Network externalities are essentially dynamic in that the value consumers feel about a product is affected by the size of the existing customer base that uses that product. However, existing studies on network externalities analyzed the effects of network externalities in a static way, not dynamic. In this study, unlike previous studies, the impact of network externalities on price competition in a vertically differentiated market is dynamically analyzed. To this end, a two-period duopoly game model was used to reflect the dynamic aspects of network externalities. Based on the game model, the Nash equilibria for price, sales volume, and revenue were derived and numerically analyzed. The results can be summarized as follows. First, if high-end product has strong market power, the high-end product vendor takes almost all benefits of the network externality. Second, when high-end product has strong market power, the low-end product will take over most of the initial sales volume increase. Third, when market power of high-end product is not strong, it can be seen that the effects of network externalities on the high and low-end products are generally proportional to the difference in quality. Lastly, if there exists a strong network externality, it is shown that the presence of low-end product can be more profitable for high-end product vendor. In other words, high-end product vendor has incentive to disclose some technologies for the market entrance of low-end product, even if it has exclusive rights to the technologies. In that case, however, it is shown that the difference in quality should be maintained significantly.

1. 서 론
 2. 2기간 게임모형
 3. 균형해
 4. 균형해 분석
  4.1 가격분석
  4.2 판매량(수요)분석
  4.3 수익분석
  4.4 기술공개 전략 분석
 5. 결 론
 References

• Hyung-Rae Cho(Dept. of Industrial Systems Engineering/ERI, Gyeongsang National University) | 조형래
• Minho Rhee(Dept. of Industrial Systems Engineering/ERI, Gyeongsang National University) | 이민호 Corresponding Author