When proliferation activity occurs, states and non-state actors combine various sources of information to gain a better understanding of the situation. The quality of information source, content, and presentation can significantly influence the perception of decision-makers and end users. However, a state’s nuclear or missile activities are almost always classified. Also, states might intentionally reveal information to deter their adversary, threaten their adversary, bolster their prestige in the international community, or a combination of all three. Hence, any revealed information inherently contains some degree of uncertainty regarding its credibility. Lack of credibility makes it difficult for other states or non-state actors to determine how much of the information is accurate and how much is deception. The increase of publicly available information (open-source information) and the development of tools to collect, process, and analyze this information increased the possibilities of using open-source information to cross-check the proliferation claims of states. North Korea is a hermit state that has very little outside interaction. It also has continued to develop and refine its nuclear program. How credible is information released by North Korea? How can scholars/experts compensate for this lack of credibility in information on North Korea’s nuclear activity? This paper seeks to apply a framework on information quality to answer these questions. First, it will briefly explain the factors comprising information quality (sources, content, and presentation). Then, it will apply the information quality framework to North Korean activity analysis. It will conclude with implications of using the information quality framework to analyze a state that is low in accessibility and high uncertainty.

• Hojung Do(Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC))