In Korea, 483,102 assemblies of spent fuel have been discharged and stored in sites, as of 2019. However, total capacity for site storage is 529,748 assemblies, and more than 90% is already saturated. Wolsong site, the most saturated site, started to construct more dry storage to extend the capacity in 2020. Spent fuel and high-level waste (HLW) is a big concern in Korean nuclear industry. Then, master plan for management of spent fuel is once announced by Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy (MOTIE) in 2016 and reviewed by civil committee in 2019. The core contents of the plan are establishing schedule for construction of HLW management facility in one area, and construction of temporary dry storage in each site, if unavoidable. For HLW management facility, there are three following schedules: siting of Underground Research Laboratory (URL) and Interim Storage by 2020, operation of facilities initiated by 2030, and operation of final disposal facility initiated by 2050. Final repository will be designed as deep geological repository. The concept of deep geological disposal is that spent nuclear fuel is placed in disposal containers that can withstand corrosion and pressure in long-term, permanently isolated from the human sphere of life, and dumped in deep geological media, such as crystalline rocks and clay layer, at a depth of 300 to 1,000 meters underground. The safety assessment of waste disposal sites focuses on determining whether the disposal sites meet the safety requirements of national regulatory authority. This safety assessment evaluates the potential radiation dose of radionuclides from the disposal site to humans or the environment. In this case, the calculation is performed assuming that all engineering barriers of the disposal site have collapsed in a long-term period. Then radionuclides are released from the waste, and migrated in groundwater. The dose resulting from the release and migration of radionuclides on the concentration of nuclides in groundwater. In general, metallic nuclides may exist in water in various ionic states, but some form colloids. This colloid allows more nuclides to exist in water than in solubility. Therefore, more doses may occur than we know generally predict. To determine the impact of colloids, we performed the safety assessment of the Yucca Mountain repository as an example.

In general, after the decommissioning of nuclear facilities, buildings on the site can be demolished or reused. The NSSC (Nuclear Safety and Security Commission) Notice No. 2021-11 suggests that when reusing the building on the decommissioning site, a safety assessment should be performed to confirm the effect of residual radioactivity. However, in Korea, there are currently no decommissioning experiences of nuclear power plants, and the experiences of building reuse safety assessment are also insufficient. Therefore, in this study, we analyzed the foreign cases of building reuse safety assessment after decommissioning of nuclear facilities. In this study, we investigated the Yankee Rowe nuclear power plant, Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, and Hematite fuel cycle facility. For each case, the source term, exposure scenario, exposure pathway, input parameter, and building DCGLs were analyzed. In the case of source term, each facility selected 9~26 radionuclides according to the characteristics of facilities. In the case of exposure scenario, building occupancy scenario which individuals occupy in reusing buildings was selected for all cases. Additionally, Rancho Seco also selected building renovation scenario for maintenance of building. All facilities selected 5 exposure pathways, 1) external exposure directly from a source, 2) external exposure by air submersion, 3) external exposure by deposited on the floor and wall, 4) internal exposure by inhalation, and 5) internal exposure by inadvertent ingestion. For the assessment, we used RESRAD-BUILD code for deriving building DCGLs. Input parameters are classified into building parameter, receptor parameter, and source parameter. Building parameter includes compartment height and area, receptor parameter includes indoor occupancy fraction, ingestion rate, and inhalation rate, and source parameter includes source thickness and density. The input parameters were differently selected according to the characteristics of each nuclear facility. Finally, they derived building DCGLs based on the selected source term, exposure scenario, exposure pathway, and input parameters. As a result, it was found that the maximum DCGL was 1.40×108 dpm/100 cm2, 1.30×107 dpm/100 cm2, and 1.41×109 dpm/100 cm2 for Yankee Rowe nuclear power plant, Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, and Hematite fuel cycle facility, respectively. In this study, we investigated the case of building reuse safety assessment after decommissioning of the Yankee Rowe nuclear power Plant, Rancho Seco nuclear power plant, and Hematite fuel cycle facility. Source terms, exposure scenarios, exposure pathways, input parameters, and building DCGLs were analyzed, and they were found to be different depending on the characteristics of the building. This study is expected to be used in the future building reuse safety assessment after decommissioning of domestic nuclear power plants. This work was

