Detectors utilized for nuclear material safeguards have been using scintillation detectors which are inexpensive and highly portable, and electrically cooled germanium detectors which are expensive but have excellent energy resolution. However, recently IAEA, the only international inspectorate of nuclear material safeguards for the globe, have replaced the existing scintillation detector and electrically cooled germanium detector with a CdZnTe detector owing to the improved performance of room-temperature semiconductors significantly. In this paper, we will examine the spectrum features of the CdZnTe detector such as spectrum shape, energy resolution, and efficiency in the energy region of interest, which are the important characteristics for measuring Uranium enrichment. For this purpose, it would be conducted to compare its spectrum features using CdZnTe, NaI, HPGe detectors. The main energies of interest include 185.7 keV and 1,001 keV, which are the decay energies of uranium 235 and uranium 238. The results of this study will provide a better understanding of the spectral features of various detectors used in uranium enrichment analysis, and are expected to be used as basic data for future related software development.

Nuclear safety, security, and safeguards (nuclear 3S) are essential components for establishing robust nuclear environments. Nuclear safety is to protect public and environments from radioactive contamination, which can be caused in accidents. Nuclear security is to protect nuclear facilities from terrorism or sabotage, which related to physical a ttacks or insider threats. And nuclear safeguards is to protect nuclear materials from extortion by a state with a purpose of weaponizing activities. When a new nuclear facility is introduced, it is possible to save abundant amount of resources by considering nuclear 3S in an early stage (design phases). Initially, the international atomic energy agency (IAEA) recommended safeguards-by-design (SBD) approach. The concept of SBD gradually expands to nuclear 3S-by-design (3SBD). Though there are differences in purpose and target subject, each nuclear ‘S’ is closely related with others. When introducing a certain technology or equipment in order to enhance one ‘S’, another ‘S’ also get affected. The effect can be synergies or conflicts. For instance, confidential information in nuclear security is required for a safeguards activity. On the contrary, inspection equipment for safeguards can be used for security. Pyroprocessing is a technology for managing used nuclear fuels. As pyroprocessing is a backend fuel cycle technology, a sensitive nuclear technology, safeguards has taken a large portion of nuclear 3S research in an effort to achieve international credibility and nuclear transparency. As mentioned, there are both synergies and conflicts in integrating nuclear 3S. In this study, we investigate potential challenges in applying nuclear 3S integration to pyroprocessing by addressing synergies and conflicts. This approach will suggest required supplementary methods to build the reliable pyroprocessing environment.

Uranium extraction from seawater has been a topic of considerable interest over the past decades. However, Commercial facilities for uranium extraction from seawater have not yet been constructed due to its lack of economic feasibility. With the increasing demand for sustainable energy sources, there is a growing interest in eco-friendly uranium extraction methods. Despite this, the safeguards associated with these extraction techniques remain relatively under-researched, necessitating comprehensive studies that address both the economic feasibility and safeguards approach. The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Central Research Institute is poised to elucidate the economic value of uranium extraction from seawater and embark on research to extract Yellow Cake from seawater on a laboratory scale. Given these advancements, it becomes imperative to consider the approach to safeguards. In this study, a comprehensive review was conducted to understand the relevant regulations that encompass both international obligations in partnership with the IAEA and domestic guidelines, specifically the Nuclear Safety Act. Emphasis was placed on a detailed examination of the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol, focusing on deriving the necessary regulatory timings, subjects, and methodologies for effective reporting and verification. We reviewed the safeguards guidelines and the IAEA policy to confirm the international non-proliferation obligations. The study also reviewed the impact of the State-Level Approach promoted by the IAEA and its implications on state-specific factors and evaluations of state technological advancement. Additionally, the regulatory aspects of extracted uranium as an internationally regulated material under the Nuclear Safety Act were critically assessed. In conclusion, this study explains the international and domestic regulatory considerations for uranium extraction from seawater. Ultimately, this study will provide valuable understanding for policymakers, researchers, and practitioners involved in uranium extraction from seawater. Additionally, we expect that this study will contribute to establishing the safeguards approach and regulatory framework for the commercialization of uranium extraction from seawater in the ROK.

