cut into the Omega Seal of the CRDM, the CRDM and Latch Housing Transfer, the boundary of the CRDM and Latch Housing, the Rod Travel Housing, the Motor Housing and the Latch Assembly, and then transfer and Drumming. In the United States, out of 93 operating reactors, 31 reactor vessel heads have been replaced and 19 reactor vessel heads are scheduled to be replaced. In Korea, 25 reactors are in operation, and two reactors have been permanently shut down. Among them, the nine old reactors for more than 30 years (as of September 2021) are expected to achieve ALARA and reduce radwaste management costs through the management method applied to replace the reactor vessel head.

There is a large amount of radioactive waste in waste storage in the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute. Some of the radioactive waste was generated during the dismantling process due to Korea Research Reactor 1&2 and it accounts for 20% of the total waste. Radioactive waste must be reduced by appropriate disposal methods to secure storage space and to reduce disposal costs. Research Reactor wastes include wastes that are below the acceptable criteria for selfdisposal and non-contaminated wastes, so they can be treated as wastes subject to self-disposal through contamination analysis and reclassification. In order to deregulation radioactive waste, it is necessary to meet the self-disposal standards stipulated in the Domestic Nuclear Act and the treatment standards of the Waste Management Act. The main factors of deregulation are surface contaminant, radionuclide activity and dose assessment. To confirm the contamination of waste, surface contaminant and gamma nuclide analysis were performed. After homogenizing the waste sample, it was placed in 1 L Mariinelli beaker. When collecting waste samples, 1 kg per 200 kg of waste was collected. The concentrations of the major radionuclides Co-60, Cs-134, Cs-137, Eu-152, and Eu-154 were analyzed using HPGe detector. To evaluate radiation dose, various computational programs were used. A dose assessment was performed with the analyzed nuclide concentration. The concentrations of representative nuclides satisfied the deregulation acceptance criteria and the results of the dose assessment corresponding to self-disposal method was also satisfied. Based on this results, KAERI submitted the report on waste self-disposal plan to obtain approval. After final approval, Research Reactor waste is to be incinerated and incineration ash is to be buried in the designated place. Some metallic waste has been recycled. In this study, the suitability of deregulation for self-disposal was confirmed through the evaluation of the surface contaminant analysis, radionuclide concentration analysis and dose assessment.

The development of existing radioactive waste (RI waste) management technologies has been limited to processing techniques for volume reduction. However, this approach has limitations as it does not address issues that compromise the safety of RI waste management, such as the leakage of radioactive liquid, radiation exposure, fire hazards, and off-gas generation. RI waste comes in various forms of radioactive contamination levels, and the sources of waste generation are not fixed, making it challenging to apply conventional decommissioning and disposal techniques from nuclear power plants. This necessitates the development of new disposal facilities suitable for domestic use. Various methods have been considered for the solidification of RI waste, including cement solidification, paraffin solidification, and polymer solidification. Among these, the polymer solidification method is currently regarded as the most suitable material for RI waste immobilization, aiming to overcome the limitations of cement and paraffin solidification methods. Therefore, in this study, a conceptual design for a solidification system using polymer solidification was developed. Taking into account industrial applicability and process costs, a solidification system using epoxy resin was designed. The developed solidification system consists of a pre-treatment system (fine crush), solidification system, cladding system, and packing system. Each process is automated to enhance safety by minimizing user exposure to radioactive waste. The cladding system was designed to minimize defects in the solidified material. Based on the proposed conceptual design in this paper, we plan to proceed with the specific design phase and manufacture performance testing equipment based on the basic design.

