생물다양성협약 당사국총회 결의에 따르면, 환경영향평가란 제안된 계획 또 는 개발이 환경에 미칠 것 같은 영향을 이익적 측면과 불리한 측면에서 사회경 제적, 문화적 및 인간의 건강에 미치는 영향과 연계하여 평가하는 과정을 의미한다. 해양에서의 환경영향평가 제도는 다수의 국가에 의해 국내법적으로 수용 하여 수행되어왔으며, 국제적으로도 많은 환경협약과 하위 지침들로부터 의무 화하여 수행되고 있다. 국제법상 국가관할권 이원지역에 대한 환경영향평가의 수행의무는 분명히 존재한다. 최근 채택된 BBNJ협정은 국가관할권 이원지역에 대한 종합적인 환경 및 해양생물다양성 보호를 목적으로 하는데, 그중 제4부는 환경영향평가의 발동요건, 절차, 평가의 내용, 협의과정, 의사결정 등 환경영향 평가 수행 전반에 대한 요건을 서술하고 있다. 본 연구에서는 다수의 환경영향 평가와 관련된 기존제도들 중 국가관할권 이원지역만을 협약의 적용지역으로 하고, 명확히 환경영향평가의 의무를 부과하고 있는 남극조약체제 및 국제해저 기구 주관하의 심해저 광업규칙상 환경영향평가제도와 BBNJ협정상 환경영향 평가제도의 비교를 통해 환경보호의 대응기조가 어떻게 유사하게 반영되었는 지 또는 차이점이 있는지 살펴보고 그 실효성에 대하여 논한다. 결론적으로 1) 기존제도와 달리 BBNJ협정은 call-in mechanism의 적용을 통 해 환경영향평가서에 대한 최종 의사결정권을 당사국에게 부여하고 있다. 2) 국가관할권 내측 지역으로부터의 월경 오염에 대한 환경영향평가 절차를 포함 함으로써 월경오염에 대한 준수의 효과성을 보장하고자 하였다. 3) 대중통고 및 협의, 활동의 영향에 대한 검토 조항을 통해 환경영향평가의 절차에서 넓은 범위의 이해관계자를 포함하고, 기존제도와 달리 국가관할권 이원지역에서의 활동으로부터 야기된 월경오염으로 영향을 받을 수 있는 연안국을 명시하여 환 경영향평가 절차에서 역할을 부여하고 있다. 4) 기존제도상 환경영향평가시 고 려되던 누적영향 및 잔존영향에 더하여 전략환경평가라는 현대적 보전기법을 규정하고 있다. 남극조약체제 및 국제해저기구 주관하의 심해저 광업규칙상 환 경영향평가제도 역시 과거 작성되었던 규칙에 대비하여 비교적 최근의 규칙 및 현재 작성중인 문서에서 대중통고 절차 신설, 확장된 이해관계자의 참여 근거 규정 마련 등에 따라 환경보호를 위한 국제사회의 강화된 기조에 대응하고 있 음을 살펴볼 수 있었다. 향후 당사국 총회를 통해 환경영향평가의 세부 지침이 보완될 것임에 따라, 기존의 관련 제도상 환경영향평가 절차 및 내용에 대한 정확한 숙지를 기반으로 하여 대응해 나가야 할 것이다. 또한 관련 전문기관을 지정하고 과학 전문가 양성에 집중해야 할 것이다.

The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.

Studies on automatic scoring systems in writing assessments have also evaluated the relationship between human and machine scores for the reliability of automated essay scoring systems. This study investigated the magnitudes of indices for inter-rater agreement and discrepancy, especially regarding human and machine scoring, in writing assessment. The mean of the overall population correlation between automated and human scoring in essay writing was .78. The overall common d effect size was 0.001. Results from this meta-analysis indicated a strong relationship with no discrepancies between automated and human scoring. Both the I2 and Q values suggested that the population correlation values studied seemed to be heterogeneous, in contrast to homogenous d effect sizes. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate the sources of the between-studies variations for r correlations. Practical implications for ways of reporting results of automatic-scoring systems research and limitations of the study are also discussed.

A bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA) should define what is subject to the agreement and when. Nuclear Materials (NM) are the subject of NCA with almost all countries, and the definition used in these agreements is borrowed from Article 20 of the IAEA Charter. The IAEA’s definition of NM as consisting of special fissionable material and source material and describes the types of material each contains. In order to control the export of NM under national laws and implement NCA, not only the types of NM but also quantitative criteria are required. This is because controlling small quantities of NM is impossible, unnecessary, and would create excessive administrative burdens. For this reason, the NSG guidelines establish a quantitative threshold of NM requiring control. Nevertheless, no quantitative thresholds have been agreed upon for NM subject to a NCA. Whether NM transferred is subject to the NCA is primarily a matter for the supplier states to determine. The supplier states make the decision based on quantitative criteria defined in their own export control laws. ROK identifies NM that require export licenses by reflecting the same criteria as the NSG guidelines in Foreign Trade Laws and its Notifications. Less than 500 kg of Natural Uranium, 1,000 kg of Depleted Uranium, 1,000 kg of Thorium, and 50 effective grams of special fissionable materials do not require an export license and is therefore not subject to NCA. In the US, the quantitative threshold for requiring an export license is different from that of ROK. For example, special fissionable materials that are not Pu are required if the individual shipment exceed 1 effective gram or 100 effective grams per year. The difference in the quantitative thresholds for NM between the two countries mean that the same item may be subject to NCA under US standards, but not under ROK’s. For example, the export of 8 grams of highly enriched uranium (93%) contained in a neutron detector would not be subject to the NCA in ROK, but would be considered NM subject to a NCA and required a special license in the US. Of course, in order to ensure the application of safeguards and physical protection to all NM transferred between the two countries, the agreement may not include a quantitative threshold for NM. However, the absence of such a threshold can lead to different conclusions by the two countries on the same item and make it challenging to control retransfers. The definition of quantitative standards will be necessary in the supplementary administrative arrangement for the practical control and management of NM subject to the NCA.

An administrative agreement (AA) was signed between NSSC and UAE FANR in January 2023 under Article 5 of the ROK-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. The AA aims to enhance regulatory efficiency in safeguards and export control. This study reviewed the export control measures for the items subject to the agreement (ISA) and implementation procedures under ROK-UAE AA by comparing them with other countries cases. First of all, the ROK-UAE AA distinguishes between ISA and the inventory management target items. Technology is divided into two categories, one requiring consent for retransfer and the other, considering the characteristics of technology that is free to be copied and deleted, and thus less useful for inventory management. Only the former is included in the annual report, which differs from the ROK-Canada or ROK-Japan NCA, which includes all technologies subject to the agreements in the annual report. When ROK notifies export information, it is mandatory to specify whether the technology requires consent for retransfer. Furthermore, some technologies should be controlled as strategic information, even if excluded from the annual report, so efforts to prevent confusion are required. Secondly, the ROK-UAE AA covers all items in INFCIRC/254/rev.9/part1, unlike the ROK-U.S. and ROK-Canada NCA, which listed equipment subject to them. This is significant because it clarifies the criteria for regulation by increasing the consistency between the trigger list items in the domestic law and the ISA. However, the expanded ISA scope could result in some changes in export control procedures. For example, when importing nuclear material (NM) from the US, only uranium was controlled as ISA, and the packages were not considered. In contrast, when exporting fuel assemblies (FA) for UAE, both uranium and zirconium cladding should be treated as ISA. To this end, NEPS was improved to implement the features of the ROK-UAE AA. Consideration of the criteria and methods for imposing obligations under the agreement is essential because this is the first case of Korea concluded AA under exporting NPP and as a supplier of FA. Generally, the obligations for NM are imposed by the country of origin, conversion, and enrichment countries. Canada and EU recognize the fuel fabrication process as a substantial transformation and impose customs origin where the process takes place. Hence, NM fabricated from Canadian equipment is also subject to the same obligations as NM of Canadian origin. From this perspective, it would be appropriate to ensure ROK acts as a supplier and controls when exporting domestically manufactured FA. Moreover, a proper national obligation code system will be required to specify Korea’s control rights.

