Nuclear security event involving nuclear and other radioactive materials outside of regulatory control (MORC) has the potential to cause severe consequences for public health, the environment, the economy and society. Each state has a responsibility to develop national nuclear security measures including nuclear forensics to respond to such events. In Japan, national nuclear forensics capability building efforts mainly based on research and development (R&D) have been conducted since 2010, in accordance with national statement of Japan at the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington DC. Most of that work is undertaken at the Integrated Support Center for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Nuclear Security (ISCN) of the Japan Atmic Energy Agency (JAEA) in close cooperation with other competent authorities. The ISCN has made increased contributions to the enhancement of international nuclear security by establishing technical capabilities in nuclear forensics and sharing the achievements with the international community. The ISCN has mainly engaged in R&Ds for establishing and enhancing nuclear forensics technical capability. As for the laboratory capability, several new pieces of analytical equipment have been introduced for nuclear forensics R&D purposes. High-precise measurement techniques validated in the past nuclear forensics incidents have been established, and novel techniques that can contribute to the more timely and confident nuclear forensics signature analysis have been developed. The ISCN has been also developed a proto-type nuclear forensics library based on the data of nuclear materials possessed for past nuclear fuel cycle research in JAEA. These technical capability developments have been conducted based on the cooperation with international partners such as the U.S. Department of Energy and EC Joint Research Center, as well as participation in exercises organized by Nuclear Forensics International Technical Working Group (NF-ITWG). Recent R&D works have been mainly based on the needs of domestic competent authorities, such as first responders and investigators, and aim to develop technologies covering the entire spectrum of nuclear forensics processes from crime scene investigation to laboratory analysis and interpretation. One important key issue is the enhancement of technical capability for post-dispersion nuclear forensics. For instance, the ISCN has carried out the development of radiation measurement equipment coupled with the low-cost and mobile radiation detectors that uses machine-learning algorithms for quick and autonomous radioisotope identification to support first responders during crime scene investigations. Laboratory measurement techniques for samples collected at a post-dispersion crime scene are also among the important technical issues studied at the ISCN. The application of emerging technologies to nuclear forensics has also been studied. This includes the application of deep leaning models to nuclear forensics signature interpretation that could provide more confident results, as well as the development of contamination imaging technology that could contribute to the analytical planning on the samples in collaboration with conventional forensics. Many analytical techniques have been developed and the capability to analyze nuclear and other radioactive materials for nuclear forensics purposes has been considerably matured over the past decade. The challenges of post-dispersion samples, collaboration with conventional forensics and the development of novel signatures will be more important in the near future. Therefore, the ISCN will promote the R&Ds to further enhance the technical capabilities solving these issues. In addition, the ISCN is also promoting to expand the nuclear forensics research into universities and other research institutes in Japan. This is expected to contribute to the establishment of a domestic nuclear forensics network that enables to respond timely and flexibly to the MORC incidents, and to the maturation of nuclear forensics as a new academic field.

North Korea claimed to have tested a hydrogen bomb in its fourth nuclear test in 2016, and declared that the hydrogen bomb was completed after the sixth nuclear test in 2017. North Korea’s operation of Yongbyon Graphite-moderated reactor has been thought to be aimed at producing plutonium, but it has been strongly argued that the restart of the Graphite-moderated reactor is, indeed, aimed at supplying tritium recently. Tritium can be used not only to manufacture hydrogen bombs, but also to miniaturize nuclear weapons, making it as a key material for nuclear weapon capability. Since upgrading nuclear weapons and developing hydrogen bombs through the use of tritium by North Korea could pose a major threat to the security of the Korean Peninsula, it is important to accurately evaluate North Korea’s nuclear weapon capabilities through the analysis of nuclear material production scenarios based on its nuclear facilities. However, researches on North Korea’s nuclear materials such as HEU (Highly Enriched Uranium) and Pu production has been actively conducted, while no research has been shown on tritium production yet. Therefore, this study aims to evaluate the tritium productivity based on the analysis of hypothetical nuclear material production facilities and possible tritium production scenarios. Basic research was conducted about the existing theoretical methodology for tritium production, the analysis of the global tritium production history, and the analysis of nuclear facilities. Based on this basic investigation, feasible tritium production scenarios were constructed. Subsequently, based on design criteria of an hypothetical Graphite-moderated reactor, possible tritium production scenario was modeled by applying the TPBAR (Tritium Production Burnable Absorber Rod). In addition, the factors such as 6Li concentration, design parameters, material compositions, and the number of TPBARs, which may affect tritium throughput were analyzed in terms of sensitivity study such that the maximum and minimum throughput can be predicted.

