전 세계적으로 금융선진국을 비롯한 각 국가의 금융당국은 금융기관과 금융소 비자 간의 정보비대칭 완화 및 이를 통한 리스크관리를 위하여 금융기관이 참여하는 신용정 보 공유제도를 운영하고 있다. 본 연구는 한국에서 공유되고 있는 신용정보 중 사고정보를 대상으로 하여 실제로 공유중 인 신용정보 데이터를 분석하였다. 사고정보를 사고횟수, 사고기간, 사고금액의 세 종류로 구 분하여, 생존분석에서는 사고정보가 기업의 생존기간에 미치는 영향을 분석하였고, 이후 집 단 간 비교분석을 통해 업력 7년 이하의 창업기업과 그 외 기존기업 간에 존재하는 사고정보 양상 차이를 검증하였다. 총 449,579개 기업의 사고정보에 대한 정량적인 분석을 시행한 결과 생존분석에서 사고횟 수가 사고후생존기간과 정(+)의 상관관계를 보였는데 이는 사고횟수를 부정적인 요소로 판단하고 있는 금융기관의 현행 리스크정책에 반증적 성격을 갖는다. 또한, 집단 간 비교분석 에서는 창업기업의 사고양상이 기존기업보다 생존기간에 더 긍정적인 모습을 보이고 있음에 따라 창업기업의 특성을 고려한 신용정보 공유제도의 개선이 필요하다는 시사점을 도출할 수 있었다.

The Indonesian government launched a new people's business credit program as part of a package of economic policy and deregulation. The interest rate is set lower than the average of the current loan interest rates, especially when compared with rural bank interest rates. To capture the social spatial aspects, quota sampling is applied to ten areas that divided based on the social culture. Further, the method utilized in this research is logit models, which designed to analyse the determinants of asymmetric information particularly on the rural bank and small micro enterprises. The study was conducted in East Java as the province with the largest number of rural banks in Indonesia. Based on the estimation of asymmetric information model to the respondent of rural banks and small businesses, the result shows that adverse selection can be avoided by strengthening the information about prospective borrowers. Regarding moral hazard, rural banks and small businessmen argued that the imposition of the collateral to the debtor has an important role to avoid moral hazard. Rural bank respondents stated that the KUR program with low-interest rates has affected their business development. The results implied the need of broadening the collaboration schemes between this people’s business credit program and rural banks.

In the Korean capital market, there are three credit rating agencies. Potential credit ratings based on credibility in the financial market are calculated independently for each rating agency. It often happens that despite the fact that the grades of the rating agencies are the same and have the same rating system, their actual ratings are different, even for the same firm. In such circumstances, investors may wonder why. In this study, we assume that the cause is the information environment in which the company operates. The credit ratings of rating agencies are mainly classified into bonds or commercial papers. The bonds are rated primarily for long-term of three years or more, and commercial papers specify ratings for less than one year. The information environment to be verified in this study was observed with a commercial paper. Under the assumption the larger the analyst following is, the more transparent is the information environment, we analyzed the influence of the number of analysts following on the degree to which ratings conflicted among credit rating agencies. The results of our analysis confirmed that opinion conflict among credit rating agencies is clearly reduced for companies with good information environments.