본 연구는 FTA 무역협정과 관련하여 기존 연구들이 수행했던 직접운 송원칙에 대한 분석을 넘어서 APTA 직접운송원칙의 운영상 제기된 여 러 문제를 파악하고자 관세청 판례사례를 바탕으로 분석해보고자 하였 다. 연구를 위해 관세청 관세평가 판례 사건번호-조심-2017-30의 심판 청구사건(제목: “APTA 직접운송원칙 위반 여부”)을 연구에 활용하였다. 최근 협정관세율 적용이 배제되어 관세를 부과 당하는 처분 사례가 증가 하고, 심사청구, 적부심사 사건 분쟁이 꾸준하게 늘고 있는 상황에서 이 번 연구 주제에 대한 논의가 APTA를 적용받고자 하는 무역 기업에 유 용한 자료를 제공하고 있다는 점에서 연구의 의의가 있다.

In his Liberation Day speech, President Yoon Suk-yeol of South Korea pointed out that he would like to improve Korea-Japan relations towards a common future. However, a thorn in the relation between Japan and South Korea has been the unresolved issue of the so-called comfort women who had been forced to serve as sex slaves for the Japanese army between 1932 to 1945. The case of the comfort women raises many legal questions. On December 28, 2015, the Japanese and Korean government reached an agreement that aims to resolve the decades-old problem. The so-called 2015 Agreement gave new impetus to the debate over the legal responsibility of the Japanese government under international law. The most relevant issues and subsequent legal developments will be discussed in the following article.

The main purpose of the Bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is to obtain the prior consent of suppliers in the case of peaceful use of items covered by the agreement, application of IAEA safeguards, reprocessing, enrichment or transfer to a third country. Reports on inventory changes and status for mutually transferred obligated items should be exchanged annually. According to the Agreement, items subject to bilateral agreement information must be exchanged with each other prior to direct or indirect transfer of controlled items. And the importing country proceeds with prior confirmation. After that, upon receipt of the target item, shipment notification and shipment confirmation are made, and an annual report on the target item is made. Such as the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), annual reporting and management of obligated items are made centered on institutions that use a lot of nuclear materials. But there are cases of delays in the agreement work due to the implementation, and discrepancies in data are occurring in the process of checking inventory details of obligated items. In addition, it was difficult to check the inventory of items subject to the agreement and the status of Export and Import status online, making it impossible for managers to monitor all aspects of bilateral agreements. Currently, there is generated to inconsistent in information between the annual report and the international transfer report in terms of Export and Import control. To solve these problems, KAERI is aim of promoting transparency in the international nuclear power sector and enhancing national reliability. And It is planning to establish an Export and Import management system for items subject to bilateral. In order to ensure the accuracy, it is going to enhance the efficiency of management methods such as new registration for new institutions when exporting and Importing items. This has the ultimate purpose of improving the efficiency of the implementation of the agreement items through the systemization of the database of agreement items and the management of the implementation of the agreement based on the sincere and timely implementation of the agreement.

