There have been debates on adoption of corporate laws regarding electing independent audit committee members separately and double derivative suit, as well as mandatory cumulative voting to improve corporate governance in Korea. This article examines whether mandatory or market based approaches are desirable to improve corporate governance in Korea. It will explore the ways to strengthen the independence of the board of directors and audit committees. Firstly, this article studies the independence of outside directors in the U.S. and Korea. The independence of the board of directors has been weak in Korea due to controlling shareholders and circular share-holding ownership structure among big business groups, even though there have been attempts to improve this situation. Secondly, this article examines the current role of outside directors, audit committees, and cumulative voting in the U.S and in Korea to find out positive changes in corporate governance Korea. Lastly, his article will discuss the appropriate direction between mandatory and market based soft law approaches on corporate governance in Korea. It will argue that Korea needs to strengthen the monitoring function of the board of directors, independence of outside directors and audit committee.

Ⅰ. Introduction
Ⅱ. Independence of Outside Directors
    A. Outside directors in the U.S. and Korea
    B. Implications to Korea
Ⅲ. Independence of Audit Committee
    A. Audit Committee in the U.S. and Korea
    B. Implications to Korea
IV. Cumulative voting
    A. Cumulative Voting in the U.S. and Korea
    B. Implications to Korea
V. Mandatory vs. Market‐Based CorporateGovernance in Korea
Ⅵ. Conclusion

• Bo Hyuk Kim(Law at Shinhan University)