Radioactive iodine-129, a byproduct of nuclear fission in nuclear power plants, presents significant environmental and health risks due to its high solubility in water and volatility. Iodine-129, with its half-life of 1.57×1017 years, necessitates safe management and disposal. Therefore, safely capturing and managing I-129 during spent nuclear fuel reprocessing is of paramount importance. To address these challenges, various glass waste forms containing silver iodide have been developed, such as borosilicate, silver phosphate, silver vanadate, and silver tellurite glasses. These glasses effectively immobilize iodine, but the high cost of silver raises affordability concerns. This study introduces CuI·Cu2O·TeO2 glass waste forms for iodine immobilization, a novel approach. The cost-effectiveness of copper, in contrast to silver, makes it an attractive alternative. The CuI·Cu2O·TeO2 glass waste forms were synthesized with varying CuI content (x) in (1-x)(0.3Cu2O·0.7TeO2) glass matrices. Xray diffraction (XRD) confirmed amorphous structures, and X-ray fluorescence (XRF) quantified composition. X-ray photoelectron spectroscopy (XPS) and Raman spectroscopy provided insights into structural properties. Durability assessments using a 7-day product consistency test (PCT-A) and inductively coupled plasma-mass spectrometry (ICP-MS) revealed compliance with U.S. glass regulations, making CuI·Cu2O·TeO2 glasses a promising choice for iodine immobilization in radioactive waste.

Among nuclear power plants in the Republic of Korea, Kori Unit 1 and Wolsong Unit 1 have been permanently shut down, and Kori Unit 1 is preparing to be decommissioned. According to the decommissioning plan (DP) of Kori Unit 1, a radioactive waste processing complex will be built on the Kori site to reduce radioactive waste generated during decommissioning actively, and various types of decommissioning waste are expected to be treated in the complex. It is judged that matters related to the safety assessment of the complex are not included in the DP since the equipment and treatment processes have not been determined. IAEA GSR Part 5 states that radioactive waste processing complex shall be operated according to national regulations and the conditions imposed by the regulatory body. However, it has been confirmed that separate regulatory requirements for the complex have not yet been established in Korea. It is expected that the Regulation on Technical Standards for Nuclear Facilities, etc. will be applied mutatis mutandis. Liquid and gaseous radioactive materials can be expected to be released into the sea or atmosphere during the operation of the complex. Accordingly, it should be proved that standards such as discharge limits of radioactive effluents are met. Although the assessment of radioactive effluent discharged from nuclear power plants to the environment is systematically conducted, it has been confirmed that the safety assessment framework for radioactive effluents discharged from the complex has not yet been established. Currently, the SAFRAN Tool is based on SADRWMS (Safety Assessment Driving Radioactive Waste Management Solutions), an IAEA safety assessment methodology for pre-disposal management, which uses Pathway Dose Factors (PDFs) derived from generic environmental models. Therefore, in order to conduct a more detailed safety assessment of the complex on a specific site, site characteristic data should be reflected. Although safety assessment using the SAFRAN Tool was conducted at the Thailand Institute of Nuclear Technology (TINT) facility, detailed data were not provided, and PDFs reflecting site characteristic data were not applied. Also, no other studies that considered many types of waste and provided detailed data on the safety assessment were not confirmed. Therefore, this study developed K-CRAFT (Kyung Hee – Comprehensive RAdioactive waste treatment Facility safety assessment Tool), this tool that can derive PDFs by reflecting site characteristic data based on the SADRWMS methodology and conducted preliminary safety assessment for the complex which will be built in Kori site by this tool.

Properties of bentonite, mainly used as buffer and/or backfill materials, will evolve with time due to thermo-hydro-mechanical-chemical (THMC) processes, which could deteriorate the long-term integrity of the engineered barrier system. In particular, degradation of the backfill in the evolution processes makes it impossible to sufficiently perform the safety functions assigned to prevent groundwater infiltration and retard radionuclide transport. To phenomenologically understand the performance degradation to be caused by evolution, it is essential to conduct the demonstration test for backfill material under the deep geological disposal environment. Accordingly, in this paper, we suggest types of tests and items to be measured for identifying the performance evolution of backfill for the Deep Geological Repository (DGR) in Korea, based on the review results on the performance assessment methodology conducted for the operating license application in Finland. Some of insights derived from reviewing the Finnish case are as follows: 1) The THMC evolution characteristics of backfill material are mainly originated from hydro-mechanical and/or hydrochemical processes driven by the groundwater behavior. 2) These evolutions could occur immediately upon installation of backfill materials and vary depending on characteristics of backfill and groundwater. 3) Through the demonstration experiments with various scales, the hydro-mechanical evolution (e.g. advection and mechanical erosion) of the backfill due to changes in hydraulic behavior could be identified. 4) The hydro-chemical evolution (e.g. alteration and microbial activity) could be identified by analyzing the fully-saturated backfill after completing the experiment. Given the findings, it is judged that the following studies should be first conducted for the candidate backfill materials of the domestic DGR. a) Lab-scale experiment: Measurement for dry density and swelling pressure due to saturation of various backfill materials, time required to reach full saturation, and change in hydraulic conductivity with injection pressure. b) Pilot-scale experiment: Measurement for the mass loss due to erosion; Investigation on the fracture (piping channel) forming and resealing in the saturation process; Identification of the hydro-mechanical evolution with the test scale. c) Post-experiment dismantling analysis for saturated backfill: Measurement of dry density, and contents of organic and harmful substances; Investigation of water content distribution and homogenization of density differences; Identification of the hydro-chemical evolution with groundwater conditions. The results of this study could be directly used to establishing the experimental plan for verifying performance of backfill materials of DGR in Korea, provided that the domestic data such as facility design and site characteristics (including information on groundwater) are acquired.

