The recent fentanyl dispute between China and the US adds the academic value to the efforts to examine the respective legal regime of public international law and the WTO law on narcotics trafficking. On the one hand, public international law offers a comprehensive framework to address narcotics trafficking but as demonstrated by Chinese proofs, its function is undermined by weak enforcement. On the other hand, there exist some useful mechanisms in the WTO law to combat narcotics trafficking but their weaknesses can also be easily spotted. More importantly, the alarm of the global threat of illicit trade is ringing, which requires our raising awareness to it. Recently, the UNCTAD and the OECD have already taken the initiative to discuss the collective actions, by means of conferences or reports, to deal with illicit trade. In the long run, it will be indispensable to establish an operational governance framework on the international level to effectively curb illicit trade.

The US has invoked Article XXI of the GATT 1994 to justify its tariff measures on imports of steel and aluminum. However, the US’ tariff measures are not imposed for the protection of the US “essential security interests” but for economic and trade reasons. They do not satisfy the conditions listed under Article XXI (b) (i) to (iii) and should not be justified by them. They should not be considered as either national security measures or safeguard measures, but as ordinary trade restriction measures that are inconsistent with the WTO rules and the US obligations. A panel or the Appellate Body not only has the jurisdiction to review this dispute, but is also capable of making findings and providing a recommendation. Even if the US has the discretion to impose tariff measures under Article XXI (b), whether it has been acted in good faith, is still subject to the WTO review. As regards the tariff measures, the US has not acted in good faith.

China’s economic success and trade expansion since the 1980s is one of the most important economic achievements, which lifted more populations out of extreme poverty than any other time and place in history. This achievement has been made possible by trade-led development policies successfully adopted by China. China also joined the WTO in 2001, after fifteen years of negotiations with its trade partners, and is subject to WTO legal disciplines requiring the transparency of its trade-related decisions and procedures. This article examines China’s economic reform, which led to its accession into the WTO, and reviews China’s trade and development policies under the WTO. In addition, this article discusses China’s participation in the WTO Dispute Settlement Procedure. There has been a concern as to whether China will be compliant with the requirements under the Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The article shows that China has become an active participant and has maintained well under the terms of the DSU.

There are calls for biofuel imports from developing countries to be restricted. The imports which are either in the form of end-product (bioethanol or biodiesel) or feedstock (oil palm, sugar cane molasses, etc) are allegedly produced in ways which can threaten the environment and violate human rights. This article finds that there is no specific regime for trade in biofuels within the WTO system. Hence any restriction on such trade is governed by the existing trade regimes including tariffs and nontariff measures. However, the existing WTO tariff and non-tariff (TBT, anti-dumping and anti-subsidy) regimes are still inadequate in ensuring that measures are taken against biofuel feedstock and products that were produced in unsustainable ways. The use of these measures without being subject to clear defining rules will create a danger that they serve a protectionist rather than social or environmental objectives.