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        검색결과 3

        1.
        2018.06 KCI 등재 서비스 종료(열람 제한)
        In the korean supreme court case in question, the fact needs to be reconsidered, that the prosecutor’s record containing the statement of witness that becomes the decisive evidence to prove the guilt was left out. Especially, even though the court judged that the chance of cross-examination was provided to the declarant of the record and there was no substantial violation of procedural rules, it could have assess the circumstantial guarantees of truthworthiness. Every issue will be absorbed into the principle of free evaluation of evidence, if the admissibility of the prosecutor’s record is not considered. It is so hard to completely agree with the argument of the dissenting opinion in which in case of inconsistent statements more weight of reliability must be placed on a court testimony. It is because it is clearly in violation of the principle of free evaluation of evidence to simply more rely on a court testimony in case of inconsistent statement. In light of the facts appearing in the case in question, it was possible to assess reliability of circumstances of statement separately from total consideration of reliability of evidences. Most of all, the witness’ statement before prosecutor should not have easily admitted when considering its’doubtful circumstances. Therefore, the courts, expecially the appellate court, should have closely examined the circumstances by having the persons related to the prosecutor’s interrogation take the stance. Because this process was left out, the requirement of the circumstantial guarantees of truthworthiness was not satisfied.
        2.
        2015.06 KCI 등재 서비스 종료(열람 제한)
        Korean supreme court in the en banc decision of 2008do942 newly set up the relationship between perjury and right to refuse to testify. Korean supreme court decided that it should be considered whether right to refuse to testify is violated by considering total circumstances even when a judge did not notify right to refuse to testify. In other words, perjury does not stand when it were an obstacle to exercise right to refuse to testify. The korean supreme court’s decision shows the unique structure of connecting right to refuse to testify with the subject requirement of crime of perjury. Many korean scholars understand the court’s decision en banc so much formally. Following their views, perjury does not stand if the mere fact of non-notification of right to refuse to testify may deny validity of an oath of witness. In contrast, just like the en banc decision of korean supreme court of 2008도942, a substantive approach raises its voice that right to refuse to testify in establishing perjury actually means prohibition of coercion of testimony. The most substantive views contents that, just like the past decisions of korean supreme court, the possibility of excuse should be taken into consideration based on the category of ‘a possibility of expectation to legal act’in case of non-notification of right to refuse to testify. In short, this paper would like to pay attention to the viewpoint that substance of right to refuse testify should be taken seriously, in relation with establishment of perjury. The real issue of the court decisions should not be on mere compliance of formal and procedural duty. The court’eye should placed on the identification of unfair circumstances that can vitiate possibility of a witness’ testimony with his or her own free will. A single factor of non-notification should not make conclusive effect. Rather, based on the factor of non-notification, perjury is not established only when substantive possibility of choice of testify was denied.
        3.
        2011.06 KCI 등재 서비스 종료(열람 제한)
        The issue of this paper is what is the definite limit of criminal coercion and how it can be determined. Basically, even if an actor gives threat to the victim, of which substance is within the scope of the actor’s right, that threatening expression can be subject to criminal punishment. In that case, if the actor does the act threatened, his act is out of the scope of criminal punishment. Korean Supreme Court has decided that, in consideration of motive and means of a threatening act, it can be wrong. Herewith, the problem is based on what standard the threatening act’s morality can be taken into consideration.Although morality of threatening act can be considered in the aspect of coercion, extortion and threat, is there any difference among them? The invasion on freedom of victim is the primary legal interest in this issue and also the invasion on freedom of actor should be taken seriously. These two aspects of threatening act should be taken to strike a balance in the area of our daily lives and market. Because the flexibility of decision of criminality of a threatening act makes it possible to restrict our legitimate activities too excessively, kinds of wisdom and principle should be invited in this area. We should note that the method of Korean Supreme Court of deciding criminality of verbal threatening is a wide scope of consideration of circumstances of an actor’s motives, means, benefits and disadvantages of his acts, etc. Also, the current interpretation of coercion, extortion and threat in Korean Criminal Code has paid more attention into violation of general morality in our society, rather than personal right to freedom from threatening expression. This interpretation seems to invite so various consideration of immorality of an actor’s threatening act.The standard of consideration of the cases in issue should be more specified. If it cannot be, it should be subject to constitutional review, based on principle of freedom and clarity. In America, If freedom of expression is in issue, the words existing in the provision of criminal punishment should be more rigorously reviewed. In Lewis v. City of New Orleans, the New Orleans’ criminal provision make it an offense “wantonly to cures or revile or to sue obscene or opprobrious language toward……” The supreme court of New Orleans strike down the provision in violation of the First Amendment, because it is too vague and general for the purpose of the Amendment. After the court's decision, the New Orleans legislator revise the provision, that you can be subject to punishment, if you falsely accuse some person of a crime or testify falsely or provide false information. By focusing on the wrongfulness of expression itself, the provision provide some restriction on punishment of an actor who expresses something within his right but with some inappropriate and base motives. Still, there remains flexible possibility of interpretation that must be a great challenge of that area.