A radioactive waste disposal facility needs to be developed in a way to protect present and future generations and its environment. A safety assessment is implemented for normal and abnormal scenarios and human intrusion scenarios as a part of a safety case in developing a disposal facility for the radioactive waste. The human intrusion scenarios include a well scenario which takes into account various potential exposure groups (PEGs) who use a groundwater well contaminated with radionuclides released from the disposal facility. It is observed that a pumping rate has a negative correlation with the biosphere dose conversion factor (BDCF) in the well scenario. C-14 is shown to be a key radionuclide in the well scenario, and a special model based on the carbon cycle is applied for C-14. For Tc-99, an adsorption coefficient should be adjusted to be suitable for the site. The safety assessment for the radioactive waste disposal facility is successfully carried out for the well scenario. However, it is observed that site-specific models needs to be developed and sitespecific input data need to be collected in order to avoid unnecessary conservatism.

Glass fiber (GF) insulation is a non-combustible material, light, easy to transport/store, and has excellent thermal insulation performance, so it has been widely used in the piping of nuclear power plants. However, if the GF insulation is exposed to a high-temperature environment for a long period of time, there is a possibility that it may be crushed even with a small impact due to deterioration phenomenon and take the form of small particles. In fact, GF dust was generated in some of the insulation waste generated during the maintenance process. In the previous study, the disposal safety assessment of GF waste was performed under the abnormal condition of the disposal facility to calculate the radiation exposure dose of the public residing/ residents nearby facilities, and then the disposal safety of GF waste was verified by confirming that the exposure dose was less than the limit. However, the revised guidelines for safety assessment require the addition of exposure dose assessment of workers. Therefore, in this study, accident scenarios at disposal facilities were derived and the exposure dose to the workers during the accident was evaluated. The evaluation was carried out in the following order: (1) selection of accident scenario, (2) calculation of exposure dose, (3) comparison of evaluation results with dose limits, and confirmation of satisfaction. The representative accident scenarios with the highest risk among the facility accident were selected as; (a) the fire in the treatment facility, (b) the fire in the storage facility, and (c) fire after a collision of transport vehicles. The internal and external exposure doses of the worker by radioactive plume were calculated at 10m away from the accident point. In evaluation, the dose conversion factors ICRP-72 and FGR12 were used. As a result of the calculation, the exposure dose to workers was derived as about 0.08 mSv, 0.20 mSv, and 0.10 mSv, due to fire accidents (vehicle collision, storage facilities, treatment facilities). These were 0.2%, 0.4%, and 0.2% of the limit, and the radiation risk to workers was evaluated to be very low. The results of this study will be used as basic data to prove the safety of the disposal of GF waste. The sensitivity analysis will be performed by changing the radiation source and emission rate in the future.

진해만 해역은 태풍 내습 시에 우리나라 남동권 해역의 주요 태풍 피항지로 이용되고 있다. 하지만 태풍 내습 시 진해만 내 선박이 폭주하고 주묘가 다수 발생하는 등 해양사고 발생 가능성이 존재한다. 본 논문은 태풍 내습 시 진해만 피항지에 대해 안전 확보 및 효율적으로 관리할 수 있는 방안을 해당 해역의 VTS 관제사로부터 도출하고, 이를 선박 운항자에게 AHP 기법을 통하여 상대적 중요 도를 도출하여 관리자와 이용자 의견이 반영된 안전대책을 제시하였다. AHP 설문조사를 위한 안전 대책 요소를 선정하기 위하여 진해만 내 태풍 내습 시 VTS 관제사의 대응 조치 평가 내용에 대해 분석하였다. 선정된 안전대책 요소를 기반으로 설문조사를 실시한 결과, 선정 된 요소에 대해 선박 운항자는 선박의 안전을 효율적 관리보다 약 2배 이상 중요하게 생각하며, 종합적으로 피항선 관리, 정박구역 관리, 피항정보 관리, 규정 및 지침 마련, 시스템 장비 개선, 교육 및 홍보·알림 활동 순으로 중요하게 고려함을 파악하였다. 본 논문에서 식별된 방안 및 상대적 중요도를 통해서 진해만 태풍 피항지를 안전하고 효율적으로 관리하는 기반이 될 수 있을 것으로 사료된다.

