The obligation to exchange views within the UNCLOS did not play its systematic role. The disputing parties are uncertain about the scope, mode, and standard of the obligation to exchange views, with adjudicators demonstrating their subjective tendencies. The low threshold of the provisional jurisdiction of maritime disputes, the emergence of jurisdiction over hybrid disputes, and the congenital deficiency of the dispute settlement mechanism of the UNCLOS address the obligation to exchange views which has not fully reflected the initial legislative intention and aim of the UNCLOS. The South China Sea Arbitration initiated by the Philippines demonstrates that the obligation to exchange views may be perfected and improved, to some extent, by enhancing the parties’ obligation of disclosure and the tribunal’s obligation of review. Where relevant unilateral or bilateral agreements exist regulating such type of disputes before the disputing parties initiate the compulsory arbitration procedure of the UNCLOS, the obligation to exchange views should be conducted with sufficient regard for the existence of such agreement.

1. Introduction
2. Why does the UNCLOS Enhance the Obligation toExchange Views?
3. The Application of the Exchange of Views and ItsDefects
    A. Means of Exchanging Views
    B. Standard for Full Performance of Obligation to Exchange Viewsand Its Defect
    C. Why Cannot Disputants Fully Exchange Their Views?
4. Explication on the Obligation to Exchange Views fromthe Perspective of Treaty Interpretation: A Review onthe South China Sea Arbitration
    A. Systematic Interpretation of the Obligation to Exchange Views
    B. Evolving Interpretation of the Obligation to Exchange Views
5. Preliminary System Design for Improving the Obligationto Exchange Views under the UNCLOS
    A. How to Enhance the Disputants’ Obligation of Disclosure?
    B. The Adjudicating Agency’s Obligation of Due Diligence
6. Conclusion

• Deyi Ma(East China University of Political Science and Law (ECUPL))