For the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the international community has devoted itself to fulfilling its obligations under the Safeguards Agreement with IAEA. In this regard, uranium in a radioactive waste drum should be analyzed and reported in terms of mass and 235U enrichment. In order to characterize radioactive wastes, gamma spectroscopy techniques can be effectively applied. In the case of high-resolution gamma spectroscopy, because an HPGe detector can provide excellent energy resolution, it can be applied to analyze a mixture having a complicated isotopic composition. However, other substances such as wood, concrete, and ash are mixed in radioactive waste with various form factors; hence, the efficiency calibration is difficult. On the other hand, In Situ Object Counting System (ISOCS) has a capability of efficiency calibration without standard materials, making it possible to analyze complex radioactive wastes. In this study, the analysis procedure with the ISOCS was optimized for quantification of radioactive waste. To this end, a standard radioactive waste drum at KEPCO NF and low-level radioactive waste drums at Korea Radioactive Waste Agency (KORAD) were measured. The performance of the ISOCS was then evaluated by Monte Carlo simulations, Multi-Group Analysis for Uranium (MGAU) code, and destructive analysis. As a result, the ISOCS showed good performance in the quantification of uranium for a drum with the homogenized simple geometry and long measurement time. It is confirmed that the ISOCS gamma spectroscopy technique could be used for control and accountancy of nuclear materials contained in a radioactive waste drum.

The Nuclear Safety Act defines items defined in nuclear cooperation agreements with each country as internationally regulated materials and requires that import and export procedures be implemented according to each agreement. In particular, the US, Canada, and Australia, which are major nuclear power suppliers, describe detailed procedures related to imports and exports in administrative agreements attached to the agreement. This paper compares and analyzes the import and export procedures of agreed items in the three major countries and proposes procedures and precautions that nuclear companies should follow for smooth import and export. The import/export procedure, according to the annexed administrative agreement, is divided mainly into Direct-transfer, Indirect-transfer, and Re-transfer. Direct transfer refers to direct import and export between countries that have signed an agreement. The four-step process of prior notice, written confirmation, shipment notice, and receipt confirmation is commonly required for direct transfer. However, in the case of Canada, if the previously related information is the same, the shipping notification and receipt confirmation procedure may be omitted. Australia only defines items included in the notification without a separate form in the administrative agreement. Indirect transfer means transferring items originating from the other two countries that signed the agreement through a third country. All three countries stipulate that item transferred by indirect transfer are also subject to the agreement, and Canada stipulates separate advance notifications and shipping notifications for indirect transfer. Australia manages indirect transfers by including information from third countries in the exchange-related information between the two countries. The US does not have a specific procedure for indirect transfer, but it is presumed that it was omitted because it was difficult to confirm the time of shipment when the US exports through a third country. Re-transfer is a procedure to obtain consent from the original exporting country in advance when exporting items held in Korea to a third country. There are two types of consent based on re-transfer, the long-term consent method, and the individual case-by-case method. Long-term consent is a method of long-term consent for re-transfer to an agreed-upon country by agreeing in advance on a list of countries where re-transfer is possible. In the long term, the procedure will be reflected in domestic laws in detail and managed through an IT-based management system so that operators can smoothly implement such complex import and export procedures.

In order to enhance the transparency of nuclear power, the investigation of nuclear activities is important at the right time. And investigation of North Korea, one of safety measures for such a surveillance system seems essential in the near future. However, the inspection period is limited and the possibility of revisiting is unclear, so it seems easy to install and more reliable monitoring devices are needed. The seal is a security device for monitoring forgery and alteration in the IAEA easily but simple. Since the existing seal devices used by IAEA and KINAC can only be checked through onsite inspections whether it is damaged or not, there is a limit to immediate response in the event of an emergency such as the theft of nuclear materials and loss of Continuity of Knowledge. While the North Korea-U.S. talks and inter-Korean talks are slowly approaching the North Korea’s nuclear issue, it is judged that the inspection of North Korea’s nuclear weapons is not in the distant future. Accordingly, it is necessary to develop a customized seal device for managing and monitoring spent nuclear fuel that can be used for inspection of North Korea. The real-time active seal device consists of a seal equipped with a detection sensor, a translator, and a server, and the translator use wireless communication in consideration of ease of installation and management, respectively. The translator and server use wired communication for data sustainability. The seal device is designed to maintain continuity of knowledge (COK) through wireless communication in consideration of security even in the event of equipment damage, malfunction, and loss of power, while enabling location detection in case of theft or abnormality. Therefore, in this study, a technical investigation on remote data communication was conducted accordingly, and a data communication module for a small amount of broadband data communication was manufactured and applied. In addition, several tests were conducted to determine data integrity and location accuracy according to the communication range.

In order to effectively and efficiently apply safeguards to new nuclear facilities, it is recommended to apply safeguards-by-design concept. In evaluating the safeguards in the early stage of the design of a facility, it is essential to analyze the diversion path for nuclear materials. This study suggests a simple method which can generate diversion paths. The essential components constituting the diversion path were reviewed and the logical flow for systematically creating the diversion path was developed. The path generation algorithm is based on this components and logical flow as well as the initial information of the nuclear materials and material flows in a planned facilities. The results will be used to develop a program module which can systematically generate diversion paths using the event tree and fault tree method.

This paper presents a strategic adoption model for blockchain technology in nuclear nonproliferation by analysing the implementation of legally binding agreements and leveraging results from governmentleading sectors. Blockchain has been emerging as not only a single promising technology but a foundational one which can be combined with diverse sectors. From the national point of view, it is imperative that the government formulates policy for fostering blockchain-related industries, thereby, gaining a competitive advantage at the national level. Accordingly, the Korean government has established the Blockchain Technology Development and Diffusion Strategies in 2018 and 2020, respectively, to verify the technology by supporting pilot projects for apposite industries, such as customs clearance, transhipment of containers, record-keeping of meat processing, and smart contracts. In addition, the strategies announce to support liaison with regulatory sandbox and cooperation between the projects. Internationally, on the other hand, nuclear nonproliferation imposes the duties of verifying that member states under the NPT and the Safeguards Agreement obey the IAEA mandate, “Atoms for Peace and Development”. Similarly, bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements and administrative arrangements specify reporting obligations for the origin and history records of the Trigger List items. Meanwhile, commercial and industrial secrets and other confidential information of any entities involved have to be securely protected. Provided accompanying activities accomplish the integrity of records and mutual transparency, it brings more credibility, and further, the competitiveness of the state’s nuclear industry. In conclusion, the tasks that the Republic of Korea implements as an exemplary country complying with the nuclear nonproliferation regime have many similarities with the pilot projects that have been or are being carried out under national strategies for fostering blockchain technology elsewhere. This implies that the leveraging of the subsets can derive a new competitive model in blockchain adoption that contributes to the competitiveness of the national nuclear industry due to the advanced nuclear regulations.

In December 26, 2017, the Ministry of Science and ICT’s Cyber Infringement Response Division, the KCC’s Internet Ethics Team, and the National Police Agency’s Cyber Investigation Division announced the “Comprehensive IP Camera Measures” to prevent damage to users by strengthening IP camera security. The background was a countermeasure against the spread of public anxiety such as leakage of privacy and threatening national security as cases of illegal filming and distribution of videos by accessing IP cameras without permission at that time occurred. At that time, the measures consisted of three major strategies: institutionalization of products with security (manufacturing and import stage), rapid action and response to hacking threats in advance, and intelligent advancement of IP cameras (industrial development) and fostering various video and safety industries. This paper deals with the development of installation standards and evaluation indicators for CCTV systems installed in the relevant national security facility. When designing a CCTV system, the resolution and sensitivity of the camera, the angle of view of the lens, and the aperture should be selected in consideration of the length and width of the monitoring area. When it is necessary to determine an alarm based on the recorded image information, the resolution of the recording device should also be considered. If there is a restriction on the surveillance area of the camera due to topographic features, visitors, etc., additional cameras should be considered. Additional surveillance cameras should be considered to effectively monitor sections where fences are bent or sections with severe slopes. When designing a CCTV system, supplementary means that can be used for intrusion monitoring should be devised even if the entire or part of the system causes a failure. KISA’s performance test and certification procedures shall apply mutatis mutandis to intelligent CCTV image analysis test procedures and certification. Intelligent CCTV image analysis evaluates the performance of the equipment by comparing files of ground truth (GT) and system alarm (SA) for verification to calculate the evaluation score.

