Unapproved parts are increasingly used in military aircraft due to part obsolescence, urgent operational needs, and domestic localization efforts. While such parts may offer short-term flexibility, they pose serious challenges to the integrity of airworthiness certification systems, which rely on part conformity, traceability, and validated performance data. This study identifies and classifies the key risks associated with unapproved parts and applies structured risk assessment tools—Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) and the Bow-Tie Risk Model—to quantify and visualize potential failures. Risk elements such as functional mismatch, lack of traceability, and insufficient certification data are prioritized using the Risk Priority Number (RPN) metric. Additionally, the study proposes institutional improvements such as digital traceability systems, conditional approval frameworks, and shared certification databases to mitigate these risks. The findings contribute to enhancing both the safety and flexibility of the airworthiness certification process, particularly in contexts where non-standard parts cannot be avoided. This research offers a practical approach for integrating risk-based thinking into component approval, providing a framework that balances operational demands with safety assurance.