The debate on whether antidumping law should be integrated into competition law is a relatively new but very significant one. Building on prior scholarship, this paper attempts to contribute to the debate by reexamining the fundamental justification of antidumping law. An exploration into the economic theories of dumping and the evolution of antidumping law indicates that the current antidumping system neither serves the broad goal of preventing ‘unfair trade’ nor functions as a ‘quasi-safeguard’ mechanism. The only rationale for antidumping law is that it deals with international predatory dumping. Modern competition rules target the same predatory conduct but they are more meticulous than antidumping law and are less susceptible to protectionist abuse. In light of this, the paper advocates the substitution of antidumping law by competition law. To achieve this, the paper suggests a gradual approach. Substitution could first be achieved in bilateral and regional trade areas before being implemented at the level of WTO.

Is Dumping Still Harmful? New Thinking on Antidumping in the Global Free Trade
  Ⅰ. Introduction 
  Ⅱ. The Debate on Competition andAntidumping in WTO
  Ⅲ. Seeking the Truth: Why Is Dumping Harmful?
  Ⅳ. Competition and Antidumping: What is Next on the Agenda?
  Ⅴ. Conclusion

• Ying Bi(law at Zhejiang University in Hangzhou, China)