Prior literature expects a lower marginal cash value for weaker governance firms. We test this empirical hypothesis by using the sample of publicly traded Korean firms from 2005 to 2013. To measure the quality of governance structures, we employ the corporate governance scores provided by Korean Corporate Governance Services. The empirical model of Faulkender and Wang (2006) is adopted to estimate the marginal value of cash. Our empirical analysis shows a higher marginal value of cash for the good governance firms in the examination of the total governance score. This finding is consistent to the agency view of cash policy predicting a larger marginal value of cash for the firms with higher governance scores. However, this positive relationship is not robust for a subset of detailed governance scores; a lower marginal cash value is observed for the firms with better qualities of board structure, auditing, dividend policies. Moreover, our empirical analysis verifies a quite low level of marginal cash value for Korean firms, which supports the existence of severe agency conflicts in Korean corporations. Our results verify the significant role of agency conflicts between a manager and shareholders in the determination of marginal cash values in the Korean firms.

1. Introduction
 2. Data and Methodology
 3. Empirical Model
  3.1. Estimation
  3.2. Data Description
 4. Main Results
  4.1. Summary Statistics
  4.2. Estimation Results: Total Governance Score
  4.3. Sub-category Analysis
 5. Discussion and Implication for Managerial Action
 6. Conclusions
 References

• Sang-Su Kim(Assistant Professor, Department of Economics, Korea National Open University)
• Jeong Hwan Lee(Assistant Professor, College of Economics and Finance, Hanyang University) Corresponding Author