A seal is one of the primary means of safeguards along with surveillance. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses various types of seals to verify the diversion of nuclear materials and is developing new seals according to the development of technology. Independent of the IAEA, ROK uses national safeguards seals for state-level regulation. A national safeguards inspector binds the nuclear material storage by combining a seal with a metal wire and checks the serial number of the RFID chip inserted in the seal with a reader. The Wolsong spent fuel dry storage facility has 14 modules, each with 24 seals, and thus a maximum of 336 national seals will be installed. Although dependent on the sealing method, it takes about 5 minutes to verify one seal. As such, a considerable workforce is required for verification, and both the IAEA and the ROK are currently conducting random inspections. In addition, there are cases where verification is impossible because old seals are damaged due to harsh environments and long exchange periods. Therefore, in this study, we analyzed cases in areas where sealing technology has been developed to improve the problems of the existing national safeguards seals. And we proposed a method for improving national seals by finding requirements of seals considering spent fuel dry storage facility characteristics. In international logistics, sealing is essential in product transport verification, terrorism prevention, and tariff imposition. Accordingly, the field of container sealing has been extensively developed, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has regulated the mechanical requirements of the seal as ISO 17712 and the electronic requirements as ISO 18185. Mechanical seals include metal and plastic seals and metal seals include bolt seals, ball seals, and cable seals. In addition, there are various electronic seals, such as radio frequency identification (RFID), near field communication (NFC), infrared (IR). Recently, there has been a trend to use active seals that have a built-in battery and can implement various additional functions. Among the various seals, the main requirements for selecting seals suitable for dry storage facilities are as follows. First, use of a sealing tube longer than 10m should be possible. Second, it should have corrosion resistance so that it can be used for more than five years in the coastal area. Third, it must be a passive seal without a power supply. Fourth, it should not be overly costly. Finally, the seal verification time should be short. As a seal that satisfies these requirements, an electronic seal with application of the passive RFID method to the mechanical form of a metal cable seal is suitable. Since it is not an active seal, it is difficult to determine the time of breakage. Therefore, designing the seal such that the RFID is also damaged when the metal seal is broken will be helpful for verification. In this study, the requirements for national safeguards seals in dry storage facilities were defined, and measures to improve the existing national seals were studied. Field applicability will be evaluated through future sealing device design and demonstration tests.

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are getting attention as an alternative to fossil fuel power stations due to versatile application and carbon dioxide reduction. Although various types of advanced reactors are being developed, water-cooled SMR will be first deployed on a commercial scale. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regulatory bodies are trying to identify safeguards issues of water-cooled SMRs as the first priority. IAEA begins to develop a safeguards plan by asking for the facility’s specification in a given format, a design information questionnaire (DIQ). Then, IAEA periodically performs safeguards activities such as design information verification (DIV) and physical inventory verification (PIV). In this sense, we utilize research and power reactor DIQ for water-cooled SMRs (NuScale, SMART, i-SMR and KLT-40S). Most of the questions are answered with open information. For undisclosed answers, pressurized water reactor (PWR) features are described. Safeguards issues in water-cooled SMR originate from core modularization. As the nuclear material flows are diversified, the number of safeguards measure will be increased while staff are reduced in SMRs. Instrumentation for safeguards should be developed to reduce worker’s fatigue level. Intensive arrangement of fuel assemblies may also need unique devices to secure their visibility or detectability. A transparent floor with a surveillance system or advanced Cherenkov viewing device may be adopted to enhance containment and surveillance. Meanwhile, some questions could be more elaborate regarding safeguards. First, question #38 cannot confirm the time of occurrence of weapon-grade plutonium for reactor operation. Second, the answers in questions #46 and #49 are primitive to identify a place to generate an undeclared fissile material. Therefore, the current DIQ should be revised to get a detailed burnup report and spatial distribution of neutron flux.