Under the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) and its administrative arrangement (AA), Korea annually exchanges the inventory of subject items (including nuclear materials (NM), non-nuclear materials, equipment, and related information) with US, Canada and Australia. Also, the government performs export control procedures such as notification or prior consent during importing and exporting of relevant items. It makes NCA a means of realizing the nuclear non-proliferation regime. However, it raises difficulties in management because the entity that uses and treats those items are end-user, not the authorities of AA, the government agency of each country. Accordingly, to increase the accuracy and effectiveness of item management at the national level, it is required to establish a system for the individual company that has the NCA items, considering the characteristics of each company. In this study, significant companies are classified into more than three types, and the management system of the items subject to the agreement is analyzed. Each company’s item management status has different characteristics depending on its role (position) within the entire nuclear fuel cycle, the type of facility, its possessed items, the main form of national trade, and the frequency of domestic movement. Those differences lead to diversity in the management systems currently owned by each company. For example, from the perspective of nuclear materials, institutions requiring bulk management have systematically organized their management system and obligation code program compared to the ‘item institutions’ that can track batch history for all facility inventory changes. Although Domestic law imposes only the duty of origin management on NMs, fuel manufacturers or research institutes have established their standard obligation codes to manage multiple obligations. The non-nuclear materials and equipment can be easily tracked and controlled by individual items. However, the management of NCA items is a complicated task involving various processes, from importing goods to using, storing, managing inventory change, selling to others, or fulfilling the obligations of AA when exporting. In particular, when the movement of items within a company or international trade occurs frequently, or when the end-users are diverse, the management difficulties increase. So a system that can accurately convey and track items subject to the AA is needed. In addition, since various entities are related, it is necessary to improve understanding of NCA items to increase the system’s utilization and effectiveness. The comparison result and requirement for system improvement based on the review above will be reflected in the history management system for items subject to NCA under development.

우리나라 원양산업은 대중성 수산물 공급 및 식량안보에 중요한 역할을 하고 있다. IMO를 비롯한 각국에서는 어선의 국제적으 로 통일된 안전 기준 마련을 위하여 노력하였고, ‘1977년 어선안전 토레몰리노스 협약’ 채택을 시작으로 ‘2012 케이프 타운 협정’ 채택을 하였으나 발효 요건을 충족하지 못하고 있다. 그러나 2019 토레몰리노스 선언으로 협정의 발효가 가시화되었고, 우리나라도 협정 비준을 앞두고 있으며 원양어선이 협정의 적용 대상이 된다. 2012 케이프 타운 협정은 적용 대상 기준을 선체의 길이 또는 총톤수를 선택할 수 있고, 현존선에 대해서도 일부 적용이 된다. 현존선에 대한 영향을 확인하기 위하여 한국원양산업협회 회원으로 등록된 원양어선 188척을 대상으로 분석한 결과 총톤수 적용이 협정 비준에 미치는 영향이 적은 것으로 나타났다. 또한 Two-way VHF, Radar transponder 등 GMDSS 설비의 강제화 및 선원들의 안전 친숙화 등의 대한 법령 개정이 필요한 것으로 식별되었다. 산업계에서는 협정에서 요구하는 설비의 비 치와 어선원의 안전 친숙화가 필요하다.

이 논문의 목적은 미국의 오바마 행정부가 유엔 기후변화에 관한 파리 협정에 가입한 요인과 트럼프 행정부가 파리협정에서 탈퇴한 요인을 이 론적 시각에서 설명하는 것이다. 이를 위해 활용하는 이론적 분석 틀은 외교정책이념 접근법과 국제협력에서의 절대적 이득 및 상대적 이득 요 인 분석이다. 분석의 결과로서 이 논문은 오바마 행정부와 트럼프 행정 부의 외교정책이념이 국제협력에서 각각 절대적 이득 또는 상대적 이득 의 중시 여부를 결정하고 그에 따라 파리협정에 가입하거나 탈퇴하는 결 과를 낳았다고 분석한다. 즉 오바마 행정부는 환경 및 경제 외교정책에 있어서는 자유주의적 국제주의 이념을 추구하는 경향을 보였다. 자유주 의적 국제주의 이념은 글로벌 기후변화 이슈에서 중국과의 협력을 권고 하고 파리협정과 관련하여 미국이 얻게 될 절대적 이득을 중시하도록 하 여 오바마 행정부가 파리협정에 가입하는 결과를 낳았다. 반면에 트럼프 행정부는 국제관계를 제로섬(zero-sum)적인 경쟁 관계로 간주하고 국제 협력에서 상대적 이득 요인을 우선시하는 경제적 민족주의 외교정책이념 을 지향하였다. 따라서 트럼프 행정부는 미국의 시장을 보호하고 경제력 을 증진하는 것을 최우선 과제로 설정하고 글로벌 환경협력에서도 상대 적 이득 요인을 중시하였다. 그리하여 파리협정이 중국이나 인도 등과 비교해서 미국에 상대적인 경제적 손실을 초래할 것을 예상하였기 때문 에 파리협정에서 탈퇴하는 결정을 내린 것으로 분석된다.

