본 연구는 중국 무용 전공 대학생의 유년시절 신체활동 태도가 무용 전공 선택동기와 무용 지속의도에 미치는 영향을 면밀히 살펴보고자 하 였다. 이를 위해 중국 산시성(陕西省) 시안(西安) 지역의 무용 전공 대학 생 500명을 통해 설문지를 수집하였다. 수집된 설문지는 SPSS 25.0 이 용하여 경향 분석, T-test 분석, Scheffe 분석, Pearsn의 상관관계분석, 단계적 중다회귀분석을 수행하였다. 본 연구결과 무용전공 대학생의 유 년시절 신체활동태도는 무용전공 선택동기 및 무용지속의도에 유의미한 영향력이 있는 것으로 나타났다. 이를 통해 아동의 신체발달을 지원하는 프로그램을 개발하는데 필요한 기초정보를 제공하고자 하며 무용 전공 대학생의 무용 지속의도를 높일 수 있는 교육과정을 개발하는 데에도 도 움을 주고자 한다.

When exporting nuclear-related items, export control is required from two perspectives: the control of “Trigger List Items” as controlled by Nuclear Supplier Groups (NSG) and the control of the “Items Subject to the Agreement” as specified in bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While Trigger List Items and Items Subject to the Agreement are largely similar, there are some items where they do not overlap. Furthermore, national law for controlling each item is different. The Trigger List Items are governed by the Foreign Trade Act, and the Items Subject to the Agreement (Internationally Controlled Items) are governed by the Nuclear Safety Act. As a result, the detailed procedures and requirements for controlling each item are quite distinct. For the Trigger List Items, export license must be obtained in accordance with the Foreign Trade Act. The details such as responsible authority, the items subject to license, license requirements and procedures, penalties are specified in the Public Notice on Import and Export of Strategic Goods. For the Items Subject to the Agreement, the process and obligations set forth in bilateral agreements and related administrative agreements are fulfilled in accordance with the Nuclear Safety Act. However, in contrast to the Trigger List Items, the details for complying with the agreements are not specified legally. Since most of the Items Subject to the Agreement are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, the obligations in accordance with the agreements are reviewed and implemented during the export license assessment process. However, if the Items Subject to the Agreement are not are fall within the category of the Trigger List Items, there is a risk of control omission. For example, this applies to cases of exporting tritium and tritium removal facilities, which are not the Trigger List Items, to Canada and Romania. Moreover, since subjects to the agreement and compliance procedures are respectively different for 29 bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements signed with different countries, it is difficult for enterprise to recognize the appropriate procedures and obligations under the agreement by their own. The bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements establish legal obligations between state parties while NSG are non-legally binding arrangements. Therefore, it could be even more necessary to comply strictly with the agreements. Consequently, legal improvements are required for effective implementations of Nuclear Cooperation Agreements. While it may be challenging to institutionalize details of 29 Nuclear Cooperation Agreements, it is essential to legally specify key elements such as the list of items subject to agreements, responsible authority, requirements and procedures for implement the agreement obligations, and penalties. Furthermore, domestic awareness on compliance with Nuclear Cooperation Agreements is lower compared to the system of export license for Trigger List Items. The continuous outreach is also necessary, along with institutional improvements.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) conducts various outreach activities, such as publishing brochures and holding seminars and briefings, to make regulated parties aware of the importance and necessity of the export control regime. The outreach program aims to increase compliance rates by generating interest in the export control regime among recipients and to increase communication to support compliance. In order to explore the long-term development of outreach activities, we analyze how KINAC conducts outreach. KINAC conducts nuclear export control outreach to organizations that deal with trigger list items and related technologies. Educational institutions with nuclear energy-related departments, research institutes related to nuclear energy and materials, and industrial companies that handle equipment used in nuclear power plants or nuclear materials were selected for outreach. The outreach program provides information on the export control regime for trigger list items, the strategic technology control regime, and the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. KINAC’s outreach programs can be categorized into education, exhibition, and publication. In the education program, we hold workshops and seminars for industrial companies, with customized content that considers the items handled by companies and the nature of technology transfer. We provide training for educational and research institutions focused on conducting research tasks and projects and transferring technology accordingly. As a result of the education program, there is a regret that the education for SMEs and educational institutions is not directly linked to the implementation of nuclear export control. The exhibition program operated a booth at nuclear-related exhibitions at least once a year. The booth distributed brochures or publications on the export control regime, conducted surveys to investigate awareness of the regime and conducted on-site consultations. The exhibition program effectively increased the understanding of the export control regime among the general public and potential regulated parties. However, it was only sometimes linked to the actual implementation of nuclear export control. The publication program produced promotional materials for use at education and exhibitions, as well as guidance materials on new and revised regulations. It used the agency’s online media to provide information on new and revised export control legislation and related issues. As a result of the publication program, various existing publications explaining the export control regime were consolidated into a single publication, increasing the efficiency and satisfaction of outreach.