SMR, which has recently been in the spotlight, has several advantages. However, it poses additional challenges in the areas of new design, digitalization, security, safety and safeguards. Among them, security refers to measures to protect nuclear materials and facilities from unauthorized access, theft, or destruction. Safeguards refer to measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The relationship between security and safeguards is complex and constantly evolving. In general, security measures are designed to protect nuclear materials and facilities from physical attack, while safeguards are designed to track and monitor the movement of nuclear materials and prevent them from being used to create nuclear weapons. In some areas security and safeguards work in complementary ways, and in other areas they conflict. But ultimately, finding a balance is what is effective and efficient. In conclusion, although the security and safeguards of SMRs have different key objectives, they are closely related and must be implemented comprehensively and consistently to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities, the public, and the environment. In this paper, we investigate how the safety and safeguards of SMR are currently being researched and analyze what difficulties there are when assuming that they are operated as a single interface.

Safeguards systems and measures are determined through diversion scenario analysis based on the facility design information submitted to the IAEA when a new nuclear facility is introduced. While the concept of safeguards-by-design (SBD), which considers the safeguards from the design phase for a facility operator to minimize unplanned changes or disruption to facility operations as well as for the IAEA to increase the efficiency and effectiveness in safeguards implementation, has been emphasized for more than a decade, there is no practical tool or guidance on how to apply it. In this study, we develop a diversion path analysis tool and introduce how to apply SBD using it. A diversion path analysis tool was developed based on the elements that constitute diversion and the algorithm generated based on the initial information of facility and nuclear material flow. The results of utilizing the analysis tool depending on a different level of facility information and the safeguards set-ups were compared through examples. Taking a typical light water reactor as an example, the test analyzed the automatic generation of dedicated routes, configuration of safeguards measures, and diversion path analysis. Through this, the application and limitations of the analysis tool are discussed, and ideas for utilization according to the SBD concept and necessary regulatory guidance are proposed. The results of this study are expected to be directly utilized to domestic nuclear control during the regulation process for a construction of new nuclear power systems, and furthermore, to enhance national credibility in the engagement with the IAEA for implementation of safeguards.

The KINAC resident inspectors are responsible for conducting on-site regulatory and intergovernmental support tasks related to safeguards, physical protection, and cybersecurity in each NSSC regional office. In nuclear material accounting and control, resident inspectors primarily perform tasks such as national inspections and technical support for IAEA inspections. However, with the increasing cases of non-compliance with the advance notification procedure by operators, there is a growing need for improvement in the role of resident inspectors in on-site regulation. In response to this situation, the safeguards division in KINAC has analyzed and improved the on-site check procedures of resident inspectors at LWR facilities. The existing procedure outlines the process where resident inspectors receive the advance notification documents submitted by operators and utilize them as a reference for conducting weekly checks during the overhaul period when IAEA surveillance cameras are installed. Additionally, according to the attached forms specified in the procedure, resident inspectors are required to submit the check results report to the director of the safeguards division in KINAC every week and to the NSSC every month. The inspection items include checking the execution and changes of advance notification, verifying unnotified matters, discussing other issues, assessing the integrity of things such as the operational status of IAEA surveillance equipment, and so on. On April 13-14, 2023, the Safeguards division organized a two-day resident inspector’s work-sharing workshop to discuss improvements in the on-site check procedures of resident inspectors at LWR facilities. During the workshop, a comparison and analysis were conducted between the existing procedures and actual on-site activities. Unnecessary tasks such as advance notification document reception and monthly reporting were eliminated, and the focus was shifted towards emphasizing essential tasks. The opinions of resident inspectors were taken into account to derive directions for improvement. The existing procedure was applicable only during Overhaul periods for resident inspectors. It has been improved by removing this limitation, allowing its use during routine times. Furthermore, the procedure has been enhanced by clarifying its purpose, scope, users, and definitions of terms and specifying responsibilities and authorities. Unnecessary terminology has been eliminated. Remarkably, the definition of advance notification has been detailed, and the reporting of check results has been simplified through weekly task reporting. The Safeguards division in KINAC has strived to enhance the efficiency and simplification of on-site regulatory activities for resident inspectors at LWR facilities by improving their on-site check procedures. These improvement activities are expected to aid resident inspectors in effectively performing a wide range of tasks, including safeguards, physical protection, cybersecurity, and government support. In the future, it will be possible to continue refining the on-site check procedures by sharing the results of using the procedure in meetings and gathering various opinions from resident inspectors.

