Once systems, structures and components (SSCs) of dry storage systems are classified with respect to safety function or safety significance (i.e., safety classification), appropriate engineering rules can be applied to ensure that they are designed, manufactured, maintained, managed (e.g. aging management) etc. In Unites States, the systems, structures and components (SSCs) consisting DSSs are classified into two or several grades (i.e., class A, B and C or not important to safety, and important to safety (ITS) or not important to safety (NITS)) with respect to intended safety function and safety significance. This classification methods were based on Regulatory Guide 7.10 (i.e., guidance for use in developing quality assurance programs for packaging). Also, in Korea, SSCs of DSSs should be classified into ITS and NITS in much the same as method based on Regulatory Guide 7.10. In that guidance, for providing graded approach to manage the SSCs of packaging, they were trying to classifying SSCs in accordance with radiological consequences. But there was limitations that the provided classification criteria was still qualitative, so that it was not enough for managing the SSCs according to graded approach. On the other hand, in some other nuclear facilities (i.e., nuclear power plant, radioactive waste management facility and disposal facility etc.), quantitative criteria relevant to radiological consequence (i.e., radiation doses to workers or to the public) or inventory of radioactivity are existed so that it can be applied for classifying safety classes. In summary, the study on the application safety classification that applied quantitative criteria to perform safety classification of SSCs in DSS is inadequate or insufficient. The purpose of this study is proposing the preliminary framework for estimating safety significance of SSCs in DSS which can be utilized in our further advanced studies. In this study, a framework was established to estimate the safety significance of SSCs related to radiation shielding and confinement using MCNP® 6.2 and Microsoft Excel. Referring to the methodology of IAEA Specific Safety Guide 30, we assumed severity for failures of components that could lead to degradation of the SSC’s performance. The safety class of SSC was decided based on the impact of SSC’s failure on consequences.