하도급거래의 현실은 수직적 구조를 특징으로 하기 때문에 계약관계에서 우월적 지위가 전제된다. 이러한 구조적 문제점으로 인한 불공정 하도급거래행위를 억제하고 공정한 하도급거래 시장 환경을 구축하기 위한 다양한 제도적 장치가 마련되어 왔다. 하지만 경제나 기술적 환경, 노동시장의 변화 등으로 인하여 하도급계약을 둘러싸고는 여전히 많은 쟁점이 도출되고 있으며 이에 대한 제도적 접근에 대한 논의가 진행되고 있다. 최근 논의가 활발해지고 있는 납품 단가 연동제 역시 COVID-19나 우크라이나 사태와 같이 평소 예기치 못한 특별한 사정이 발생하여 원자재 가격 등이 상승함으로 발생한 위험을 하도급 계약의 당사자 간에 어떻게 분담할 것인가에 대한 논의를 다시 촉발시켰다. 원자재 가격 등이 급등하여 하도급계약에서 정한 제품이나 용역을 제공하기 위해 필요한 비용이 크게 증가하였음에도 불구하고 납품단가에 대하여 다시 검토하지 않는 것은 원사업자의 우월적 지위를 남용하여 수급사업자에게 실질적 으로 하도급계약을 통한 대가를 인하하는 것과 같은 불이익을 주게 될 수 있다.이러한 점을 고려하면 현행 조정협의제의 실효성에 한계가 노정된 경우 납품 단가 연동제를 통한 보완책을 마련하는 것은 고려할 수 있는 하나의 대안으로 생각된다. 그러나 건설 하도급거래는 전통적으로 도급계약이 가장 많이 활용되는 분야이다. 아울러 건설공사는 통상의 제조업과는 달리 정형적인 제품을 일률적으로 생산 하는 것이 아니라 발주자의 수요에 따라 다양한 형태의 생산물이 요구된다. 그리고 건설공사의 수직적 구조에 참여하는 다양한 건설주체들에 의해 만들어 지는 중간생산물이 긴밀하게 연계되어 최종 생산물을 완성하게 된다. 결국, 건설공사를 이루는 수직적 구조에서는 참여자 간에 협의 및 조정을 통한 협력이 매우 중요하다. 따라서 하도급대금의 조정에 관한 입법정책은 계약의 당사자들 간의 자발적 협의 및 조정을 강화할 수 있는 방향으로 설계되고 운용되는 것이 바람직할 것이다.

The ROK conducts several export procedures, communications in connection with transfers; exchange of information on export plan, shipments, and receipt of nuclear materials, in accordance with bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCA) and Administrative Arrangements (AA) signed with US, Canada, and Australia. Also, the inventory amount of items subject to NCA has reported annually. This study reviewed the export procedures and management methods for spent nuclear fuel subject to NCA. The re-transfer procedures start with obtaining consent from the original exporting country. It is impossible to retransfer nuclear material without consent, whether long-term or individual case-bycase. If the material has multiple obligations, prior consent from all of those countries is required. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the foreign obligated materials correctly. In general, nuclear fuel is subject to multiple obligations of all countries through which the materials have passed during the front-end fuel cycle. Then the new obligations are imposed on those irradiated materials or their by-products after ‘used-in’ or ‘produced through the use of ’ equipment subject to NCA. For example, fuel assemblies manufactured under CANDU fuel fabrication equipment subject to ROK-Canada NCA or burned in nuclear reactors where US equipment is installed have obligations based on Canada or US agreements. In order to impose obligation to irradiated materials, the principle of proportionality is applied as stipulated in each Agreement. According to the AA between US and ROK, nuclear materials used in the equipment transferred under the Agreement and produced through them are differently controlled. After the cycle in the reactor with US-made equipment, uranium in the irradiated fuel is considered a material used in the equipment. So it would be appropriate to apply obligation proportionality according to its origin, regardless the US-made equipment. Meanwhile, the obligation under US NCA is given to the entire amount of produced plutonium in the irradiated fuel. Although the contribution to the production of fuel is to be discussed case-by-case basis in the case of Canadian obligation, applying a similar method is proper. Since the fuel is burned in the form of bundles or assemblies, it is impossible to separate the spent fuel into uranium and plutonium physically. However, as discussed above, to clarify the rights and obligations pursuant to Agreement and ensure accuracy in inventory management, the obligation codes should be imposed on irradiated fuel as not a single item but separated individual substance of materials. Moreover, when an obligation swap occurs for the irradiated fuel, its movement and combustion history should be considered to prevent confusion in confirming multiple obligations and implementing export procedure.

In April 2015, the government of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America signed a new Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA). Subsequently, in April 2016, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) of the ROK and the Department of Energy (DOE) of the US signed the Administrative Agreement (AA) under the new Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Accordingly, when Korea imports items subject to the Korea-US agreement, it is required to determine the inventory of imported agreement items and notify the United States of the inventory amount every year. In addition, when re-exporting an agreement item to a third country, prior consent of the original exporting country (USA) must be obtained. Nuclear companies that import items subject to the Korea-US Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement must report their inventory to the government every year, but the standards and procedures for managing the inventory are not clearly stipulated in the national law. This makes it difficult for the government to verify the adequacy of the report submitted by nuclear companies, adding to the administrative burden on both the government and the companies. Accordingly, it is required for the government to establish and operate a system for history management system for import and export items subject to the agreement so that related information can be recorded and managed at each stage, such as first import of items to Korea, generation, disposal, and exports to third countries. This system provides history management functions such as initial import information record for items imported through import/export procedures according to administrative agreements, change of owned company due to domestic movement, deletion of inventory due to loss/disposal, deletion of inventory due to export or addition of inventory due to derived materials. Through this system, operators can easily manage agreement items, and the government can obtain reliable information on agreement items in close to real-time. In addition, when this system applies to exports of items subject to the agreement, the number of items subject to the agreement exported by Korea can be provided first so that the importing country can more quickly check the items subject to the agreement. It is expected to contribute to securing control of the items subject to the agreement and reducing concerns over nuclear proliferation.

The Nuclear Safety Act defines items defined in nuclear cooperation agreements with each country as internationally regulated materials and requires that import and export procedures be implemented according to each agreement. In particular, the US, Canada, and Australia, which are major nuclear power suppliers, describe detailed procedures related to imports and exports in administrative agreements attached to the agreement. This paper compares and analyzes the import and export procedures of agreed items in the three major countries and proposes procedures and precautions that nuclear companies should follow for smooth import and export. The import/export procedure, according to the annexed administrative agreement, is divided mainly into Direct-transfer, Indirect-transfer, and Re-transfer. Direct transfer refers to direct import and export between countries that have signed an agreement. The four-step process of prior notice, written confirmation, shipment notice, and receipt confirmation is commonly required for direct transfer. However, in the case of Canada, if the previously related information is the same, the shipping notification and receipt confirmation procedure may be omitted. Australia only defines items included in the notification without a separate form in the administrative agreement. Indirect transfer means transferring items originating from the other two countries that signed the agreement through a third country. All three countries stipulate that item transferred by indirect transfer are also subject to the agreement, and Canada stipulates separate advance notifications and shipping notifications for indirect transfer. Australia manages indirect transfers by including information from third countries in the exchange-related information between the two countries. The US does not have a specific procedure for indirect transfer, but it is presumed that it was omitted because it was difficult to confirm the time of shipment when the US exports through a third country. Re-transfer is a procedure to obtain consent from the original exporting country in advance when exporting items held in Korea to a third country. There are two types of consent based on re-transfer, the long-term consent method, and the individual case-by-case method. Long-term consent is a method of long-term consent for re-transfer to an agreed-upon country by agreeing in advance on a list of countries where re-transfer is possible. In the long term, the procedure will be reflected in domestic laws in detail and managed through an IT-based management system so that operators can smoothly implement such complex import and export procedures.