Among the public notices of the NSSC, five notices related to safeguards, including “Education of Nuclear Control, International Regulatory Materials, Preparation of Regulation of NMAC (Nuclear Material Accounting and Control), the National Inspection of NMAC, and Reporting of International Regulatory Materials” The regulations on the National Inspection of NMAC have remained the same since some revisions were made on December 26, 2017, raising the need to revise the public notice due to changes in the domestic and international safeguards regulatory environment. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the public notice of the National Inspection of NMAC and proposes the revision direction. The regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC comprises sections such as Purpose and Definition, Types - Scope - Frequency of the National Inspection, Notification of the National Inspection’s plan, and Management of Violation. Appendices include the contents of the violation table, explanations regarding types of violations, and various forms related to the National Inspection, which are attached separately. IAEA mentioned that ROK was selected as a pilot country for the Improved SLA (State-Level Approach) project starting in November 2020. IAEA explained that a quantitative and standardized methodology was adopted and developed for this purpose. As a result, the Unannounced Inspection at LWR facilities will transition to the Random Interim Inspection. Additionally, the Physical Inventory Verification in CANDU facilities will increase to once a year per reactor. This status will change the frequency and intensity of inspection at domestic nuclear facilities. Furthermore, domestically, there is an ongoing trend of continuous growth and diversification of nuclear facilities. In light of the changing domestic and international safeguards environment, it is necessary to set a direction for revising the regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC that was partially amended in 2017 to align with the current status. Firstly, due to the increased burden on operators resulting from the increased number of IAEA inspections following the application of Improved SLA, there is a need to streamline the National Inspection of NMAC frequency to enhance overall regulatory efficiency. Furthermore, the definition section should also be revised to include matters related to the regulation to reflect the current reality accurately. Considering the operation and name changes of new domestic nuclear facilities, there may be a need to add or modify computer input codes. While pursuing the revision of regulations regarding the National Inspection of NMAC, an analysis of the need for revision of other regulations related to safeguards should also be conducted, and directions should be set. Through this process, improving the regulatory framework that forms the basis of safeguards can help prevent confusion among operators and promote regulatory efficiency. We can better cope with these changes by proactively adapting to the rapidly changing domestic and international nuclear environment.

Nuclear fusion energy is considered as a future energy source due to its higher power density and no emission of greenhouse gas. Therefore, various researches on nuclear fusion is being conducted. One of the key materials for the nuclear fusion research is tritium because the D-T reaction is the main reaction in the nuclear fusion system. However, that tritium can also be used for non-peaceful purposes such as hydrogen bombs. Therefore, it is necessary to establish the safeguards system for tritium. In that regards, this study analyzed the possibility of applying safeguards to tritium. To achieve this objective, the tritium production capacity through the light water reactor was analyzed. Tritium Production Burnable Absorber Rod (TPBAR) was modeled through the MCNP code, and tritium production was analyzed. The TPBAR is composed of a cylindrical tube with a double coating of aluminum and zirconium, filled with a sintered lithium aluminate (LiAlO2) pellet to prevent the release of tritium. Tritium is produced by the reaction of Li-6 in the TPBAR with neutrons, and it is extracted and stored at the Tritium Extraction Facility (TEF). As a result, the tritium production increased as the burnup and Li-6 mass increased. In addition, when the tritium produced in this way was transferred to TEF and extracted through the process, the application of safeguards measures was analyzed. To this end, various safeguards measures were devised, such as setting an Material Balance Area (MBA) for TEF and analyzing Material Balance Period (MBP). As there is no designated Significant Quantity (SQ) for tritium, cases were classified based on the type and form of nuclear weapons to estimate the Sigma MUF (Material Unaccounted For) of the TEF. Finally, the comprehensive application of safeguards to tritium was discussed. This research is expected to contribute to the establishment of IAEA safeguards standards related to tritium by applying the findings to actual facilities.

Milling facilities, which belong to the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, are essential steps for utilizing uranium in nuclear power generation. These milling facilities currently provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the location and annual production capacity of the facility through the Additional Protocol (AP, INFCIRC/540) and grant IAEA inspectors on-site sampling authority to apply safeguards to the facility. However, since milling facilities process a large amount of nuclear material and the product uranium ore concentrate (UOC) is bulk material, the absence of accounting for the facility could pose a potential risk of nuclear proliferation. Therefore, this study proposes technical approach that can be utilized for safeguards in milling facilities. Since the half-life of uranium isotopes is much longer than that of its daughter, they reach the secular equilibrium condition. However, after milling process, the fresh tailing showed the break of that secular equilibrium. As time goes on, they newly reach another secular equilibrium condition. Based on this observation, this study discussed the feasibility of the ratio method in safeguards purpose. The scenario applied in this study was 1% of uranium mill tailing. It was observed that the U-238/Th-234 and U- 238/Pa-234m ratios in fresh milling tails varied as a function of time after discharging, particularly during the first one year. This change can be worked as a significant signature in terms of safeguards. In conclusion, the ratio method in mill tails could be applicable for safeguards of nuclear milling facility.

According to the ROK-IAEA Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA), the ROK submits inventory change reports (ICRs), physical inventory lists (PILs), and material balance reports (MBRs). Suppose inventory changes occur in each material balance area (MBA). In that case, the facility operators prepare ICRs monthly, conduct physical inventory taking (PIT) every 12 to 18 months, and submit PILs and MBRs to KINAC. KINAC reviews ICR presented by the facility operators, submits it to the IAEA, and reports it to the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC). Various methods have been prepared and implemented to minimize errors in reviewing the accounting reports submitted by the facility operators. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the mistakes in the accounting reports that occurred over the past two years and proposed methods to improve them. The basis for carrying out the accounting reports is stipulated mainly in the CSA and the Nuclear Safety Act. First, Article 63 of the CSA describes the rationale for submitting the accounting reports, and the details are described in detail in the subsidiary arrangement. Article 98 of the Nuclear Safety Act stipulates information related to accounting reports, and details are described in the regulations on reporting internationally regulated materials, etc., of the NSSC Notice No. 2017-84. Among the accounting reports submitted in 2021, a total of 36 errors were confirmed. There were ten errors related to inventory changes, followed by six errors in the material balance period (MBP) in the header information. There were four cases of spacing, weight mismatch, and overdue errors, and the rest were related to grammar errors. There were a total of 30 errors in the accounting reports identified in 2022. MBP errors of header information, which occurred the second most in 2021, was the highest with nine, followed by six inventory change errors and five weight mismatch and overdue errors, respectively. Compared to 2021, the total number of errors has decreased by about six, which is interpreted as the result of outreach activities through accounting reporting workshops and nuclear control education conducted by KINAC. Accounting reporting is the most critical part of the Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) system. Efforts to check errors in accounting reports and improve report quality through outreach activities could be confirmed by the statistics of the two years analyzed earlier. In the future, if the reporting program used by the facility operators is improved to minimize errors and manage the accounting reporting system through continuous maintenance work, the quality of the accounting reports will be upgraded to the next level.

