The CTBTO is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization to ban all forms of nuclear testing (underwater, air, and underground) worldwide and was adopted at the UN’s 50th annual general meeting in September 1996. As of September 2023, 187 out of 196 countries signed and 178 ratified. The Republic of Korea signed it in 1996 and ratified it in 1999. Several major Annex 2 countries still need to ratify it, and certain countries have not even signed it, so it has not come entry into force. The CTBTO has three verification systems for nuclear tests and consists of the International Monitoring System (IMS), the International Data Center (IDC), and On-Site Inspections (OSI). IMS consists of seismic, hydroacoustic, infrasound, and radionuclide monitoring. The measured data are delivered to IDC, analyzed by CTBTO headquarters, distributed raw data, and analyzed forms to member states. The final means of verification is in the field of OSI and will be operated when CTBT takes effect. Based on the IMS data, inspectors will be dispatched to the Inspected State Party (ISP) to check for nuclear tests. KINAC is attending the Working Group B, OSI technology development verification along with KINS and KIGAM. Since OSI is a means for final verification, integrated capabilities such as seismic and data interpretation and nuclides detection are required. CTBTO continues its efforts to foster integrated talent and modernize OSI equipment. Types of equipment include measurement, flight simulation equipment, and geographic information monitoring systems etcetera. KINAC is also developing equipment to detect contaminated areas using drones and probes. Development equipment is the nuclides detection and measurement of contaminated areas, and it is the equipment that prepares a control center and drops probes into suspected contamination areas to find a location of the radiation source. The probe can be used to track the location where the dose is most substantial through Bayesian estimation and source measurement.

Spent nuclear fuel continues to be generated domestically and abroad, and various studies are actively being conducted for interim dry storage and disposal of spent nuclear fuel. The characteristics vary depending on the type of spent nuclear fuel and the initial specifications, and based on these characteristics, it is essential to estimate the burnup and enrichment of spent nuclear fuel as a nondestructive assay. In particular, it is important to estimate the characteristics of spent nuclear fuel with non-destructive tests because destructive tests cannot be performed on all encapsulated spent nuclear fuel in case of intrusion traces in safeguards. Data is made by measuring spent nuclear fuel directly to evaluate burnup of spent nuclear fuel, but computer simulation research is also important to understand its characteristics because past burnup history is not accurately written, and destructive testing is difficult. In Sweden, the dependency of the burnup history in source strength and mass of light-water reactor-type spent nuclear fuel was evaluated, and this part was also applied to MAGNOX in consideration of the possibility of being used to verify DPRK’s denuclearization. SCALE 6.2 TRITON modeling was performed based on public information on DPRK’s 5 MWe Yongbyon reactor, and the source strength of Nb-95, Zr-95, Ru-106, Cs-134, Cs-137, Ce-141, Ce- 144, Eu-154 nuclides were evaluated. Since the burnup of MAGNOX is lower than that of lightwater reactors, major nuclides in decay heat were not considered. The cooling period was evaluated based on 0, 5, 10, and 20 years. In case the discharge timing was different, the total period of discharge and reloading was the same, and the end-cycle burnup was the same, calculations showed that the source strength emitted from major nuclides was evaluated within 2-3% except for Ru-106 and Ce-144 nuclides. Even the burnup step of nuclear fuel is the same, and the reloaded length after discharge is different, i.e., the cooling period between is different at 5, 10, and 20, the source strength of Nb-95, Zr-95, Ce-144, and Cs-137 was evaluated as an error of 1%. Except for Ru-106 and Ce-144, nuclides are highly dependent on burnup. Compared to the case of light-water reactors, the possibility of a decrease in error needs to be considered later because the specific power is low. As a result, radionuclides in released fuel depend on the effects of burnup, discharged and reloaded period, and a cooling period after release, and research is needed to correct the cooling period within the future burnup history. In addition, in this study, it is necessary to select a scenario -based burnup because the standard burnup due to the statistical treatment of discharged fuels was not considered as conducted in previous studies.

Any type of nuclear arms control or disarmament agreement requires some form of verification measure. Existing nuclear arms control treaties drew upon previous agreements such as the INF treaty, START, and IAEA nuclear safeguards inspections. However, previous treaties focused on limiting specific types of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles or reducing the total number of nuclear weapons rather than eliminating the nuclear enterprise as a whole. A potential nuclear disarmament verification treaty or agreement will depend on the geopolitical environment of the time as well as the national policies and priorities of each signatory state. Although research on the gradual reduction and eventual elimination of nuclear weapons is still ongoing, several states have cooperated to conduct experiments, exercises, and simulations on the procedures and technologies required for nuclear disarmament verification. Three of these efforts are the LETTERPRESS simulation conducted by the Quadrilateral Nuclear Verification Partnership (QUAD), NuDiVe Exercise conducted by the International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV), and the Menzingen experiment organized by the UNIDIR in partnership with the Swiss Armed Forces, Spiez Laboratory, Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security, and the Open Nuclear Network. These contain aspects for the development of a potential nuclear disarmament verification. The LETTERPRESS exercise conducted in 2017 tested potential activities and equipment inspectors might utilize in a nuclear weapon facility. The IPNDV NuDiVe exercises conducted in 2021 and 2022 tested the activities and equipment required for the verified dismantlement of a warhead within a dismantlement facility. Finally, the Menzingen experiment conducted in 2023 tested the practical procedures for the verification of a nuclear weapon’s absence at a storage site. This paper will analyze the three cases to offer considerations on the procedures and technologies future nuclear disarmament verification might include.

