By the time the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) entered into force, there had been numerous bilateral and multilateral agreements between the parties regarding its rules on dispute settlement. However, the WTO dispute settlement system currently remains the most requested. The present article provides a comparative analysis of the procedures of dispute settlement under the CPTPP, the WTO DSU, and some RTAs. Among the novelties of the CPTPP mechanism compared to the WTO DSU are that it extends its scope to measures not yet introduced, offers more transparency, including the use of electronic means of communication, simplifies access for third parties, and provides financial compensation as a temporary remedy. Although the authors conclude that many of the CPTPP provisions repeat those of the WTO DSU and other RTAs between the CPTPP partners, there may be a desire to test the CPTPP mechanism in practice due to crises of the WTO Appellate Body.

The EU, China, and other WTO members recently released their concluded MPIA with its Annexes I and II as a temporary arrangement to deal with the appeals of panel rulings before the Appellate Body resumes its operation. The WTO dispute settlement mechanism is a complete unit with unique features and inherent logic. Although this arrangement maintains the two-tier process with arbitration to replace the appellate review, there is a fundamental difference between them, which is embodied not only in the dispute settlement process but also in the implementation of the rulings. The challenges that the WTO dispute settlement mechanism encounters are not limited to those procedural issues, but they are also connected with the substantive rules, with which the procedural issues should be jointly resolved. This is the correct way to deal with the current challenges and to reform the multilateral trade regime.

The primary purpose of this research is to propose the solution to the current crisis of the WTO dispute settlement system focusing on Article 25 of the WTO Agreement. The Dispute Settlement Understanding is one of the significant successes of the WTO. Recent years, however, have witnessed the difficulties and challenges facing the multilateral trading system along with rising anti-globalization and trade protectionism. The Appellate Body (AB) has been experiencing an unprecedented crisis of dysfunction mainly due to the US’s boycott of appointing the new members. The WTO Members, including China, have thus proposed various reforms in response to the crisis. However, they have not touched the core demands of the US. Because of the imminent crisis that the AB is about to stop operating, China should take urgent action with other WTO members, consider launching a majority voting program, design and use alternative appeal arbitration, and combine international rules with domestic deepening reforms.

The Dispute Settlement Mechanism of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is facing serious crisis, which has impeded its normal function. To address this impasse, this article suggests a reform of the WTO’s dispute-settlement mechanism: the establishment of a new megamultilateral court to substitute for the Appellate Body. The first part of this paper addresses the reasons for considering this approach. The second part identifies how to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO. The third part puts forward an idea of the function of the Dispute Settlement Body, which would serve as a forum for adjudicators and State Parties of the mega-multilateral court, in order to balance judicial independence, judicial accountability, and consistency. In discussing the reason for this reform, approaches to implementing it, and other examples of what form it might take, this article concludes that it is appropriate to establish a new mega-multilateral court within the WTO.

Since its accession to the WTO in 2001, China has been involved in 21 cases as complainant, 44 as respondent, and 179 as a third party. However, China-related cases have not overburdened the WTO dispute settlement system. Instead, China has assisted in the development of international trade law through the creative interpretations of different provisions achieved in the WTO dispute settlement proceedings. This article seeks to provide an overview of China’s participation in the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and contribution to the rules over the past decade. In doing so, the article not only highlights the jurisprudential and doctrinal contributions of some of the critical disputes, but also examines the role of various interest groups and stakeholders in shaping China’s dispute settlement activity. Overall, the article provides an overview of China’s WTO dispute settlement activities and its role in assisting the development of international trade law.

The era of globalization has created a proverbial ‘rush’ to utilize trade and investment in developing nations. Growing fear over the abuse of developed nations’ bargaining power in these areas led the WTO to adopt remedial measures ensuring the protection of developing nations during disputes. The WTO’s dispute settlement system is unequivocally the most comprehensive form of the resolution of disputes among its Member States. Despite the numerous privileges and safeguards offered to developing Members States, reluctance and a lack of understanding in using the WTO dispute resolution process remain within these nations. This paper explains the options available to these nations, in an attempt to attract to use the dispute resolution process, and offers key insight on future amendments that can facilitate developing Member’s participation in the future. It will further articulate the statutory safeguards and favors provided to developing countries in DSS.

From the twentieth century on, legalization process has been evident in international relations. As a core issue of international law and relation, dispute settlement between States has been evolving from its tit-for-tat strategy to diplomatic and then legal control. Based on the GATT DSP, the WTO DSM has achieved significant progress in legalization. In particular, as more DSM decision have been complied by member States, legalization process of trade dispute resolution via WTO is regarded promising. From the viewpoint of the legalization theory, in comparison to the GATT, the compliance of the WTO DSM’s decisions have become more precise. The WTO members have granted more authorities to its panel of the AB or DSB. It means that in the aspect of compliance of the WTO DSM’s decisions, the degree of delegation to the DSB has been lifted to a higher level.

The implementation system of the recommendations and rulings of the Dispute Settlement Body is an important component of the WTO dispute settlement procedure. Where there is any disagreement between disputing parties as to the existence or consistency with a covered agreement of measures taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings, a winning party may refer the matter to a compliance panel and the Appellate Body. If a losing party is found to have failed to comply with the recommendations and rulings, DSB may authorize the winning party to retaliate. This article analyzes the implementation system of the WTO dispute settlement procedure in comparison with other systems of ‘second-order’ compliance in international law. Also, attention will be directed to the relationship between the WTO retaliation and countermeasures in general international law. Countermeasures under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, in particular, have a legal nature akin to that of countermeasures under the law of State responsibility.