but interpretation and application of the relevant provisions differ, and the views expressed on them still leave ample room to be unilaterally interpreted and applied. So, it is undeniable that conflicts over ocean waters among the concerned countries are serious and difficult to overcome. To solve these problems, the UNCLOS calls for the countries concerned to make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature. Korea and Japan have maritime boundary problems in the waters surrounding the Korean peninsula, and so, in order to solve those problems, both nations established a joint development zone (JDZ) in the East China Sea in 1974. The zone can be terminated in 2028. Therefore, this study examines and analyzes the impact of the JDZ agreement between Korea and Japan over the East China Sea as to the delimitations of the continental shelf/EEZ

선주의 책임제한권은 우리나라의 상법 제769조에서 규정하고 있듯 법률상 권리이다. 이와 같은 법률상 권리를 당사자 간의 계약으로 배제할 수 있는지 및 그에 대한 계약 문구가 불분명한 경우 해석을 어떻게 해야 하는지 문제가 있다. 이와 관련하여 대법원 2015. 11. 17. 선고 2013다61343 판결에서는 당사자 간의 계약상 문구로 선주의 책임제한권이 배제되는지에 대하여, 상법 제769조 는 임의규정이므로 당사자 간의 합의를 통해 배제할 수 있고, 그 내용에 비추 어 계약상 문구에 부여된 객관적 의미는 선주의 책임제한권을 배제하는 것으로 볼 수 있다고 하였다. 동일한 쟁점의 사건에 대하여 영국 추밀원은 1976년 해사채권에 관한 책임제 한 조약에 따른 선주의 책임제한은 권리이고 그것의 배제를 금지하는 규정이 없으므로 당사자 간의 합의로 배제할 수 있으나, 그러한 배제 여부가 문언상으 로는 불분명한 경우에는 합리적인 사람이 계약체결 시점에 합리적으로 접근할 수 있는 배경지식을 토대로 이해하는 계약 문언의 의미를 찾아야 하고, 법률상 권리는 당사자들 사이에서 당연히 행사될 것이라고 여겨지므로 이러한 법률상 권리를 배제하기 위해서는 명백하고 분명하게 권리를 배제하여야 한다고 하여, '모든 손해(all and any damages)배상' 및 ‘손해가 없도록(harmless)’이라는 문구 만으로는 선주의 책임제한권과 같은 법률상 권리를 배제한 것으로 볼 수 없다고 하였다. 당사자 간의 계약의 해석에 있어 특히 계약 문언만으로 그 의미를 확정할 수 없을 경우에 대하여 자연적 해석, 규범적 해석, 보충적 해석과 같은 다양한 해 석방법이 제시되고 있다. 또한, 해석방법마다 다양한 견해와 기준이 제시되고 있다. 사안과 같이 법률상 권리의 당사자 간의 합의에 따른 배제 여부 및 그러 한 합의의 해석에서도 해석자에 따라 결론이 달라질 수 있다. 다만 선주의 책 임제한은 해상법 관계에서 국제적으로도 오랜 기간 사용된 권리이며 해상사고 에 있어 선주의 최후의 보루라는 점에서, 그 배제 여부가 달린 계약해석에 필 요한 합리적인 의사해석의 요소가 무엇인지 살피기 위해서는 해석에 관한 다양 한 입장을 비교하고 분석할 필요가 있다.