The main purpose of the Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is to obtain the prior consent of suppliers in the case of peaceful use of items covered by the agreement, application of IAEA safeguards, reprocessing, enrichment or transfer to a third country. Reports on inventory changes and status for mutually transferred obligated items should be exchanged annually. According to the Agreement, items subject to bilateral agreement information must be exchanged with each other prior to direct or indirect transfer of controlled items. And the importing country proceeds with prior confirmation. After that, upon receipt of the target item, shipment notification and shipment confirmation are made, and an annual report on the target item is made. Such as the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), annual reporting and management of obligated items are made centered on institutions that use a lot of nuclear materials. But there are cases of delays in the agreement work due to the implementation, and discrepancies in data are occurring in the process of checking inventory details of obligated items. In addition, it was difficult to check the inventory of items subject to the agreement and the status of Export and Import status online, making it impossible for managers to monitor all aspects of bilateral agreements. Currently, there is generated to inconsistent in information between the annual report and the international transfer report in terms of Export and Import control. To solve these problems, KAERI is aim of promoting transparency in the international nuclear power sector and enhancing national reliability. And It is planning to establish an Export and Import management system for items subject to bilateral. In order to ensure the accuracy, it is going to enhance the efficiency of management methods such as new registration for new institutions when exporting and Importing items. This has the ultimate purpose of improving the efficiency of the implementation of the agreement items through the systemization of the database of agreement items and the management of the implementation of the agreement based on the sincere and timely implementation of the agreement.

IAEA has the right and obligation to verify the states’ commitments for safeguards under the comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocols. There are IAEA inspections such as PIV, DIV, RII, SNRI under these agreements. As part of the implementation of this mission, the IAEA inspectors perform the verification for the state’s accounting reports related the nuclear materials such as ICR, PIL, MBR. To do well this verification, the inspectors often use non-destructive analysis, which aims to measure attributes of the items during the inspections. This kind of an activity aims to detect the missing nuclear items or wrong things in the facility using nuclear materials. In general, NDA techniques use the neutron counting and gamma ray spectrometry. Besides, IAEA also performs several verification measures as follows. - C/S (Containment and Surveillance techniques) is to maintain the continuity of the knowledge by giving assurance that its containment remains unimpaired. - Unattended and remote monitoring is to transmit the data from onsite of the facility through the on-line system. - E/S (Environmental Sampling) is to detect the minute traces of nuclear materials by smearing some points in the on-site of the facility. Nowadays, the above mentioned techniques are important ways to increase the effectiveness of the safeguards approaches reducing IAEA actual costs. To strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards approaches, IAEA always develops and adopts the techniques and equipment for safeguards. Especially, IAEA seems to be concerned with the improvement and development of the non-destructive techniques and equipment in the fields of nuclear fuel cycle. IAEA develops the new techniques and equipment through the help of MSSP (Member States Support Programs). The IAEA defines the needs of safeguards and coordinates the support programs. After the IAEA tests and evaluates the techniques/equipment developed, IAEA decides whether to use the developed techniques and equipment during the inspection by the procedure of the IAEA quality assurance. This paper aims at studying the current changes of the IAEA equipment such as DCVD, NGSS and HCES.