The aim of this study is to ensure the structural integrity of a canister to be used in a dry storage system currently being developed in Korea. Based on burnup and cooling periods, the canister is designed with 24 bundles of spent nuclear fuel stored inside it. It is a cylindrical structure with a height of 4,890 mm, an internal diameter of 1,708 mm, and an inner length of 4,590 mm. The canister lid is fixed with multiple seals and welds to maintain its confinement boundary to prevent the leakage of radioactive waste. The canister is evaluated under different loads that may be generated under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, and combinations of these loads are compared against the allowable stress thresholds to assess its structural integrity in accordance with NUREG-2215. The evaluation result shows that the stress intensities applied on the canister under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions are below the allowable stress thresholds, thus confirming its structural integrity.

A transfer cask serves as the container for transporting and handling canisters loaded with spent nuclear fuels from light water reactors. This study focuses on a cylindrical transfer cask, standing at 5,300 mm with an external diameter of 2,170 mm, featuring impact limiters on the top and bottom sides. The base of the cask body has an openable/closable lid for loading canisters with storage modules. The transfer cask houses a canister containing spent nuclear fuels from lightweight reactors, serving as the confinement boundary while the cask itself lacks the confinement structure. The objective of this study was to conduct a structural analysis evaluation of the transfer cask, currently under development in Korea, ensuring its safety. This evaluation encompasses analyses of loads under normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, adhering to NUREG-2215. Structural integrity was assessed by comparing combined results for each load against stress limits. The results confirm that the transfer cask meets stress limits across normal, off-normal, and accident conditions, establishing its structural safety.

The dry storage of spent fuel has become an increasingly important issue in the field of nuclear energy. Square-gridded baskets have been widely used for the storage of spent fuel because of their superior heat transfer and structural integrity. In this paper, we review the fabrication process of square-gridded baskets for dry storage of spent fuel. The review includes the design considerations, material selection, manufacturing methods, and quality control measures. We also discuss the challenges and opportunities for further improvement in the fabrication of square-gridded baskets. The fabrication of square-gridded baskets is a critical process for the safe and reliable dry storage of spent fuel. The review of the fabrication process highlights the importance of design considerations, material selection, manufacturing methods, and quality control measures. Continued efforts to improve the fabrication process will help to ensure the safe and secure storage of spent fuel.

As of 2023, there has been significant progress worldwide in the management of nuclear fuel’s spent radioactive waste (HLW). Several countries have made important strides in advancing their plans for the construction of deep geologic repositories (DGRs) to safely dispose of their nuclear waste. Finland led the way, with its nuclear waste management organization, Posiva Oy, submitting an application for an operating license for a DGR for spent fuel generated by the nuclear power plants of its owners. The facility, ONKALO, will be located on the island of Olkiluoto and is expected to begin final disposal in the mid-2020s. Sweden also approved SKB’s application to build a DGR in Forsmark, and an encapsulation plant next to the Clab interim storage facility. In Switzerland, Nagra selected Nordic Lagern as the site for the Swiss DGR, and is preparing the general license applications for the required facilities. Meanwhile, Canada’s Nuclear Waste Management Organization (NWMO) narrowed down the possible locations for its DGR to two, and expects to name its preferred site by fall 2024. The UK established four Community Partnerships to participate in the siting process for a DGR, with Nuclear Waste Services (NWS) responsible for identifying a site. Andra, the French organization responsible for managing all French radioactive waste, is expected to submit an application by the end of the year for a DGR in France that will contain HLW resulting from reprocessing of spent fuel assemblies from French nuclear power plants, as well as intermediate-level waste. Overall, the progress made by these countries represents a tangible and sustainable step forward in the management of spent fuel and HLW, and brings us closer to the safe and effective long-term disposal of nuclear waste.

The spent fuel is classified based on the arrangement of fuel rods, which is considered the primary characteristic data for selecting nuclear fuel. The reason for prioritizing the classification by fuel rod arrangement is that it has the greatest physical impact on the production, supply, operation, reactor type, rack size within the containment vessel, and specifications for the basket in the future dry storage system. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, various meanings of nuclear fuel types are distinguished according to the arrangement of fuel rod. The burnup and cooling period ranges are also important factors in the characterization analysis for the selection of spent fuel, the burnup range was set for both low and high burnup ranges and the cooling period is necessary to consider the reliability during handling of nuclear fuel thermal distribution within the storage system

Spent fuel from the Wolsong CANDU reactor has been stored in above-ground dry storage canisters. Wolsong concrete dry storage canisters (silos) are around 6 m high, 3 m in outside diameter, and have shielding comprised of around 1 m of concrete and 10 mm of steel liner. The storage configuration is such that a number of fuel bundles are placed inside a cylindrical steel container known as a Fuel Basket. The canisters hold up to 9 baskets each that are 304 L stainless steel, around 42” in diameter, 22” in height, and hold 60 fuel bundles each. The operating license for the dry storage canisters needs to be extended. It is desired to perform in-situ inspections of the fuel baskets to very their condition is suitable for retrieval (if necessary) and that the temperature within the fuel baskets is as predicted in the canister’s design basis. KHNP-CNL (Canadian Nuclear Lab.) has set-up the design requirements to perform the in-situ inspections in the dry storage canisters. This Design Requirements applies to the design of the dry storage canister inspection system.

PWR spent nuclear fuel generally showed an oxide film thickness of 100 um or more with a combustion rate of 45 MWD/MTU or higher, while CANDU spent nuclear fuel with an average combustion rate of about 7.8 MWD/MTU had few issues related to hydride corrosion. Even based on the actual power plant data, it is known that the thickness of the oxide film is 10 μm or less on the surface of the coating tube, and brittleness caused by hydride is shown from the thickness of the oxide film of about 80 μm, so it is not worth considering. However, since corrosion may be accelerated by lithium ions, lithium ions may be said to be a very important factor in controlling the hydro-chemical environment of heavy water. Lithium has a negative effect on the corrosion of zirconium alloys. However, since local below 5 ppb to prevent corrosion. maintained at a concentration between 0.35 and 0.55 ppm. Hydrogen is known to have a positive effect by suppressing radioactive decomposition of the coolant and suppressing cracks in nickelbased alloys. However, too much hydrogen can produce hydride in a pressure tube composed of Zr-2.5Nb, so DH (Disolved Hydrogen) maintains the range of 0.27–0.90 ppm. pH and conductivity are completely determined by lithium ions, and DH can be completely removed below 5 ppb to prevent corrosion. Therefore, for cladding corrosion simulation of the CANDU spent nuclear fuel, a hydrochemical of the equipment, not 310°C, and 14 uS·Cm−1 is targeted as conditions for corrosion acceleration. In addition, for acceleration, the temperature was set to 345°C (margin 10°C), which is the maximum accommodation range of the equipment, not 310°C.