논문 상세보기
pp.80-87
The proliferation of the Internet and communication technologies and applications, besides the conventional retailers, has led to a new form of distribution channel, namely home sopping through the telephone, TV, catalog or the Internet. The conventional and new distribution channels have different transaction costs perceived by the consumers in the following perspectives: the accessibility to the product information, the traffic cost and the opportunity cost for the time to visit the store, the possibility of ‘touch and feel’ to test the quality of the product, the delivery time and the concern for the security for the personal information. Difference in the transaction costs between the distribution channels results in the different selling prices even for the same product. Moreover, distribution channels with different selling prices necessarily result in different business surpluses. In this paper, we study the multilateral bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through multiple distribution channels with different transaction costs. We first derive the Nash equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The numerical analyses for the Nash equilibrium solutions show that the optimal bargaining strategy of the manufacturer heavily depends not only on the degree of competition between the distribution channels but on the difference of the business surpluses of the distribution channels. First, it is shown that there can be four types of locally optimal bargaining strategies if we assume the market powers of the manufacturer over the distribution channels can be different. It is also shown that, among the four local optimal bargaining strategies, simultaneous bargaining with the distribution channels is the most preferred bargaining strategy for the manufacturer.
2. 분석모형
2.1 시장모형
2.2 협상모형
3. 협상 균형해
3.1 동시 협상
3.2 순차 협상 : 공급자 잉여가 작은 유통채널 1과먼저 협상하는 경우
3.3 순차 협상 : 공급자 잉여가 큰 유통채널 2와먼저 협상하는 경우
4. 최적 협상전략
5. 제조업체의 시장지배력이 미치는 영향
6. 결 론
References
