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Analysis and Prospect of the Implementation of Random Inspection in ROK

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한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 (Abstracts of Proceedings of the Korean Radioactive Wasts Society)
한국방사성폐기물학회 (Korean Radioactive Waste Society)
초록

Since 2015, the IAEA has been implementing inspections by changing the paradigm from a nuclear facility level perspective to state level approach in order to enhance effectiveness/efficiency, and random inspections have become a major means of paradigm conversion. From this point of view, Safeguards Division analyzed the implementation status of random inspection conducted in ROK over the past five years by type, facility, and year, and predict the future implementation direction. A total of 106 random inspections have been implemented in ROK over the past five years (2017- 2021). When classified by random inspection type, 20 Short Notice Random Inspections (SNRI), 9 Short Notice Inspections (SNI), 34 Unannounced Inspections (UI), and 43 Random Interim Inspections (RII) were performed, of which RII accounted for the largest proportion with about 40.6%. IAEA conducts customized random inspections according to the characteristics of each nuclear facility. In the past five years, 34 cases of LWR, 20 cases of Bulk Handling Facility, 22 cases of CANDU, 30 cases of random inspections were implemented at R&D facilities, with the largest proportion of LWR. In connection with this, as a result of analyzing the current status of random inspections by year, 19 cases in 2017, 21 cases in 2018, 20 cases in 2019, 19 cases in 2020, and 27 cases in 2021 were implemented, especially in 2021, an increase of about 40% compared to the previous year. In conclusion, the IAEA is increasing the proportion of random inspections every year in line with the updated SLA, and this stance is expected to be maintained in the future. This can be seen as proof that randomized tests are showing an increasing trend even in the COVID-19 pandemic situation that has occurred since December 2019. and, In the case of LWR, it is expected that the form of random inspection may vary depending on the direction of IAEA’s SLA improvement. Through these analyses, it is expected that the direction of future safeguards policy can be established.

저자
  • Chul Heo(Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC)) Corresponding author
  • Donghyuk Lim(Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC))