This paper argues that neither the classical semantic treatment of the propositional attitudes (Hinttikka 1969) nor the previous semantic analyses of the hearsay or reprotative evidentials fit into the semantics of the English hearsay evidentials. This is mainly because not only is the notion of the compatibility that is employed in the semantics of propositional attitudes inappropriate for that of hearsay evidentiality, but they can be interpreted to convey an assertion, in which the speaker commits to the truth of the embedded proposition, and a proffering, in which the speaker does not. In order to account for the different interpretations, this paper develops an analysis of the English hearsay evidential, which is along the lines of that proposed by Krazter (1991), by positing different ordering sources for each of the interpretations. The introduction of the different ordering sources into the semantics of the hearsay evidentials plays the role of indicating whether or not the speaker commits to the truth of the proposition expressed by the embedded clause.