Purpose: This paper examines the theoretical grounds for the disclosure of the Korea Fair Trade Commission. Three central measures of the disclosure are scrutinized: The interconnected status of affiliate companies, the important matters of private affiliates, and the large internal transactions. Contemplating on three measures, respectively, we review the rationale and derive policy implications. Research design, data, and methodology: Collecting the data of violation rates and remedial measures, we analyze the intensity of the disclosure enforcement. These statistics are critically reviewed by the economic literature of mandatory disclosure. Results: Statistics evince that the Korea Fair Trade Commission has enforced the regulatory disclosure quite successfully. Violation rates of the disclosure has declined from the outset. It demonstrates that the Korea Fair Trade Commission has enforced those measures satisfactorily for about a decade. But we cannot ascertain empirically whether the regulatory disclosures are socially and economically beneficial. To evaluate the effect of the regulatory disclosures precisely, we need a further empirical investigation. Conclusions: Despite the lack of policy evaluation, this study suggests complementary measures for current disclosures. First, disclosure of executive compensation in privately held subsidiaries must be introduced. Second, the controlling shareholder/manager should be responsible for information disclosure on foreign subsidiaries.

Purpose – This study measures how competitive securities broker-dealers are in the Korean financial markets. It aims to test whether the markets are perfectly competitive or monopolistic since the global financial crisis of 2008. Research design, data, and methodology – We apply the method developed by Panzar and Rosse (1987), H-statistics, which offers an index for the competitiveness as well as statistical tests. The dataset in use is retrieved mainly from the quarterly statements of the financial services companies by the Financial Statistics Information System of the Financial Supervisory Service. General information on officers and employees is utilized in addition to balance sheets and income statements of securities companies. Results – H-statistics for 2009-2015 is about 0.7 that is a robust estimate regardless of model specifications such as full trans-log, partial trans-log, and Cobb-Douglas regression equations. H-statistics for each year is also computed in similar ways in that it varies between 0.3 and 0.9. Conclusions – Since the global financial crisis, H-statistics concludes that securities broker-dealer markets in Korea is neither perfectly competitive nor monopolistic. It evidences that the markets are rather monopolistically competitive. The trend in annual H-statistics leads to the same conclusion but the result is not such stable that overall H-statistics implies.

Purpose – This aim of this study is to examine how conglomerates in Korea have evolved from the perspective of institutional economics. The growth of the economy, dominated by large conglomerates, is projected in light of the dynamic equilibrium between government and capitalists. Research design, data, and methodology – The historical formation of big business groups is examined in chronological order. For the analysis, we divide the assessment into three different eras: Japanese colonial rule, liberation up to the civil war, and the fast growing period since the military coup. Each period is viewed as a dynamic equilibrium that is shaped by economic agents. Results and Conclusion – Despite the rise of modern commerce during the colonial era, contemporary conglomerates came into being with the "enemy property" allotted by the government. Around the civil war, the government coexisted with prototype conglomerates through foreign aid. As the external aid decreased, the system could not be sustained anymore, thus the military coup took place. The reinstated strong bond between government and the conglomerates has shaped the forms of the modern conglomerates thereafter.