Article 3(1) of the Act on Special Cases concerning the Settlement of Traffic Accidents (hereinafter ‘Traffic Special Act’) provides that “A driver of a vehicle who commits a crime provided for in Article 268 of the Criminal Act by reason of a traffic accident shall be punished by imprisonment without prison labor for not more than five years or by a fine not exceeding 20 million won”. This regulates Non-real Status Crime, and ‘traffic’ stipulated herein is interpreted as objective circumstances of conduct. Additionally, driver stipulated in the Traffic Special Act seems to be defined as ‘a person driving or who has driven.’ This stems from legislator’s preference for compressed expression in terms of legislative technical efficiency. It is understood to be the result of preference for ’driver’, which is a compressed expression, rather than the descriptive phrase such as “anyone who is under the circumstances of operating a vehicle or driving” (Article 3(1) of the Traffic Special Act, Article 151 of the Road Traffic Act is identical) or “anyone who is driving or have driven” (Article 3(1) & 4(1) of the Traffic Special Act). The background of the subject judgment corresponds to [Case 2] where a non-driver (different occupation), who is a person lacking status, collaborates with an ‘occupational’ driver, who is a person with status. In this case non-driver, who lacks the status as an ‘occupational’ driver, has a status for a different occupation, and consequently shall be punished according to the statutory penalty for Co-principals of Traffic Special Act along with the person with status as ‘occupational’ driver (Article 33 of the Criminal Act). The reason is that the person lacking status has its own unique occupational negligence derived from the different occupation apart from the occupational driver, being guilty as Co-Principals of Bodily Injury by Negligence of the Criminal Act - Article 3 of the Traffic Special Act supercede Article 268 of the Criminal Act based on the existence of special relation. As regards to the contravention of Article 3(1) of the Traffic Special Act, where ‘traffic’ situation, which is the condition of punishment, and 12 exception clauses, which are the conditions of prosecution, exist only in respect of occupational driver, the person lacking such status also is inevitably guilty for Co-Principals of Traffic Special Act. As an inevitable outcome, Article 3(2) of the Traffic Special Act, which is a special case of non-prosecution against the clearly expressed intention of the victim, also applies to the person lacking such status. However, since the Principle regarding the Indivisibility of Criminal Complaint does not apply to an offence which cannot be prosecuted against the clearly expressed intention of the victim, declaration of an injured party of his/her intention not to prosecute two or more Co-Principals does not take effect in respect to the other accomplices. Therefore, Article 4(1) of the Traffic Special Act, stipulating special cases of comprehensive insurance coverage, is interpreted to limit the scope of personal application to only ‘driver’ according to its literal reading. “Exceptions must be interpreted narrowly”(ingularia non sunt extendenda), which is a principle of limitation, must apply to the above. The subject judgment is evaluated to confirm the non-application of the special cases of insurance to non-driver, i.e. comprehensive insurance coverage not taking effect to non-driver. This point is at least considered to be in line with the established precedent that the principle of Subjective Indivisibility of Criminal Complaint shall not apply mutatis mutandis to offence which cannot be prosecuted against the clearly expressed intention of the victim. Nonetheless, it is extremely regrettable that the subject judgment only declares such purport without any detailed grounds.

The ruling that declared the restriction of right of arraignment according to exemption law is unconstitutional in case of grieve bodily harm regardless of light/heavy negligence poses several problems. This is especially the case in heavy negligence, but it is in overall problematic in execution levels if negligence is not considered. Even though heavy negligence is not seen as a weighing factor of professional negligence and instead either is seen as a weighing factor of normal negligence in criminal law, the ruling completely ignores this. It is also problematic in that heavy negligence is not a solid concept and leaves much to the judgement of the jury. In addition, the fact that decision of heavy negligence depends on doctor's opinion is also a problem. The unconstitutional declaration saw the exemption law as a violation of the equality rights, but it actually helps the people's convenience by speeding up the process of compensation, and the differentiation of death and heavy negligence is according to their inherent differences. The exemption law serves its purpose by transferring the loss of property of victims to the car insurance and preventing the mass production of ex-convicts.