In this paper, we study the bargaining strategy of a manufacturer who sells a product through the online and offline distribution channels. To do this, we derive and analyze the equilibrium solutions for both simultaneous and sequential bargaining games. The result shows that the optimal bargaining strategy heavily depends on the size of the online distribution channel’s loyal customers and the difference between the retail prices of the online and the offline distribution channels. It is also shown that, in some cases, the online distribution channel has incentive to downsize its loyal customers and its retail price for a better bargaining outcome.

1. 서 론
 2. 분석 모형
 3. 협상 균형해
  3.1 동시 협상
  3.2 순차 협상 : 온라인 유통채널과 먼저 협상하는경우
  3.3 순차 협상 : 오프라인 유통채널과 먼저 협상하는경우
 4. 협상 균형해 분석
  4.1 제조업체의 최적 협상 방식
  4.2 B 및 pd/pr이 제조업체 및 유통채널의 수익에미치는 영향
 5. 결론 및 추후 연구 방향
 References

• 조형래(경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) | Hyung-Rae Cho
• 이민호(경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) | Minho Rhee Corresponding Author
• 임상규(경상대학교 공과대학 산업시스템공학부/공학연구원) | Sang-Gyu Lim