Korea has signed nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) with 29 countries. Nuclear materials, materials, equipment, and technology transferred under the agreements are “internationally controlled materials (ICM)” under the Nuclear Safety Act. The main obligations imposed on those items include ensuring peaceful use, safeguards, physical protection, annual inventory reporting, and retransfer with supplier prior consent. The Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS) handles the export control procedures for transferring ICM. After import, inventory management for ICM in Korea would be transitioning to an item-based system through the Obligation Tracking System for internationally controlled item (OTS) currently under development. A one-stop import and export control system for ICM can be established when information is well-linked between these two systems. This paper aims to derive a methodology for integrating NEPS and OTS. NEPS-OTS coupling begins at the receipt confirmation and shipment notification stages in NEPS. When importing ICM under NCA, the inventory change (code RF: receipt foreign) is entered in OTS by getting the information that has completed the receipt confirmation in NEPS. Conversely, during export, the information that has completed the shipment notification procedure in NEPS is linked to the OTS so that the entire cycle from import to re-export of the ICM can be concluded. Inventory verification for retransfer, checking that the book inventory remains positive value, is impossible under the current system. This issue can be resolved by enabling inventory information in OTS to be displayed in NEPS. Determining when and how to generate the obligation code for imported ICM is essential for NEPS-OTS coupling. Manual input may be necessary for some cases with multiple obligations. Nevertheless, it is more efficient from a system communication protocol to automatically generate and impose a single obligation based on the supplier country information in NEPS. Moreover, it is important to automatically link crucial information available in NEPS to reduce the administrative burden on OTS users and discrepancies between systems. Most required OTS data, such as country obligation, item categories, quantity, physical or chemical form, and receipt date, can be directly linked from NEPS. However, NEPS improvement is needed for digitizing the receiver information and facility data, like the material balance area. The NEPS-OTS integration involves sharing data as a system and encompasses the connection between export control and inventory management. Future work to link some information in NEPS -OTS with the KSIS could be suggested to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in managing ICM.

The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.

Glutamine has been used to treat canine patients with parvoviral enteritis. However, little is known about the effect of L-alanyl-L-glutamine (Ala-Gln) supplementation in dogs with parvoviral enteritis. The objective of this study was to determine whether Ala-Gln supplementation can improve dog survival and ameliorate clinical signs without adverse effects. We conducted a randomized, double-blind, placebo-controlled clinical trial involving 39 client-owned dogs. The dogs were randomly assigned to two groups and administered either an Ala-Gln solution (Dipeptiven, 0.4 g/kg, n = 20) or an equivalent volume of placebo (n = 19) orally twice daily. Of the 39 dogs, 17 were vaccinated (n = 9 in the Ala-Gln-treated group and n – 9 in the placebo group). All dogs received standard treatment while hospitalized. The dogs were monitored according to a clinical scoring system and evaluated diagnostically daily for 11 days. Survival rates in both groups were quantified using Kaplan‒Meier survival curves and statistically compared using the log-rank test. The total score for clinical signs did not differ between the groups, except on day 2. The survival rates differed significantly (p=0.038). Three Ala-Gln-treated dogs (15.0%) died during the study, whereas eight dogs in the placebo group died (42.1%). No adverse effects were found to be associated with Ala-Gln treatment. Oral administration of Ala-Gln improves survival in dogs with parvoviral enteritis without causing adverse effects.

The Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) and the Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) operate the Nuclear Export and Import Control System (NEPS), an online comprehensive export and import control management system to guide the domestic nuclear export and import control regime and efficiently process the application, processing, and issuance of various civil complaints required for compliance. This paper analyzes the results of NEPS functional improvements made in 2022. First, NSSC and KINAC launched a nuclear plant technology follow-up system. Since establishing the Nuclear Plant Technology Export License (Plant License) system in 2015, large-scale nuclear power plant projects with a large amount of technology transfer have been issued a Plant License, allowing them to transfer technology without a separate individual export license. The recipient of a Plant License is not required to obtain an additional export license but to follow up on the transferred technology, such as checking whether it is a strategic technology and reporting quarterly transfer details. A dedicated system has been established to facilitate the follow-up of plant license projects. That has improved work efficiency for both the regulated and the regulator. Second, we have improved the procedures for retrieving and supplementing civil petitions. We added a function allowing civil petitioners to directly retrieve a civil petition to cancel a previously filed civil petition or to revise it themselves. In addition, we improved the procedure for supplementing a civil petition by setting a supplementation deadline for a reviewer’s request to modify a civil petition and sending a reminder before the expiration of the supplementation deadline. That enhances the convenience of the complainant and the examiner. Finally, we have changed the numbering system for export and import control reviews. Previously, the application number was a 15-digit system with an 8-digit date and 7-digit serial number. We have simplified the number by changing the three unused digits in the serial number to a single symbol that separates the type of application. That made it possible to utilize the number for relevant searches in the future. Also, simplifying the number has improved the efficiency of applying, processing, and consulting for civil affairs. In the future, NSSC and KINAC will continue to upgrade NEPS and make various functional improvements, and there will be many changes in system operation through cloud transfer in a few years.

For the export of nuclear materials (NM), the NSG guidelines require governmental assurance from the importing State that the NM will be used for peaceful purposes, safeguards and physical protection will be applied, and prior consent will be obtained for retransfer. By providing this assurance, the importing State (recipient) is responsible for fulfilling the obligations required by the exporting States (supplier). If the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) has been concluded between the supplier and recipient, it may be replaced by implementing the procedures under the NCA. In the case of NM subject to this obligation, continuous management at the national level is required because prior consent from the supplier may be required for retransfer to a third party under the assurance or may be subject to annual reporting. The obligation swaps are the exchange of obligations of NM without the physical movement of it. Since the physical movement of NM is costly and risky, its obligations are often exchanged for commercial reasons. The basis for obligation swaps is the fungibility and equivalence of NM. The fungibility allows that the inventories of NM need not physically identify the particular NM originally obligated but identify an equivalent quantity of the same isotopic composition. In addition, under the principle of equivalence, even if NM loses its unique physical properties, it can be exchanged by another obligated or nonobligated NM. That is, the principles of equivalence and proportionality allow the comparison of quantities of uranium in different forms. Therefore, it is theoretically possible not only to exchange obligations between NM in same physical form, but also different physical forms of same composition (with the same enrichment), e.g., UO2 powder and its pellets. In U.S., it appears that there are obligation swaps of NM between different enrichment levels, but according to the NCA and its Administrative Arrangement between ROK and U.S., Canada and Australia, the principle of fungibility and equivalence shall not be used to reduce the quality of a quantity of NM. In other words, swaps between NM of different enrichment levels are not allowed under the NCA and AA. However, according to the Supplementary Arrangement between ROK and Canada, the replacement of NM by lower quality NM may only occur where the two States so decide following consultation. The U.S., Canada, and Australia, which are major suppliers of NMs, allow internal obligation swaps within the U.S. and the EU through NCA. The NCA between ROK and these countries does not address whether internal swaps are possible. Since governmental assurance does not impose restrictions on swaps, it can be considered if necessary. Although there is no actual practice of obligation swaps in ROK, research will be necessary regarding the extent to which swaps in ROK should be allowed and the need for government approval or permission.

The Internal Compliance Program (ICP) is a framework for promoting compliance with laws and regulations and minimizing violations. It aims to prevent law breaches, by raising awareness of the compliance within the organization, which leads to enhance the credibility of the organization, and to prepare for audits. From the perspective of nuclear export control, ICP can be used to verify the company’s credibility by following NSG Guidelines and is expected to contribute to preventing the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons in the international community. However, ICP system is not globally established, and the NSG does not provide official guidelines for ICP. Therefore, this study aims to analyze the “Good Practices for Internal Compliance Programs for Nuclear and Nuclear-Related Exports” provided by the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory to find ways to apply and activate ICPs for domestic exporters. The form of ICP could vary depending on company’s size and internal environments, but it should be organized as follows. First, an internal department should be established so as to implement the ICP, and an executive who has export control knowledge should be assigned as the Chief Export Control Officer (CECO). The CECO, establish and revise ICP operating procedures and manual, organize contact point to communicate internally and externally. Second, measures should be established minimize risks in the export process, including business development transaction screening, supply chain, research and development, human resource, and intangible technology transfer risks. Third, internal control system should be established for export control compliance. The CECO should conduct regular assessments to ensure compliance and strengthen the organization’s internal export compliance processes. Fourth, an export-related training program should be periodically conducted for employees. In addition, as soon as the CECO becomes aware of, CECO should review the matter, take corrective action, and report to the relevant national authorities, when a violation of domestic export control laws or suspicious circumstances are captured. Nuclear export control plays an important role in ensuring nuclear nonproliferation. Republic of Korea has been implementing the ICP system for Dual-Use Items under the Foreign Trade Act, but not for Trigger List Items. Therefore, introduction of ICP for Trigger List Items is expected significantly contribute to nuclear nonproliferation. The subjects of ICP will be initially targeted to major nuclear enterprises, then gradually expanded to all nuclear enterprises. Further researches are needed to introduce on ICP for Trigger List Items.

In the late 80s, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear, chemical, and biological, became an internationally important issue, and in order to keep pace with the international situation, Korea amended the Foreign Trade Act in 1992 to legislate the export control of strategic goods. In addition, Korea joined the NSG, one of the international export control regimes, in 1995, and nuclear power operators are required to obtain export licenses in accordance with the NSG export control guidelines. In the nuclear export business, technical documents, equipment, materials, SW, etc. are exported to the importer, and the export items may include strategic items designated by the NSG, so operators must check whether they are strategic items and, if so, obtain an export license in accordance with foreign trade laws that reflect the NSG export control guidelines. In the case of processing and exporting goods or materials imported from another country, exporters must fulfill complex nuclear export control procedures, including obtaining the original supplier’s consent for re-transfer. In recent years, the international situation on export control has been more sensitive than ever, including the Russo-Ukrainian war, the U.S.-China semiconductor supremacy dispute, and U.S. lawsuits against domestic companies related to original technologies. In the worst-case scenario, a company may not be able to fulfill a contract due to export control issues. In order to facilitate the smooth export business of operators when exporting nuclear energy, ‘Nuclear Export Control Pre-Consulting’ is proposed to check compliance with export control requirements in advance and provide operators with customized export control implementation plans reflecting business characteristics. Through the pre-consultation, issues, requirements, and preparatory documents related to nuclear export control can be checked before the export business starts in earnest, i.e., when the decision to participate in the business is made, and the business can be supported to export smoothly by complying with the export control system. The most important aspect of pre-consultation is that domestic nuclear exporters need to know and apply for the program. To this end, the program will be actively promoted online and offline, and support will be provided for easy application through NEPS. In addition, procedures and outcomes will be continuously refined to ensure that the program is a means of ensuring full compliance with international nuclear non-proliferation norms for nuclear exports.

A bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) should define what is subject to the agreement and when. Nuclear Materials (NM) are the subject of NCA with almost all countries, and the definition used in these agreements is borrowed from Article 20 of the IAEA Charter. The IAEA’s definition of NM as consisting of special fissionable material and source material and describes the types of material each contains. In order to control the export of NM under national laws and implement NCA, not only the types of NM but also quantitative criteria are required. This is because controlling small quantities of NM is impossible, unnecessary, and would create excessive administrative burdens. For this reason, the NSG guidelines establish a quantitative threshold of NM requiring control. Nevertheless, no quantitative thresholds have been agreed upon for NM subject to a NCA. Whether NM transferred is subject to the NCA is primarily a matter for the supplier states to determine. The supplier states make the decision based on quantitative criteria defined in their own export control laws. ROK identifies NM that require export licenses by reflecting the same criteria as the NSG guidelines in Foreign Trade Laws and its Notifications. Less than 500 kg of Natural Uranium, 1,000 kg of Depleted Uranium, 1,000 kg of Thorium, and 50 effective grams of special fissionable materials do not require an export license and is therefore not subject to NCA. In the US, the quantitative threshold for requiring an export license is different from that of ROK. For example, special fissionable materials that are not Pu are required if the individual shipment exceed 1 effective gram or 100 effective grams per year. The difference in the quantitative thresholds for NM between the two countries mean that the same item may be subject to NCA under US standards, but not under ROK’s. For example, the export of 8 grams of highly enriched uranium (93%) contained in a neutron detector would not be subject to the NCA in ROK, but would be considered NM subject to a NCA and required a special license in the US. Of course, in order to ensure the application of safeguards and physical protection to all NM transferred between the two countries, the agreement may not include a quantitative threshold for NM. However, the absence of such a threshold can lead to different conclusions by the two countries on the same item and make it challenging to control retransfers. The definition of quantitative standards will be necessary in the supplementary administrative arrangement for the practical control and management of NM subject to the NCA.

Under the Foreign Trade Act, an export license from the Nuclear Safety Commission is required to export items specified in Part 10 of Schedule 2 of the Public Notice of Exportation and Importation of Strategic Items (Trigger List Items). In the case of nuclear materials, deuterium, and heavy water, its cumulative amount determines whether it is trigger list item. An export license is required only if the cumulative amount exported to a single end-user country from January 1st to December 31st exceeds the regulation criteria. The reason for this cumulative control is to exclude small amounts of materials from the scope of control as they are considered less important in view of nuclear proliferation, but to prevent the possibility of acquiring large quantities of materials by importing small amounts several times. As a result, export control of nuclear material, deuterium, and heavy water requires different considerations than other Trigger List Items. First, materials exported by different companies must be consolidated to manage the cumulative amount. Second, it is necessary to continuously follow up the actual export status. If the material is not exported after it was classified as ‘non-Trigger List Items’, it should not be included in the cumulative amount. Third, there may be a difference between the accumulated quantities aggregated at the time of the classification and the time of the actual export. The classification should be changed if an export of the classified material is postponed or another export of same materials occurs before the export of the classified material. Fourth, the classification result of these materials should not be reused. Generally, the classification result could be reused within the expiration date (2 years) but in the case of substances. However, the reuse of classification result for materials should be limited as the classification results could be change depending on the cumulative amount. In addition, the sharing of classification results between different entities should also be restricted. The government approval procedures are required even for export of small amounts of nuclear materials which are less than the regulation criteria. The cumulative quantities of nuclear materials are systematically managed in the Nuclear Export & imPort control System (NEPS) through these procedures. NEPS is also linked to the custom clearance system of Korea Customs Service, which enables to track actual exports and the time of exports. However, cumulative quantities for the heavy water and deuterium are managed individually by classification reviewers. The annual export plans are received in advance from major entities which deal with the materials for nuclear uses, and the cumulative quantities for each application are managed manually. The systematic management has not been required as there were a few cases of exporting small quantities. However, systematic management may be required in the future as overseas expansion attempts from various companies in the nuclear field has been increasing. In addition, further study is needed on the criteria and system for calculating the cumulative amount. The time of aggregate the cumulative amount should be clarified by considering the difference between the time of classification and actual export. It is required to devise an efficient way to follow up the actual export.

An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

Recently, many studies are being conducted to extract emotion from text and verify its information power in the field of finance, along with the recent development of big data analysis technology. A number of prior studies use pre-defined sentiment dictionaries or machine learning methods to extract sentiment from the financial documents. However, both methods have the disadvantage of being labor-intensive and subjective because it requires a manual sentiment learning process. In this study, we developed a financial sentiment dictionary that automatically extracts sentiment from the body text of analyst reports by using modified Bayes rule and verified the performance of the model through a binary classification model which predicts actual stock price movements. As a result of the prediction, it was found that the proposed financial dictionary from this research has about 4% better predictive power for actual stock price movements than the representative Loughran and McDonald’s (2011) financial dictionary. The sentiment extraction method proposed in this study enables efficient and objective judgment because it automatically learns the sentiment of words using both the change in target price and the cumulative abnormal returns. In addition, the dictionary can be easily updated by re-calculating conditional probabilities. The results of this study are expected to be readily expandable and applicable not only to analyst reports, but also to financial field texts such as performance reports, IR reports, press articles, and social media.

Graphite felt is a felt-like porous material made of high-temperature carbonized polymers. It is widely used in electrode materials because of its good temperature resistance, corrosion resistance, large surface area and excellent electrical conductivity. In this paper, the surface functional group modification is of graphite felt electrodes (mainly nitrogen doping modification, nitrogen–sulfur or nitrogen–boron co-doping modification) and surface catalytic modification (metal/ion surface modification and metal oxide surface modification as Main). There are two main methods and research progresses to improve the performance of graphite felt electrodes, and the comprehensive performance of surface functional group-modified graphite felt electrodes and surface catalytically modified graphite felt electrodes are compared respectively. The results show that both surface functional group modification and surface catalytic modification can improve the comprehensive performance of graphite felt electrodes. In this paper, the future development direction of graphite felt activation modification is also prospected.