Purpose – Prior studies reported that the opacity of information caused stock price crash. If managers fail to disclose unfavorable information about the firm over a long period of time, the stock price is overvalued compared to its original value. If the accumulated information reaches a critical point and spreads quickly to the market, the stock price plunges. Information management by management's disclosure policy can cause information uncertainty, which will lead to a plunge in stock prices in the future. Thus, this study aims at examining the impact of disclosure quality on crash risk by focusing on the unfaithful disclosure firms. Research design, data, and methodology – This study covers firms listed on KOSPI and KOSDAQ from 2004 to 2013. Firms excluded from the sample are non-December firms, capital-eroding firms, and financial firms. The financial data used in the research was extracted from the KIS-Value and TS2000 database. Unfaithful disclosure firm designation data was collected from the Korea Exchange’s electronic disclosure system (kind.krx.co.kr). Stock crash is measured as a dummy variable that equals one if a firm experiences at least one crash week over the fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Results – Empirical results as to the relation between unfaithful disclosure corporation designation and stock price crashes are as follows: There was a significant positive association between unfaithful disclosure corporation designation and stock price crash. This result supports the hypothesis that firms that have previously exhibited unfaithful disclosure behavior are more likely to suffer stock price plunges due to information asymmetry. Second, stock price crashes due to unfaithful disclosures are more likely to occur in Chaebol firms. Conclusions – While previous studies used estimates as a proxy for information opacity, this study used an objective measure such as unfaithful disclosure corporation designation. The designation by Korea Exchange is an objective evidence that the firm attempted to conceal and distort information in the previous year. The results of this study suggest that capital market investors need to investigate firms' disclosure behaviors.

Purpose – This study examines the effect of control-ownership wedge on stock crash risk. In Korea, controlling shareholders have exclusive control rights compared to their cash flow rights. With increasing disparity, controlling shareholders abuse their power and extract private benefits at the expense of the minority shareholders. Managers who are controlling shareholders of the companies tend not to disclose critical information that would prevent them from pursuing private interests. They accumulate negative information in the firm. When the accumulated bad news crosses a tipping point, it will be suddenly released to the market at once, resulting in an abrupt decline in stock prices. We predict that stock price crash likelihood due to information opaqueness increases as the wedge increases. Research design, data, and methodology – 831 KOSPI-listed firm-year observations are from KisValue database from 2005 to 2011. Control–ownership wedge is measured as the ratio (UCO −UCF)/UCO where UCF(UCO) is the ultimate cash-fl ow(control) rights of the largest controlling shareholder. Dependent variable CRASH is a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has at least 1 crash week during a year, and zero otherwise. Logistic regression is used to examine the relationship between control–ownership wedge and stock price crash risk. Results – Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in KisValue database for the period 2005–2011, we find that stock price crash risk increases as the disparity increases. Specifically, we find that the coefficient of WEDGE is significantly positive, supporting our prediction. The result implies that as controlling shareholders’ ownership increases, controlling shareholders tend to withhold bad news. Conclusions – Our results show that agency problems arising from the divergence between control rights and cash flow rights increase the opaqueness of accounting information. Eventually, the accumulated bad news is released all at once, leading to stock price crashes. It could be seen that companies with high control-ownership wedge are likely to experience future stock price crashes. Our study is related to a broader literature that examined the effect of the control-ownership wedge on stock markets. Our findings suggest that the disparity is a meaningful predictor for future stock price crash risk. The results are expected to provide useful implications for firms, regulators, and investors.

Purpose – This paper examines the effect of related party transactions on crash firm-specific stock price crash risk. Ownership of a typical Korean conglomerate is concentrated in a single family. In those entities, management and board positions are often filled by family members. Therefore, a dominant shareholder can benefit from related party transactions. In Korea, firms have to report related party transactions in financial statement footnotes. However, those are not disclosed in detail. The more related party transactions are the greater information risk. Thus, companies with related party transactions are likely to experience stock price crashes. Research design, data, and methodology – 2,598 firm-year observations are used for the main analysis. Those samples are from TS2000 database from 2009 to 2013, and the database covers KOSPI-listed firms in Korea. The proxy for related party transactions (RTP) is calculated by dividing total transactions to the related-party by total sales. A dummy variable is used as a dependent variable (CRASH) in the regression model. Logistic regression is used to explain the relationship between related party transactions and crash risk. Then, the sample was separated into two groups; tunneling firms and propping firms. The relation between related party transactions and crash risk variances with features of the transaction were investigated. Results – Using a sample of KOSPI-listed firms in TS2000 database for the period of 2009–2013, I find that stock price crash risk increases as the trade volume of related-party transactions increases. Specifically, I find that the coefficient of RPT is significantly positive, supporting the prediction. In addition, this relationship is strong and robust in tunneling firms. Conclusions – The results report that firms with related party transactions are more likely to experience stock price crashes. The results mean that related party transactions increase the possibility of future stock price crashes by enlarging information asymmetry between controlling shareholders and minority shareholders. In case of tunneling, it could be seen that related party transactions are positively associated with stock crash risk. The result implies that the characteristic of the transaction influences crash risk. This study is related to a literature that investigates the effect of related party transactions on the stock market.