Regulatory agencies require burn-up verification to ensure that dry storage casks using burn-up credit are not loaded with fuel with a reactivity greater than the allowable standard. Accordingly, in preparation for dry storage of SF, the reliability of the burnup was verified and action plans for fuel with confirmed errors were reviewed. Reliability verification was performed by comparing the actual burnup calculated with combustion calculation code (TOTE, ISOTIN) used in NPP and the design burnup calculated with the nuclear design code (ANC). As a result of comparing the differences between actual burnup and design burnup for 7,414 assemblies of SF generated from CE-type NPPs, the average deviation was confirmed to be 0.79% and 220 MWD/MTU. In the CE-type NPPs, no fuel showing large deviations was identified, and it was confirmed that reliability was secured. As a result of comparing the differences in 11,082 assemblies of SF generated from WH-type NPPs, the differences were not large, averaging 1.16% or 422 MWD/MTU. However, fuels showing significant differences were identified, and cause analysis was performed for those fuels. The cause analysis used a method of comparing the burnup of symmetrically loaded fuels in the reactor. For fuels that were not symmetrically loaded, a method was used to compare them with fuels with similar combustion histories. As a result of the review, it was confirmed that the fuel was under- or over-burned compared to symmetrically loaded fuel. For fuels for which clear errors have been identified, we are considering replacing them with the design burnup, and for fuels whose causes cannot be confirmed, we are considering ways to maintain the actual burnup.

For the transport of spent nuclear fuel, it is necessary to evaluate the amount of radioactivity for each assembly and the total amount of radioactivity for each cask. Currently, KHNP is evaluating the radioactivity using the Express mode of the OrigenArp program in the SCALE6.1 code. Express mode is a method to evaluate the radioactivity assuming that it has been burned with the same power per cycle, and Detail mode is a method to evaluate the actual combustion history such as power and cooling time for each cycle. For a total of 3,795 assemblies, including 1,391 assembliess for Kori Unit 1, 1,427 assemblies for Hanbit Unit 2, and 977 assemblies for Hanul Unit 3, the radioactivity was evaluated in Express mode and Detail mode, respectively, and the results were compared. As a result of the evaluation, it was confirmed that the results of the Express mode were evaluated more conservatively by 2.5~12.9% than that of the Detail mode. Accordingly, KHNP established a plan to change the evaluation method from Express mode to Detail mode in order to improve the accuracy of the radioactivity assessment results and eliminate conservatism.

The manufactured nuclear fuel assembly is loaded into the nuclear reactor after the core design, and is finally discharged to the wet storage pool after depletion for 3 cycles. The discharged spent nuclear fuel is transported and stored in a dry storage system at the on-site of the nuclear power plant, which is cooled by natural convection, and undergoes final disposal or reprocessing through an intermediate dry storage facility. In this series of processes, the characteristics of the final product, the spent fuel, vary depending on the environmental conditions, so it is essential to manage each history data to verify the long-term integrity of the spent nuclear fuel. In this paper, safety information on spent nuclear fuel is described in order to establish technical requirements that should be considered in each stage of storage, transport, reprocessing, and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. Comprehensive safety information on spent nuclear fuel is basically calculated from basic information that considers characteristic information that can be obtained through the manufacture and design of nuclear fuel assemblies, operation history in a nuclear reactor, and location history in a wet storage pool. It can be divided into secondary production information (SF Burnup, Nuclide Inventory, etc.) and tertiary integrity-related information obtained through cladding inspection during spent fuel storage. KHNP produces this multi-layered information according to the production stage and manages it through the comprehensive management system of the spent nuclear fuel, and safety information with some errors is not only improved through re-verification but also continuously updated. In this paper, the spent nuclear fuel safety information was derived based on various information calculated in the entire process of being discharged and managed in a wet storage pool, including new fuel manufacturing information and depletion history. Such safety information will be used as basic data for long-term safe management of spent nuclear fuel, and will be continuously produced and managed. In the future, additional discussions will be held on the safety information of the spent nuclear fuel through consultation with KORAD and regulatory agencies.