KINAC began dispatching the resident inspector in 2012 to strengthen on-site Wolsong nuclear power plants (NPPs) regulations. The dispatched resident inspector is a member of the regional office of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and is in charge of technical support, on-site regulation of safeguards, and physical protection for the Wolsong regional office of NSSC. As the number of nuclear facilities in the ROK increased, the resident inspectors began to be dispatched to other regional offices. The resident inspectors were assigned to Hanul in November 2015, Kori in March 2017, Hanbit in March 2015, Saeul in March 2022, and Wolsong in March 2023. Accordingly, this paper intends to reflect on the increasing role of resident inspectors and predict on-site regulatory work in the field of nuclear control. The role of the resident inspectors is described in detail in the internal regulations of KINAC. Among the tasks in the common field is technical support at regional offices for the most critical areas of nuclear control implementation, and on-site verification of the matters requested by the director of each implementation division shall be carried out. Tasks in the field of safeguards include an on-site check of facility regulation review, implementation of national inspections, technical support for IAEA inspections, and information management. Among them, technical support work for Unannounced inspections should be the top priority. These days, in particular, the importance of reviewing the results of checking advanced information and containment and surveillance equipment by facility operators is emerging. Among the tasks performed by the resident inspectors, more than 80% of the functions related to physical protection account for. The resident inspectors check the status of the physical protection system by weekly/monthly/quarter, implement physical protection regulation review and inspection, conduct exercise evaluation, and perform technical support for special assessments. Recently, regulatory activities related to radioactive terrorism and the emergence of illegal drones have been strengthened. In the field of cybersecurity, where its role has recently been increasing, the resident inspectors are performing basic field regulation tasks. Similar to the area of physical protection, the resident inspectors check the cybersecurity system for weekly, monthly, and quarterly readiness, and on-site inspections of cybersecurity review and inspection technical support, exercise evaluation, and other requests are mainly performed. The role of the resident inspectors is expected to expand further in the future due to the increase in terrorist risks at home and abroad and changes in the regulatory environment. However, there is a limit to performing an increasing number of tasks, with the human resources of the resident inspectors limited to one to two for each site. If the resident inspectors are dispatched for each field of safety measures, physical protection, and cybersecurity, they can perform their duties more efficiently, but problems may arise in the operation of our personnel. Therefore, the proper and precise allocation of work while maintaining the current system is an essential part. The roles and prospects of the resident inspectors analyzed in this paper can be used to deploy the headquarters and field regulation personnel and set the direction of work in the future.

To evaluate the safeguards system or performance in a facility, it is crucial to analyze the diversion path for nuclear materials. However, diversion paths can range from the extremely simplified to the complicated depending on the level of knowledge and the specific person conducting the analysis. This study developed the diversion path analysis tools using an event tree and fault tree method to generating diversion paths systematically. The essential components of the diversion path were reviewed, and a logical flow was developed for systematically creating the diversion path. An algorithm was created based on the facility design components and logical flow, as well as the initial information of the nuclear materials and material flows. The event tree and fault tree analysis tools were used to test the path generation algorithm. The usage and limitations of these two logic methods are discussed, and ideas to incorporate the logic algorithm into practical program tools are suggested. The tests were analyzed on a typical light water reactor as an example, including automatic generation of dedicated pathways, configuration of safeguards measures, and analyzing paths with strategies for avoiding safeguard systems. The results led to the development of a draft pathway analyzer program that can be applied to general nuclear systems. The results of this study will be used to develop a program module that can systematically generate diversion paths using the event tree and fault tree method. It can help to guide and provide practical tools for implementing SBD.

