In the modern climate of concern regarding rogue states and terrorists attacks following September 11th, the Proliferation Security Initiative, a new cooperative interdiction separate from treaties and multilateral export control regimes, is considered a useful tool in preventing the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. However, the Proliferation Security Initiative[j2] includes certain strategies that are in conflict with contemporary international law of the sea. On a bilateral and multilateral basis, the United States seeks to promote the international law-making process to achieve the goals of the PSI through the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1540, the conclusion of a bilateral boarding agreement, and the revision of the SUA Convention. Despite such efforts, the United States has made little progress towards achieving its goals. It is difficult to overcome generally accepted and established principles of flag states and freedom of navigation, even if there are certain potential threats to international peace and security caused by the proliferation of WMD.

The Proliferation Security Initiative was launched in 2003 by the Bush administration right after the So San incident. Its primary purpose is to interdict the spread of WMD and their delivery systems. Due to the provocative and challenging characteristics of the Initiative, which are inconsistent with conventional international law, there are some objections against the Initiative. This paper answers the highly topical questions regarding the Initiative in three parts. The first part addresses the origin and development of the Initiative. The second part critically analyzes the background of the Initiative such as the neoconservative ideology of the Bush administration and its world strategy, international terrorism, and the U.S. arms industry. The third part scrutinizes questions concerning the preemptive use of force for self-defense and the interdiction of foreign vessels on the territorial and high seas. The Initiative is also examined from a viewpoint of customary international law.

China did not join the Proliferation Security Initiative due to deep legal and policy considerations. China now has sufficient reasons to reappraise its existing stance in light of the establishment and continuous development of a positive, cooperative and comprehensive Sino-U.S. relationship, institutionalization of the PSI by U.S. President Barack Obama, and new changes in nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. China’s participation in the PSI will be much more useful in enhancing the construction of international nonproliferation systems rather than remaining disengaged. Now it is the time for China to make the political decision and participate in the PSI.

This monograph takes on“ modern art”as the location of modernity. This subject, in my view, holds potential for a productive multi-logue and not just a dialogue, between three binary socio-cultural categories: child and adult, normal and mad, and colonisers and colonised. Modern art raises very interesting questions, and as an area that is often ignored in the analysis of law and science, it forms a powerful field for exploring both, as well as their intersections. Exploring the psychology of colonisation/domination is an important objective of this monograph. In order to get at it, the monograph imbibes Appadurai, Foucault, and Nandy as offering complementary stances on modernity and subsequent globalisation of intra- European relations after the industrial revolution. In doing so the author relates aspects of semiotic theory by looking at theories of myth. This monograph concludes by applying their relevance to the strategy of signification deployed by international law and relations.

UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in the 2004 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change,“ A more secure world: Our shared responsibility” (under the heading “A more effective United Nations for the twenty-first century” stated: “The United Nations was never intended to be a utopian exercise. It was meant to be a collective security system that worked.”However, several authors in recent years have asserted that the victorious powers merely wanted to maintain the status quo and their privileged positions, and never intended the system to work and give up those privileges. This paper, however, argues the contention that the UN was never designed to function effectively, is a myth, and it does not take into account important aspects and innovations that presented decisive new developments that originated with the United Nations. Thus the international court, which had in the interwar period been an institution outside the framework of the League of Nations Covenant, became an integral part of the UN system, making it more closely resemble a government with legislative, executive and judicial functions. Even more prominent, concerning the executive branch, the Security Council, unlike what had been the case with the League Council, opened itself to instigate members to delegate powers for its effective functioning. This was a most significant innovation that would allow for democratic process in the organization and defence of peace. Finally, a new principle in international law, i.e. the concept of a “transitional period”for world organization, was conceived.

Custom is a source of Islamic law in general and Siyar (Islamic international law) in particular. Islamic jurists have set out the elements and conditions of customs for general jurisprudential purpose. However, no one has, to the authors’knowledge, formulated them from Siyar perspective. This paper is an attempt to fill this gap by tracing two important elements of an international custom, namely frequent and dominant general practice of States, and acceptance of that practice as law. These two will constitute a valid custom provided they fulfill certain conditions, most importantly that the custom must not conflict with Shari’ah or the spirit of Shari’ ah.