Since the beginning of the seventh century, Islamic law has played an essential role in protecting the personal, economic, judicial, and political rights of civilians during armed conflict. Fourteen centuries before the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted in 1948, it had already initiated a human revolution consisting of a set of human principles. In addition, Islamic law has made a significant contribution to international humanitarian law (IHL). This paper focuses on two specific legal constructs in warfare: the definition of the combatant and the principle of distinction. This article comparatively examines how these two laws deal with different aspects of war that fall under jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and jus post bellum. A comparative analysis of the various elements and aspects of just war theory in Islamic and contemporary international law provides a much deeper understanding of its limitations. We can safely conclude that there is a unique relationship between the Islamic law of war and IHL.

The prohibition on torture has attained status as a peremptory norm of general international law. This gives rise to the obligation erga omnes to take action against those who torture. Despite this, most world states routinely conduct torture. Is there really a worldwide prohibition of torture? Argument is framed to demonstrate that the concept of a jus cogens peremptory norm, flowing erga omnes to all nations, is in practice unattainable, preventing any absolute and universal international law prohibition against torture. States cannot declare someone an enemy of all mankind, or bind all other states to that view. Jus cogens is a text writers’ municipal communis opinio, but held administratively to be based in customary international law. Any prohibition against torture appears to remain in municipal customary law form, breaches of which are proved as arguments based on fact, eliminating operation of any absolute peremptory governing norm.