The characterization of nuclear materials is crucial for global nuclear safeguards efforts, as these materials can potentially be used for illicit purposes. In this study, we evaluated the applicability and performance of the In-Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) equipment for the characterization and quantification of uranium, including uranium pellets and radioactive wastes. Our methodology involved using ISOCS to measure samples with different enrichments and total amounts of uranium, and to analyze the results in order to evaluate the ISOCS’s effectiveness in accurately characterizing the various uranium samples. To this end, we compared the ISOCS results with those of the Multi-Group Analysis for Uranium (MGAU) system, which is currently used in the field of international safeguards. The results of this study showed that the ISOCS was sensitive enough to analyze small amounts of uranium pellet, with %differences ranging from -0.7% to 19%. However, when analyzing shielded nuclear materials like in concrete waste, the uncertainty was relatively high, with %differences ranging from 11% to 67%. On the other hand, the MGAU system was unable to analyze uranium for the same spectrum, indicating the superiority of the ISOCS in terms of usability. The ISOCS instrument was also found to be effective in analyzing uranium in various types of samples without the need of standard sources. Overall, the findings of this study have important implications for the development of more effective safeguards strategies for the characterization of nuclear materials. The ISOCS instrument could be a reliable tool for analyzing nuclear materials, contributing to global safeguards efforts to reduce the risk of nuclear proliferation.

In addition to Korea, various countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and China are designing small module-type reactors. In particular, a small modular reactor is the power of 300 MWe or less, in which the main equipment constituting the nuclear reactor is integrated into a single container. Depending on the purpose, small modular reactors are being developed to help daily life such as power, heating supply, and seawater desalination, or for power supply such as icebreakers, nuclear submarines, and spacecraft propellants. Small modular reactors are classified according to form. It can be classified into light-water reactors/ pressurized light-water reactors based on technology proven in commercial reactors, and non-lightwater reactors based on fuel and coolant type such as Sodium-cooled Fast Reactor, High temperature gas-cooled reactor, Very high temperature reactor and Moltenn salt reactor. SMRs, which are designed for various purposes, have the biggest difference from commercial nuclear reactors. The size of SMRs is as small as 1/5 of that of the commercial reactors. Several modules may be installed to generate the same power as commercial reactors. Because of the individually operation for each module, load follow is possible. Also, The reactor can be cooled by natural convection because the size is small enough. It is manufactured as a module, the construction period can be reduced. Depending on the characteristics of these SMRs, application for safeguards is considered. There are many things to consider in terms of safeguards. Therefore, it is IAEA inspection or other approaches for SMRs installed and remotely operated in isolated areas, data integrity for remote monitoring equipment to prevent the diversion of nuclear materials, verification method and material accountancy and control for new fuel types and reactors. Since SMR is more compact and technical intensive, safeguards should be considered at the design stage so that safeguards can be efficiently and effectively implemented, which is called the Safeguards by design (SBD) in the IAEA. In this paper, according to the characteristics of SMR, we will analyze the advantages/disadvantages from the point of view of safeguards and explain what should be considered.

Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control (KINAC) Safeguards division and Export control division operate regulation management system each other according to their work scope and characteristics. Korea Safeguards Information System (KSIS) of Safeguards division handles information for nuclear material accounting and control. Especially, accounting and declaration reports submitted to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) are important information in this system. And Nuclear Import and Export Control System (NEPS) of Export control division deals with import and export information of nuclear materials and nuclear weapon trigger list items. Establishing and operating the integrated database as sharing information between KSIS and NEPS derive merits as follows. First, the full cycle of nuclear material transfer records can be managed by collecting information on the nuclear materials from import to export or disposal. In addition, regulatory body can verify inconsistency between transfer records and account records in date, location, element, mass etc. Especially, small quantity nuclear materials are major loop hole in nuclear material accountancy system. The accumulated material transfer data will give an evidence to catch loss nuclear material. Second, sharing the information on nuclear fuel cycle related research and development activities in both divisions can utilize the information to outreach on facility subject to nuclear technology transfer for Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and additional protocol declaration for Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. Third, regulatory body is easily able to manage entire import and IAEA report procedure for items subject to the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA). In present, KINAC regulation on NCA is divided to Export control and Safeguards. Export control division conducts classification imported items subject to NCA and acquires prior consent or notifies to other country. And Safeguards division report inventory list for each NCA country to the ROK government once a year. Imported NCA inventory list will be generated automatically by merging database. Then, it can be easily verified without any additional process by both divisions.

