The DPRK had been upgrading its nuclear weapons capabilities from the past to the sixth nuclear test in 2017, and Kim Jong-un has been in power since the death of Kim Jong-il in 2011, striving to upgrade and diversify four nuclear tests and firing means. In 2022, in particular, DPRK launched more than 40 ballistic and cruise missiles and provoked them in various ways, such as developing solid rocket engines, flying fighter jets, and invading drones. In addition, reprocessing facility activities have been observed again since 2021 at the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex. Operational activities such as continuous activities of the 5MWe Yongbyon reactor and the additional construction of new buildings are observed. DPRK’s recent activities could result in nuclear weapons in all except conventional weapons provocations. DPRK has researched and developed nuclear weapons since the 1950s. It has been preparing to operate nuclear weapons, operating nuclear power, and modernizing nuclear power simultaneously. Given the number of nuclear weapons using DPRK’s nuclear materials and various means of missiles, an offensive transition is expected to enable restrictive deterrence strategies that can be used first use and on assured retaliation. In addition, based on the nuclear strategy, which is interpreted as Vipin Narang’s nuclear doctrine and nuclear posture, DPRK is also capable of assured retaliation and asymmetric escalation posture. In particular, considering the continuous activities of the Yongbyon Nuclear Research Complex, which has recently diversified the investment vehicle, and the delegation of nuclear weapon use, it is expected to move differently from the previous one based on the changed nuclear strategy. However, there are clear limitations to interpreting it as a completely assured retaliation and asymmetric expansion nuclear strategy. First, there is a lack of development of atmospheric reentry vehicles that can avoid ICBM interception for assured retaliation capabilities against the United States. Second, there are limitations in the open capacity of nuclear weapons due to the absence of SSBN capabilities. However, delegation to operations at strategy force suggests the possibility of asymmetric expansion strategies. The previous analysis of DPRK’s nuclear strategy and limitations is valid in that the U.S. nuclear umbrella guarantees the Republic of Korea in a strong alliance between the Republic of Korea and the U.S. If the Republic of Korea lacks a nuclear umbrella due to the weakening of the alliance or limits U.S. intervention by having more than dozens of ICBMs, it is considered that DPRK can use a definite confirmation retaliation and asymmetric escalation nuclear strategy. As a response to this, it is the first way to verify and strengthen the validity of the three-axis system (Kill Chain, KAMD, KMPR), second to strengthen the Korea-U.S. alliance, and finally to appeal to the international community and increase consensus. In particular, it is possible to form a consensus of sanctions and condemnation DPRK by expressing concerns about nuclear dominoes caused by nuclear proliferation and arms competition to the international community.

• Dongjin Kim(Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC))