ontological distinction between "presence-at-hand(Vorhandenheit)" and "readiness-tohand( Zuhandenheit)". Roughly put, the former indicates the way in which things exist regardless of a cognitive agent's interest or purpose. Whereas the latter signifies the way in which things exist in connection with a cognitive agent's particular interest or purpose. The distinction in question has been chiefly used to uncover the priority of human existence to indifferent, natural realities in the world. While taking the Heideggerian ontological idea seriously, I propose to formulate and explore the following questions: What does the mind associated with the presence-at-hand(MPH) look like? Also, what does the mind linked to the readiness-to-hand(MRH) look like? As an answer to the questions, I provide the suggestion that on the whole, MPH is representational and self-contained, whereas MRH is non-representational and others-contained, and those two different aspects or kinds of the mind are somehow united in the same self that interacts with the two different ways of being, i.e. Vorhandensein and Zuhandensein. This consideration of MPH and MRH can shed light on some baffling issues about the nature of the mind. In that regard, for example, a clue as to how we can resolve the theoretical conflict between representationalism and non-representationalism in perceptual intentional experience is suggested.