Probiotic strain is known to regulate the immune system by colonizing in the intestine and interact with intestinal cell receptors of lymphoid tissue. In this study, safety of Streptococcus thermophilus KCTC14471BP and silk fibroin coating effects was evaluated with respect to mucin binding abilities and immune system modulation. S. thermophilus KCTC14471BP was coated with silk fibroin by adding 1% water-soluble calcium and 0.1% silk fibroin. S. thermophilus KCTC14471BP showed the high activities of leucine arylamidase and β-galactosidase. Regarding the antibiotic resistance tests, S. thermophilus KCTC14471BP was susceptible to ampicillin, vancomycin, gentamicin, kanamycin, streptomycin, erythromycin, clindamycin, tetracycline, and chloramphenicol. S. thermophilus KCTC14471BP coated with silk fibroin showed the improved mucin binding ability from 16.1% to 71.3% and was confirmed to have no cytotoxicity against RAW 264.7 macrophage. S. thermophilus KCTC14471BP coated with silk fibroin showed dose-dependently significant increases in pro-inflammatory cytokines IL-1β, IL-6, and TNF-α. These results suggested that S. thermophilus KCTC14471BP can be expected as a promising probiotic bacteria for applications to food industries such as fermentation or functional foods.

To obtain confidence in the safety of disposal facilities for radioactive waste, it is essential to quantitatively evaluate the performance of the waste disposal facilities by using safety assessment models. Thus, safety assessment models require uncertainty management as a key part of the confidencebuilding process. In application to the numerical modelling, the global sensitivity analysis is widely employed for dealing with parametric and conceptual uncertainties. In particular, the parametric uncertainty can be effectively reduced by minimizing the uncertainty of critical parameters in the safety assessment model. In this paper, the numerical model of each step disposal facility (Silo, Near surface, and Trench type) at Wolsong Low and Immediate Level Waste (LILW) Disposal Center is designed by using a two-dimensional finite element code (COMSOL Multiphysics). In order to determine the critical parameters for non-adsorbed nuclides such as H-3, C-14, Tc-99, we introduced the variance-based sensitivity analysis methodology of the global sensitivity analysis. In the case of Silo type, the density of waste is highly sensitive to the total leakage quantity of all nuclides. Additionally, the initial nuclide concentration of H-3 was identified as another important parameter of H-3. On the other hands, the mass transport coefficient showed a high contribution in C-14 and Tc-99. In other types of disposal facilities, the leaking properties of H-3 are significantly affected by the amount of infiltration water. However, C-14 and Tc-99 were found to be more sensitive to the density of waste.