IAEA has the right and obligation to verify the states’ commitments for safeguards under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocols. There are IAEA inspections such as PIV, DIV, RII, SNRI under these agreements. As part of the implementation of this mission, the IAEA inspectors perform the verification for the state’s accounting reports related the nuclear materials such as ICR, PIL, MBR. To do well this verification, the inspectors often use non-destructive analysis, which aims to measure attributes of the items during the inspections. This kind of an activity aims to detect the missing nuclear items or wrong things in the facility using nuclear materials. In general, NDA techniques use the neutron counting and gamma ray spectrometry. Besides, IAEA also performs several verification measures as follows. - C/S (Containment and Surveillance techniques) is to maintain the continuity of the knowledge by giving assurance that its containment remains unimpaired. - Unattended and remote monitoring is to transmit the data from onsite of the facility through the on-line system. - E/S (Environmental Sampling) is to detect the minute traces of nuclear materials by smearing some points in the on-site of the facility. Nowadays, the above mentioned techniques are important ways to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approaches reducing IAEA actual costs. To strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards approaches, IAEA always develops and adopts the techniques and equipment for safeguards. Especially, IAEA seems to be concerned with the improvement and development of the non-destructive techniques and equipment in the fields of nuclear fuel cycle. IAEA develops the new techniques and equipment through the help of MSSP (Member States Support Programs). The IAEA defines the needs of safeguards and coordinates the support programs. After the IAEA tests and evaluates the techniques/equipment developed, IAEA decides whether to use the developed techniques and equipment during the inspection by the procedure of the IAEA quality assurance. This paper aims at studying the current changes of the IAEA equipment such as DCVD, NGSS and HCES.

The purpose of the present research is to verify the design characteristics of the SMART facility for the application of the IAEA’s safeguards-by-design (SBD) concept to small modular reactor (SMR) and to establish a foundation for SBD to be faithfully implemented as early as possible from the design stage. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is planning to facilitate the verification activities of inspectors by developing a safeguards approach to the reactor as early as possible and preparing a safeguards technical report (STR) before commercial operation of SMR begins. To this end, the IAEA is developing various approaches to the application of SBD to SMR with countries such as Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, China, the United States, and Canada through the Member State Support Program (MSSP). In order to review the unique design information of SMART facilities, the only deployable SMR in Korea, and to establish safeguards from the early design stages of SMART, it is necessary to carry out the task through cooperation with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) and Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC). IAEA agreed with the KINAC and KAERI to the direction of the project and to prepare both the Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) and the Safeguards Technical Report (STR) for SMART facilities sequentially. The DIQ is a collection of questions to understand the characteristics of the reactor facilities that must be considered in applying safeguards. The STR is a document referenced by IAEA inspectors when verifying safeguards. Those draft versions were prepared and submitted to the IAEA. After review opinions were received, additional revision was conducted. In 2022, the IAEA holds the consultancy meeting on SBD for SMART. The purpose of the meeting is to review the draft DIQ and STR prepared by designers and discuss the future work plan of the task with designer and the task point of contact in order to safeguards can be considered at the early stage of the design. The results will be beneficial to the efficient safeguards verification activities of IAEA inspectors in the future.

The nuclide management technology for separating high-heat generating/high-mobility/long-lived nuclides from high-level wastes based on the chemical reactions is under development. In order to secure the reliability of nuclear non-proliferation and to implement the effective safeguards, it is necessary to consider the safeguards from the conceptual design phase of the novel technologies. However, there was no experience and research on safeguards for the chemical reaction based nuclide management technology. In order to development the available monitoring techniques for the safeguards of nuclide management technology, the possible diversion scenarios were developed and the material flows of major nuclear materials were analyzed according to the various diversion strategies for each unit process in this study. The diversion strategies in this study is limited to the diversion of nuclear materials according to the change of operational parameters (temperature, chemical reagents, pressures, etc). The nuclear material distribution behaviors under the abnormal conditions were analyzed and compared with normal conditions using the HSC Chemistry. The results will be used to determine the proper signals and feasible techniques to monitor the abnormal operations.