The resolution process of PPI scandal was led and driven by the UK’s FCA- financial regulator based on powers stipulated in Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. FCA made rules requiring financial institutions concerned to assess mis-selling claims of PPI holders and pay redress to them if mis-selling was found. The opt-out class action, in contrast, is not likely to handle finance mis-selling collectively because commonality requirement is not easily satisfied. The PPI resolution process overcame this problem by assigning the investigation and assessment of individual aspects of the disputes to the financial institutions concerned. This approach is equitable in that financial institutions which are liable to the scandal bears the time and pecuniary cost instead of relying on public resources of courts as in the litigation. The regulator-led resolution can be helpful in designing collective resolution system of finance mis-selling which is characterized as mass victims with small damages.

1. Introduction
2. Collective Dispute Resolution Process on PPI Scandal
    A. Powers of FCA
    B. The First Stage of PPI Resolution Process
    C. Court Ruling on British Bankers Association Case
    D. Court Ruling on Plevin Case and the Second Stage of PPI ResolutionProcess
    E. Salient Characteristics of the PPI Resolution Process
3. Possibility of Using Opt-Out Class Action as a Meansto Settle PPI Scandals
    A. A Strict Criterion on Commonality under the US Rule
    B. A Lenient Criterion on Commonality under Canadian andAustralian Rules
4. Applicability of Regulatory Intervention in OtherJurisdictions
5. Conclusion

• Young Yoon Park(Yulchon LLC. B.A./M.A. in Economics (Seoul N.U.))