The effect of various physicochemical processes, such as seawater intrusion, on the performance of the engineered barrier should be closely analyzed to precisely assess the safety of high-level radioactive waste repository. In order to evaluate the impact of such processes on the performance of the engineered barrier, a thermal-hydrological-chemical model was developed by using COMSOL Multiphysics and PHREEQC. The coupling of two software was achieved through the application of a sequential non-iterative approach. Model verification was executed through a comparative analysis between the outcomes derived from the developed model and those obtained in prior investigations. Two data were in a good agreement, demonstrating the model is capable of simulating aqueous speciation, adsorption, precipitation, and dissolution. Using the developed model, the geochemical evolution of bentonite buffer under a general condition was simulated as a base case. The model domain consists of 0.5 m of bentonite and 49.5 m of granite. The uraninite (UO2) was assigned at the canister-bentonite interface as the potential source of uranium. Assuming the lifetime of canister as 1,000 years, the porewater mixing without uranium leakage was simulated for 1,000 years. After then, the uranium leakage through the dissolution of uraninite was initiated and simulated for additional 1,000 years. In the base case model, where the porewater mixing between the bentonite and granite was the only considered process, the gypsum tended to dissolve throughout the bentonite, while it precipitated in the vicinity of bentonite-granite boundary. However, the precipitation and dissolution of gypsum only showed a limited effect on the performance of the bentonite. Due to the low solubility of uraninite in the reduced environment, only infinitesimal amounts of uranium dissolved and transported through the bentonite. Additional cases considering various environmental processes, such as seawater or cement porewater intrusion, will be further investigated.

Understanding the long-term geochemical evolution of engineered barrier system is crucial for conducting safety assessment in high-level radioactive waste disposal repository. One critical scenario to consider is the intrusion of seawater into the engineered barrier system, which may occur due to global sea level rise. Seawater is characterized by its high ionic strength and abundant dissolved cations, including Na, K, and Mg. When seawater infiltrates an engineered barrier, such dissolved cations displace interlayer cations within the montmorillonite and affect to precipitation/ dissolution of accessory minerals in bentonite buffer. These geochemical reactions change the porewater chemistry of bentonite buffer and influence the reactive transport of radionuclides when it leaked from the canister. In this study, the adaptive process-based total system performance assessment framework (APro), developed by the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, was utilized to simulate the geochemical evolution of engineered barrier system resulting from seawater intrusion. Here, the APro simulated the geochemical evolution in bentonite porewater and mineral composition by considering various geochemical reactions such as mineral precipitation/dissolution, temperature, redox processes, cation exchange, and surface complexation mechanisms. The simulation results showed that the seawater intrusion led to the dissolution of gypsum and partial precipitation of calcite, dolomite, and siderite within the engineered barrier system. Additionally, the composition of interlayer cation in montmorillonite was changed, with an increase in Na, K, and Mg and a decrease in Ca, because the concentrations of Na, K, and Mg in seawater were 2-10 times higher than those in the initial bentonite porewater. Further studies will evaluate the geochemical sorption and transport of leaked uranium-238 and iodine-129 by applying TDB-based sorption model.