The study reveals the extent of changes in selective financial numbers caused by fixed asset revaluation (FAR) and explores whether there was a management motive for playing the financial numbers game through using the FAR model. The data set consists of a sample of 142 listed companies purposively selected from 13 industries. The study found a significant impact of FAR on the net asset value (NAV), fixed asset intensity (FAI), and debt-to-equity ratio (DER). These findings are supported by the political cost and the debt covenant hypotheses. The study also observed a high growth of fixed assets by 9.5% to 14,603.8% resulting from FAR. More revealing is that FAR increased NAV in revaluer companies by an average of 427.20% as compared to 6.86% in non-revaluer companies. Even some companies with negative NAV took resort on FAR to show positive NAV. Besides, revaluer companies managed to reduce their DER by 70.45% as opposed to an increase of 8.45% in non-revaluer companies. Hence, the study concludes that most of the publicly-listed companies are involved in financial numbers game by the use of the FAR model. To build confidence among investors, companies should practice FAR rightly and disclose related information to help reduce information asymmetry.

The study examines the impact of corporate governance mechanisms, such as board characteristics on corporate social responsibility disclosure (CSRD). The data on CSRD items and board characteristics have been collected by content analysis of the annual reports of 30 publicly-listed banks in Bangladesh covering six years, from 2013 to 2018. More specifically, the directors’ report, the chairman’s statement, notes to the financial statement and CSR disclosure reports included in annual reports were used to collect the CSRD data. The empirical analysis applies the ordinary least square and the generalized method of moments. The results of the study have revealed that board size, board independence, female board member, and foreign directors have a significant positive impact on CSRD. By contrast, political directors and audit committee size have a negative impact on CSRD. Interestingly, accounting experts on boards ensure more CSRD as they curb the influence of politicians on the board. Thus, it is better to increase accounting experts and decrease politicians on the board. These findings provide valuable insights into the process of forming a suitable CSR policy by connecting the efforts of the board, government, and regulatory bodies to enhance the performance of banks to CSR as well as to CSRD.