In a recent preliminary inspection for disposal, the glass fiber waste (GFW), used as a pipe insulation, was judged as “pending evaluation” because some dust was found in drum opening tests. Therefore, additional inspection is required to ensure that the package corresponds with the acceptance criteria of the particulates. The dust was generated presumably due to GFW being used in a high-temperature environment for a long time, thus being easily degraded and crushed. For this reason, safety issues that may occur in the process of handling, transportation, and disposal are emerging. Therefore, in this study, a preliminary safety assessment of GFW disposal was performed, the exposure dose to the general public was derived, and compared with the dose limit. The evaluation was carried out in the following order: (1) evaluation of GFW radiation source term, (2) selection of accident scenario, (3) calculation of exposure dose, (4) comparison of evaluation results with dose limits, and confirmation of satisfaction. The average radioactivity of the GFW to be disposed of was used as the source term, and the main nuclides were identified as H-3, Fe-55, Co-60, Ni-63, and Pu-241. In general, the types of accidents that can occur at disposal facilities can be classified into falls, fires, collisions during transportation, off-site accidents, and nuclear criticality, and the accident scenarios are selected by analyzing and reviewing the probability of each accident. In this study, the accident analysis and scenarios presented in the safety assessment of the KORAD were reviewed, and the fire in the treatment facility, the fire in the storage facility, and the collision of the transport vehicle were selected as the evaluation scenarios. When an accident occurs, the radioactive material inside the container leaks out and diffuses into the atmosphere. In this evaluation, the internal and external exposure of the general public due to radioactive plume at the site boundary was evaluated and the dose conversion factors from ICRP-72 and FGR 12 were used. Based on the evaluation, general public was exposed to 0.004 mSv, 0.013 mSv, and 0.045 mSv, respectively, due to a fire at a treatment facility, at a storage facility, and in a transport vehicle. Most of the dose is due to internal exposure by Pu-241 nuclide, because the proportion of it in the waste is high, and when inhaled, the internal dose is high by emitting beta rays. It was confirmed that the result of dose was 0.4%, 1.3% and 4.5% of the annual dose limit, sufficiently satisfying the dose limit and safety.

Recently, concern regarding disposal of cellulosic material is growing as cellulose is known to produce complexing agent, isosaccharinic acid (ISA), upon degradation. ISA could enhance mobility of some radionuclides, thus increasing the amount of radionuclide released into the environment. Thus, evaluation on the possible impact of the cellulose degradation would be an important aspect in safety evaluation. In this paper, safety assessments conducted in Sweden and UK are studied, and the factors required to be considered for appropriate safety assessment of cellulose is analyzed. SKB (Sweden) conducted safety assessment of cellulose degradation as a part of long-term safety assessment of SFR. SKB determined that ISA would impact sorption of trivalent and tetravalent radionuclides (Eu, Am, Th, Np, Pa, Pu, U, Tc, Zr and Nb) at concentration higher than 10−4–10−3 M, and impact sorption of divalent radionuclides (Ni, Co, Fe, Be and Pb) at concentration higher than 10−2 M. Then, SKB conservatively set the upper limit of ISA concentration to be 10−4 M and conducted cellulose degradation evaluation on each waste package type, considering the expected disposal environment of SFR. Based on the calculated results, some of the waste packages showed concentration of ISA to be higher than 10−4 M, so SKB conservatively developed waste acceptance criteria to prevent ISA being produced to an extent of affecting the safety of the repository. SKB conducted safety assessment only for the repositories with pH above 12.5 and excluded 1BLA from the safety assessment as the expected pH of 1BLA is around 12, which is insufficient for cellulose to degrade. However, SKB set disposal limit for 1BLA as well, to minimize potential impact in future. Serco (UK) conducted safety assessment of cellulose degradation for the conceptual repository, which is a concrete vault with cementitious backfill. Serco estimated that the pH of repository would maintain around 12.4. Serco conservatively assumed that the pH would be sufficient for cellulose degradation to occur partially, and suggested application of appropriate degradation ratio for safety assessment of cellulose degradation. To conduct appropriate safety assessment of cellulose degradation, an appropriate ISA concentration limit based on radionuclide inventory list, and an appropriate cellulose degradation ratio based on the pH of disposal environment should be determined. As for guidance, below pH 12.5, cellulose degradation is not expected, and between pH 12.5–13, partial cellulose degradation is expected. In future, this study could be used as fundamental data to evaluate safety of the repository.

