The decommissioning of nuclear facilities produces various types of radiologically contaminated waste. In addition, dismantlement activities, including cutting, packing, and clean-up at the facility site, result in secondary radioactive waste such as filters, resin, plastic, and clothing. Determining of the radionuclide content of this waste is an important step for the determination of a suitable management strategy including classification and disposal. In this work, we radiochemically characterized the radionuclide activities of filters used during the decommissioning of Korea Research Reactors (KRRs) 1 and 2. The results indicate that the filter samples contained mainly 3H (500–3,600 Bq·g−1), 14C (7.5–29 Bq·g−1), 55Fe (1.1– 7.1 Bq·g−1), 59Ni (0.60–1.0 Bq·g−1), 60Co (0.74–70 Bq·g−1), 63Ni (0.60–94 Bq·g−1), 90Sr (0.25–5.0 Bq·g−1), 137Cs (0.64–8.7 Bq·g−1), and 152Eu (0.19–2.9) Bq·g−1. In addition, the gross alpha radioactivity of the samples was measured to be between 0.32–1.1 Bq·g−1. The radionuclide concentrations were below the concentration limit stated in the low- and intermediatelevel waste acceptance criteria of the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, and used for the disposal of the KRRs waste drums to a repository site.

We established pretreatment method of solidified cement ion-exchange resin samples generated before 2003 in nuclear power plants for measurement of non-volatile radionuclide activity. A microwave digestion system (MDS) with mixed acid (HCl-HNO3-HF-H2O2) was used to dissolve cement and to desorb non-volatile elements such as Ce, Co, Cs, Fe, Nb, Ni, Re, Sr and U from mixed ion-exchange resin. The content of Ce, Co, Fe, Nb, Ni, Re, Sr, U and Cs after pretreatment of cement plus mixed ion-exchange resin was measured by ICP-AES and ICP-MS, respectively. As iron and strontium are also present in cement, their content after dissolving a certain amount of cement was measured by ICP-AES. All elements except Nb were quantitatively recovered. Especially since the Nb recovery was low at 72.0±2.5%, the MDS following addition of the mixed acid to the resin was operated once more for desorbing Nb from it. Finally the recovery of Nb was over 95%. This sample pretreatment method will be applied to solidified cement ion-exchange resin samples generated in nuclear power plants for assessment of radionuclide inventory.

The massive amount of radioactive waste will generated during decommissioning of nuclear. Among the radioactive waste from these disposal process, 50-55 million tons of concrete waste are included. For safe disposal, it is very important to accurately analyze the concentration of radionuclides, especially 129I and 131I, contaminated concrete. 129I, a long-lived radioisotope of iodine (t1/2=1.57 × 107 y), and 131I (t1/2=8.04 d) are generated from the fission of uranium in nuclear reactors. In Korea, according to the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) radioactive clearance level guide, the limit for radioactive clearance level of 129I is less than 0.01 (Bq/g). Iodine can be absorbed, accumulate in organisms, and exhibit low energy emission compared with cesium, and cobalt. Therefore, it is essential to an accurately separate and analyze iodine radioactive waste. In this study, we focused on the determination of iodine in simulated cement waste form containing KI for the recovery of iodine. We performed cement waste form sieved through a different particle size (0.5 mm < ɸ < 6.35 mm). For the separation of iodine from solid samples with low iodine content, such as soil, sediment, and cement, for sample decomposition associated with solvent extraction using CHCl3 for separation of iodine from the matrix. The separation of iodine in cement waste particles was therefore carried out using an acid leaching method using KI containing cement particles. We observed that cement particle size decreased at 6.35 mm to 0.5 mm with iodine yield decrease at 0.840±0.011 to 0.582±0.010. Thus, in this study, the acid leaching method enables to determination Iodine in cement.

In a recent preliminary inspection for disposal, the glass fiber waste (GFW), used as a pipe insulation, was judged as “pending evaluation” because some dust was found in drum opening tests. Therefore, additional inspection is required to ensure that the package corresponds with the acceptance criteria of the particulates. The dust was generated presumably due to GFW being used in a high-temperature environment for a long time, thus being easily degraded and crushed. For this reason, safety issues that may occur in the process of handling, transportation, and disposal are emerging. Therefore, in this study, a preliminary safety assessment of GFW disposal was performed, the exposure dose to the general public was derived, and compared with the dose limit. The evaluation was carried out in the following order: (1) evaluation of GFW radiation source term, (2) selection of accident scenario, (3) calculation of exposure dose, (4) comparison of evaluation results with dose limits, and confirmation of satisfaction. The average radioactivity of the GFW to be disposed of was used as the source term, and the main nuclides were identified as H-3, Fe-55, Co-60, Ni-63, and Pu-241. In general, the types of accidents that can occur at disposal facilities can be classified into falls, fires, collisions during transportation, off-site accidents, and nuclear criticality, and the accident scenarios are selected by analyzing and reviewing the probability of each accident. In this study, the accident analysis and scenarios presented in the safety assessment of the KORAD were reviewed, and the fire in the treatment facility, the fire in the storage facility, and the collision of the transport vehicle were selected as the evaluation scenarios. When an accident occurs, the radioactive material inside the container leaks out and diffuses into the atmosphere. In this evaluation, the internal and external exposure of the general public due to radioactive plume at the site boundary was evaluated and the dose conversion factors from ICRP-72 and FGR 12 were used. Based on the evaluation, general public was exposed to 0.004 mSv, 0.013 mSv, and 0.045 mSv, respectively, due to a fire at a treatment facility, at a storage facility, and in a transport vehicle. Most of the dose is due to internal exposure by Pu-241 nuclide, because the proportion of it in the waste is high, and when inhaled, the internal dose is high by emitting beta rays. It was confirmed that the result of dose was 0.4%, 1.3% and 4.5% of the annual dose limit, sufficiently satisfying the dose limit and safety.