Arms control treaties during the Cold War generally used national technical means (NTM) to verify treaty compliance. This was because signatory states refused to agree on on-site inspection (OSI) measures since it would require some level of intrusion. Efforts on nuclear arms control such as the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) or Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) initially included some form of OSI but could not continue due to refusal from signatory states. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) treaty concluded between the US and the Soviet Union in 1978 was significant since both states agreed on a highly intrusive verification measure. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and the new START also called for OSI measures similar to the INF. Alongside reducing a significant number of nuclear warheads and limiting specific types of nuclear warhead delivery vehicles, these treaties also provided basic models for conducting on-site inspection (OSI). OSI measures primarily rely on the political agreement between signatory states. However, the structure, types of inspections, number of inspections allowed, and technology/equipment used in each of the regimes also differ according to the objectives of each treaty. The INF treaty and START are salient cases as basic models for current nuclear disarmament verification research. Thus, this paper will conduct a case study on the procedures and mechanisms required for nuclear arms control verification in terms of OSI. Using the implications drawn from the INF treaty and START, this paper offers considerations for a potential nuclear disarmament verification.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) is developing a simulation model to estimate nuclear material production. This model is a foundational technology in interpretation and evaluation in preparation for denuclearization verification. Through this model, it is possible to estimate the amount of nuclear material that can be produced based on information on the activities of facilities related to the nuclear fuel cycle in the actual denuclearization verification stage. This model makes it possible to determine whether the declared amount of nuclear material is reliable. In addition, the reliability of the reported information can be confirmed through on-site inspection. However, there is a possibility that proliferation-related activities cannot be detected even through this inspection, and a normal state may be misdiagnosed as carrying out nuclear proliferation-related activities. Therefore, it is unreasonable to specify activities related to nuclear proliferation with only one inspection. Since each inspection method has its diagnosis rate and false diagnosis rate, measures such as repeating the same inspection method or combining different inspection methods are required to detect activities related to nuclear proliferation reliably. Therefore, a model capable of estimating the number of repetitions to obtain a reliable nuclear activity detection probability was developed by using each inspection method’s diagnosis rate and false diagnosis rate as input information through a Bayesian inference method. Through this model, it can be concluded that repetitive inspections increase the probability of detecting nuclear proliferation-related activities. This approach confirmed the possibility of repeatedly breaking away from the high-intensity inspection method that causes political and diplomatic resistance from the target country and substituting it with a more readily acceptable, low-intensity inspection method.

When proliferation activity occurs, states and non-state actors combine various sources of information to gain a better understanding of the situation. The quality of information source, content, and presentation can significantly influence the perception of decision-makers and end users. However, a state’s nuclear or missile activities are almost always classified. Also, states might intentionally reveal information to deter their adversary, threaten their adversary, bolster their prestige in the international community, or a combination of all three. Hence, any revealed information inherently contains some degree of uncertainty regarding its credibility. Lack of credibility makes it difficult for other states or non-state actors to determine how much of the information is accurate and how much is deception. The increase of publicly available information (open-source information) and the development of tools to collect, process, and analyze this information increased the possibilities of using open-source information to cross-check the proliferation claims of states. North Korea is a hermit state that has very little outside interaction. It also has continued to develop and refine its nuclear program. How credible is information released by North Korea? How can scholars/experts compensate for this lack of credibility in information on North Korea’s nuclear activity? This paper seeks to apply a framework on information quality to answer these questions. First, it will briefly explain the factors comprising information quality (sources, content, and presentation). Then, it will apply the information quality framework to North Korean activity analysis. It will conclude with implications of using the information quality framework to analyze a state that is low in accessibility and high uncertainty.

