These days, corporate risk management has become a major concern in the corporate world. Companies in the global environment are exposed to diverse kinds of risks that are affecting the decisions of investors and other stakeholders. Therefore, companies are expected to not only identify and manage risks but also voluntarily report the same to the stakeholders. Increasingly, standard setters and regulators are requiring firms to disclose such information. On the contrary, there also exists a perception that risk reporting can create a negative impression among the stakeholders about the future of the company. In line with such growing dilemma for risk disclosures, the issue of corporate risk reporting (CRR) has been receiving immense emphasis from the accounting academicians. The main objective of this article is to conduct a comprehensive literature review on corporate risk disclosures. In order to fulfill this objective, at first, a summary of the relevant available literature is presented to identify the current regulations on risk reporting, existing trends of CRR research and theories applied in research. Then, through analysis, several research avenues are identified. It is expected that if these dimensions are explored by the future researchers, a better and broader understanding of the risk reporting practices can be achieved.

This paper explores the impact of corporate control, measured by ownership structure, on top-executives’ compensation in Japan. According to agency theory, the pay-performance link is expected to be affected by the firm’s ownership structure. Using a sample of 4,411 firm-year observations (401 firms for the 11-years period from 2001 to 2011) for Japanese non-financial firms publicly traded on the first section and second section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE), this study demonstrates that institutional ownership (both financial and corporate) is negatively related to the level of executives’ compensation. Such finding is in line with efficient monitoring hypothesis which claims that the presence of institutional shareholders provides direct monitoring over managers, limits managerial self-dealing and curves the increase in top-executives pay. On the other hand, the results also show that managerial ownership is positively related to their compensation which supports managerial power theory hypothesis, i.e. management-controlled firms are more likely to extract more compensation from the business than other firms. Overall, this study confirms that corporate control has significant impact on cash compensation paid to Japanese top-executives after controlling the conventional pay-performance relationship.