An objective of a safety assessment for geological disposal is to evaluate the radiological impact by radionuclides release from radioactive wastes. Computational estimation of all radionuclides transport in the disposal system, however, is not neccessary because some radionuclides has negligible effect on radiological doses. For this reason, prioritization of radionuclides list is preceded before the safety assessment. The Korea Atomic Energy Research Institue (KAERI) has assessed the long-term safety of a disposal system for spent nculear fuels. Currently, thirty eight radionuclides and twenty three elements are considered in the safety assessment activity of the KAERI. Nevertheless, a screening process for radionulides selection has not been articulated yet. In this study, we reviewed radionuclides selection process in forign countries to re-establish screening criteria for the KAERI’s radionuclides list. Screeing models of the Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB), the Deparment of Eenrgy (US DOE), and the Japan Nuclear Cycle Development Istitute (JNC) were compared. We found that each country developed different screening model depending on scenarios of radionuclides release. Nonetheless, there were common properties that determines the importance of radionuclides. These properties for radionuclides include halflife, radiotoxicity (or specific activity), and mobility in underground medium. Based on the review results, we proposed radionuclides selection process to prioritize the importance of radionucldies in the KAERI safety assessment.

The timescale for the post-closure safety assessment of a deep geological repository ranges from ten thousand to a million year. In such a long period of time, the biosphere inevitably undergoes changes. Therefore, the long-term evolution of a biosphere is recognized as an important issue in the post-closure safety assessment of a deep geological repository for spent fuels. In this study, we reviewed the approaches to address the long-term evolution of a biosphere. The major drivers of longterm evolution of a biosphere are the climate change and the resulting landscape development. They can affect the hydrogeological and hydrogeochemical characteristics of a biosphere, and then the radionuclide migration through the biosphere followed by the exposure doses for the critical groups. In addition, human activities and the social developments can affect the climate change resulting in the long-term evolution of a biosphere. To make a biosphere assessment, the long-term evolution scenarios for the biosphere should be formulated considering these climate change, landscape development, and human activities. In addition, features, events, and processes (FEPs) that affect the long-term evolution of a biosphere should be used. According to the Safety Case reports of Finland, the major long-term evolution scenario drivers of a biosphere are local sea-level change due to climate change and land use related to crop type, irrigation procedures, livestock, forest management, construction of a well, and demographics. The climate change causing the local sea-level change can be simulated using various earth system models such as CLIMBER-2, MPI/UW, and UVic and an icesheet model such as SICOPOLIS. The review results of this study and FEPs related to the climate change, the landscape development, and human activities will be used to formulate long-term evolution scenarios for the safety assessment of a deep geological repository for spent fuels.

In South Korea, the master plan for high-level radioactive waste management, announced in 2016, suggested the construction and operation of intermediate storage facilities on a permanent disposal site and specified the adoption of dry storage in consideration of the ease of operation and expansion. As of 2021, the government is again reviewing its overarching policy on the back-end fuel cycles, including intermediate storage and permanent disposal. In the case of dry storage facilities, safety evaluation is being conducted using a combination of deterministic and probabilistic approaches, similar to that of nuclear power plants. The two methods are complementary, of which Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) has the advantage of being able to identify key scenarios affecting safety, but its use in storage facilities has not been highlighted so far. However, depending on the spent fuel management phases such as loading, transportation, and storage, it may be not enough to capture effective and efficient safety evaluation only deterministically, and probabilistic methods may contribute to the evaluation of long-term operation or external events such as an earthquake. There have already been cases where PSA has been performed on a part of the nuclear fuel cycle through previous studies. This paper created the safety assessment model based on open sources such as the released EPRI reports, by targeting arbitrary intermediate storage facilities. The model considered the scenarios for loading, transportation, and storage, with human error respectively. It will be able to be modified and improved to fit domestic and specific intermediate storage facilities in the future.

The decommissioning of a nuclear power plant generates large amounts of radioactive waste, which is of several types. Radioactive concrete powder is classified as low-level waste, which can be disposed of in a landfill. However, its safe disposal in a landfill requires that it be immobilized by solidification using cement. Herein, a safety assessment on the disposal of solidified radioactive concrete powder waste in a conceptual landfill site is performed using RESRAD. Furthermore, sensitivity analyses of certain selected input parameters are conducted to investigate their impact on exposure doses. The exposure doses are estimated, and the relative impact of each pathway on them during the disposal of this waste is assessed. The results of this study can be used to obtain information for designing a landfill site for the safe disposal of low-level radioactive waste generated from the decommissioning of a nuclear power plant.