Concerns about North Korea’s 7th nuclear test have been rising recently, and it is a significant threat to the situation around the Korean Peninsula. Amidst these threats, the Korean government also shows a strong will for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula, referring to the “Audacious Initiative.” For denuclearization negotiations with North Korea, it is essential first to understand North Korea’s nuclear capabilities. However, since access to information is complicated and contains many uncertainties, many studies have been conducted to estimate it. Among them, Von Hippel surveyed to estimate the total amount of uranium ore based on information on uranium mining, which is relatively widely known throughout North Korea’s nuclear fuel cycle, and the amounts of HEU and Pu suggested by many experts. KINAC has conducted a study on a methodology that can narrow the estimation range and improve reliability through the Bayesian Network based on Von Hippel’s research results. However, in this study, the probability distribution is assumed to be the simplest form of uniform distribution, and the estimation formula for the amount of Pu produced compared to the amount of uranium loaded in the core is used as it is, which is an error in Von Hippel’s study. Improvement is needed. This study proposes a more reliable BN model by supplementing this and attempts to estimate the amount of uranium ore that North Korea produces or possesses. Of course, the data used as the basic structure of the model is insufficient, and the estimation formula is straightforward, so it is somewhat unreliable to trust the estimate for uranium ore. However, it is expected to be a suitable methodology that can narrow the scope of North Korea’s nuclear material production estimate or compensate for the uncertainty of the nuclear material production estimation model being developed at KINAC.

Monitoring a state that intentionally hides its nuclear activity via open-source information is akin to looking through a black box. Direct information on the state’s nuclear activity remains in the dark, leaving scholars to speculate how much nuclear material or warheads are being produced. Nevertheless, a state’s nuclear program consists of a complex network that ranges from producing weapon-grade nuclear materials by operating its nuclear facilities to securing resources to fund these activities. These indirect activities allow a narrow window of opportunity for researchers to map a state’s activity that sometimes may not be directly linked to nuclear activity per se but is significant to maintaining and operating its nuclear program. These may include malicious cyberattacks to steal or launder cryptocurrency and facilitating cooperation with fellow rogue states that do not comply with the NPT and nuclear nonproliferation regime. The problem lies in how researchers can map this network. Much of the literature that uses text analysis uses data from either (1) formal statement, reports, and documents or (2) journal articles to extract relations between topics that is otherwise difficult to surmise. This study, however, analyzes news articles containing keywords related to a states’ nuclear activity such as international sanctions, trade activities, other states’ policy etc. While news articles fail to live up to the academic rigor of journal articles and unlike formal documents may sometime contain misinformation or incorrect facts, they are a valuable medium to show the day-to-day activity of a state. Although bias may exist as particular news articles may or may not be chosen for text analysis, by using articles collected from 2021 to 2022, this study argues it is enough data to show a short-term trend in nuclear activity.

KINAC is trying to build a comprehensive aerial view of the nuclear material balance to predict North Korea’s weapons-grade nuclear material production capacity. We are creating a visualization model for North Korea’s nuclear facilities as part of these efforts. However, information on North Korea’s nuclear facilities is scarce, and it is not easy to consider additional facilities other than those already known. In addition, in the case of a model that targets only exceptional situations, it is not easy to secure objectivity for model validation, so it is necessary to upgrade to a general-purpose analysis tool that can be applied more generally. The following two examples are proposed as an analysis tool that can be a high degree of analysis. The first case is an Acquisition Path Analysis (APA) utilized to introduce IAEA’s State-Level Approach (SLA). The acquisition path analysis aims to find and evaluate the technically possible pathways to obtain nuclear materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive development. It can be an acquisition route if it is possible to produce at least 1 Significant Quantity (SQ) of weapongrade nuclear material within five years. The assessment of technologically feasible pathways is based on available information about the country’s past and present nuclear cycle capabilities. The second is the IAEA Physical Model. The IAEA Physical Model was carried out to introduce a comprehensive approach to all information on a country’s nuclear activities. It describes and characterizes the technologies and processes expressed at all levels of the acquisition path, depending on the development objectives. The IAEA Physical Model attempts a multi-tiered acquisition path analysis to identify all known technologies and processes in the nuclear fuel cycle, from raw material production to weapon usable material acquisition. Based on this analysis, the IAEA evaluates the signs of nuclear proliferation in a specific country. Based on the two cases discussed above, we intend to derive the following implications and priorities for extending the existing nuclear cycle model to a more general-purpose for a specific country. First of all, the requirements necessary to evaluate nuclear non-proliferation or verification of denuclearization must be at a level that the international community can recognize. In the stage of actual denuclearization verification, since verification will be conducted through the IAEA, a corresponding level of tools and technology will be required. From this point of view, the following is presented as a prerequisite for adding versatility to the existing physical model: It is necessary to derive all processes related to the nuclear cycle and standardize relevant indicators and data. In order to determine the signs of nuclear activity, detailed information on technologies, materials, by-products, and wastes, which are essential for each process, is required. For denuclearization verification, cumulative information from the past to the time point is required, and a comparative analysis of the operation history information of all facilities and the amount of nuclear material is required. To this end, it is necessary to make it possible to trace the history at every point where it can be determined that nuclear material has been diverted so that missing nuclear material can be found. Based on this, it is expected that it can be possible to evaluate a hypothetical threat state, but it is also expected that it will be easy to verify the model through the evaluation of easily accessible domestic facilities.