Timely detection of nuclear activity is important for the management and supervision of nuclear materials, and inspections on North Korea as a method of safety measures for this monitoring system seem to be a not far future in the rapidly changing North Korea relationship. However, a simpler and more reliable monitoring device is required since the inspection period is limited and the possibility of revisiting is unclear. The seal is a simple but easily used security device for monitoring forgery and falsification in the IAEA. IAEA presents matters related to 1) project engineering, 2) remote monitoring, and 3) seal development as the three major tasks of the Department of safeguards and Division of Technical Support. The importance of development, modernization, and application of new seal devices is emphasized, and advanced sealing and identification system development is in progress at many research institutes such as JRC, ISCN, and JAEA. Since the existing seal devices used by IAEA and KINAC can only be confirmed through on-site inspections for damage, it is difficult to respond immediately in the event of similar situations such as theft of nuclear materials and loss of continuity of knowledge. Unlike facilities that comply with the requirements for safety measures, such as domestic nuclear facilities, in the case of facilities subject to denuclearization, it is very likely that various hazardous environments will exist that make it difficult to apply safety measures. Hence, a real-time seal device has developed through prior research due to the high possibility of situations in which Continuity of Knowledge (COK) is not maintained, such as damage, malfunction, and power loss of sealing and monitoring equipment. Through previous studies, the real-time seal device was loaded with server-based operating software and improved its performance by utilizing feedback from real users (KINAC) after use. In this study, the effectiveness of the previously developed sealing system was verified through performance evaluation, and the authentication of the equipment was secured through environmental tests.

• Jung-ki Shin(Neosiskorea) Corresponding author
• Jiyeon Namgung(Neosiskorea)
• Seongjae Jeong(Neosiskorea)