This study empirically examines the effect of ownership structure on bank diversification and risk-taking behavior. The population of this study is based on all commercial banks listed in Bangladesh. Thirty-two conventional commercial banks were randomly selected from thirty-three conventional banks for this study. Data was collected from the annual reports of the concerned banks from 2000 to 2017. To analyze the data, we had applied the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. The results of the analysis show that ownership structure i.e. managerial ownership, institutional ownership, general public ownership, and ownership concentration have a significant negative impact on bank diversification. On the other hand, institutional ownership, managerial ownership, and general public ownership have a significant positive impact on Z-score, and ownership concentration has an insignificant but positive impact on the Z-score of banks in Bangladesh. Therefore, the study opposes the benefits of diversification and promotes ownership structure which is capable of ensuring better financial stability by reducing the probability of risk. The policy-makers especially, Bangladesh banks should evaluate the fact of this study to issue guidelines on corporate governance, bank diversification, and risk-taking behavior of commercial banks.

The purpose of this study is to investigate the relationship between diversification and the performance of commercial banks, while taking into account the ownership status of these banks in Sri Lanka. Two-way relationship between diversification and performance was scrutinised by employing the 2SLS regression technique. The data consists of 17 registered commercial bank in Sri Lanka between 2001- 2016. The results show a strong significant bidirectional relationship exists between diversification and bank performance. The performance of Sri Lankan banks has been significantly improved by their diversification attempts. In other words, the banks whose incomes are more diversified from various sources, they are more profitable and successful in long-term. On the other hands, the results also reveal that bank performance positively and significantly affects diversification. This finding suggests that the banks with great profitability are more capable in diversify their operations. Furthermore, private sector banks, both listed and unlisted, are significantly more diversified than their government-owned counterparts, but their performance is not necessarily superior to government-owned banks. This may be the result of the economic environment and the perception of the public, which have allowed the government-owned banks to entertain significant market power over the private sector banks in the country.

The study aims to empirically examine the determinants of bank margins from Pakistan, an emerging South Asian economy. To elucidate the importance of the Pakistani banking sector, secondary data has been used, which was extracted from the annual accounts of twentyfour Pakistani scheduled commercial banks (20 conventional, four full-fledged Islamic) over a sample period of 2006 to 2017. The factors identified in the dealership model and the subsequent empirical developments in the dealership model categorized as bank-specific, diversification, regulatory, and industry concentration are analyzed by applying the most-common linear dynamic panel-data estimator, the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator, developed by Arellano and Bond (1991). The findings reveal that, among the bank-specific variables, funding cost, credit risk, managerial efficiency, market share, and operating cost are significant predictors of bank margins. For diversification variables employed in the study, both variables including net non-interest income and asset diversity are as well significant predictors of bank margins. It is also found that the market concentration variable proxied by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is significantly predicting bank margins. Subsequently, one of the regulatory variables, the opportunity cost of holding reserves, and one bank-specific variable, the degree of risk aversion, are insignificant in the model.