In the event of an contingency situation of physical protection in nuclear facilities, the first organization to deal with at the forefront is the Special Response Forces (SRF). Since the SRF has to perform nuclear facility protection at the actual battle site, they must repeatedly train tactical understanding such as shooting, entry, and suppression so that their body can remember it even in real contingency situations (called Muscle Memory). In reality, however, repeated training using firearms is very difficult due to high risk and high cost, except for some military and police organizations. Using the advantages of VR technology, the Korea Institute of Nuclear nonproliferation and control (KINAC) has developed educational contents of “VR Shooting Training Center (VR STC)” to enable low-risk, low-cost, and repeated shooting training for these high-risk, high-cost training. This content was developed by dividing it into an “indoor” and “outdoor” training field. Educational firearms are all developed as gas guns to add to the sense of reality, and trainees can choose firearms, distance movement of targets and other options. The “Indoor training field” was developed by imitating an actual indoor shooting field, in particular the “outdoor training field” was developed using VR technology and motion tracking technology. Therefore, in “outdoor training field”, trainees can move freely within the designated spot of not only in VR content but also reality and then have to perform some missions. Trainees have to overcome random obstacles as they move to a designated destination, and at the destination, they are attacked by terrorists. Therefore, trainees must complete missions by concealing their bodies using objects around them. The one training course includes a total of 10 missions, and after the training is completed, comprehensive training results such as shooting accuracy and mission completion are expressed. VR STC will be a representative example of making high-risk, high-cost training into low-risk, low-cost, and repeated training. In this respect, VR technology can be used to develop various radiation protection curriculums accompanied by high risk and high cost, and can improve educational effects.

MSSP means Member State Support Program, which is the program of the member state supporting IAEA. To efficiently carry out the safeguards, IAEA receives the support of the member states through this program and carries out R&D for the nuclear material inspection equipment, etc. ROK has been supporting and contributing total 21 tasks to IAEA in-cash and in-kind. These tasks consist of training, safeguards approaches, Analysis Support and NWAL Coordination, information analysis, Safeguards Information Systems and System Usability. ROK support program that consisted mainly of hosting IAEA inspector training courses was not active in 2021 due to COVID-19. So, through the project called “online course development consultation”, we developed e-learning module (titled “Introduction to Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements following the model text of INFCIRC/153 (corr.) related to State reporting obligations”) to provide continuous support for IAEA’s non-face-to-face safeguards activities in the current pandemic situation. We developed this module that is HTML5+MP4-based SCORM type to provide services for both PCs and smart phones. In conclusion, The ROK has differed in its form of support from previous years by developing e-learning modules for IAEA trainings and thus contributed towards IAEA’s international collaborative system to enhance its safeguards capability and this has enhanced the ROK’s status in the IAEA.

IAEA, in preparation for possible commercial operation of small modular reactors (SMR), is pursuing the early development of safeguards approaches for these reactors along with the publication of the safeguards technical report (STR) to make verification activities easier for inspectors. For this purpose, the IAEA, through the MSSP, is developing various approaches for the application of safeguards by design for SMRs in collaboration with five countries that along with the ROK includes Russia, China, and U.S. etc. In order to review the specific design information of the ROK’s only SMR facility, SMART, and to establish safeguards methods from the initial design stage, collaborations were made with the Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute, which researched and developed the SMART. As a result, the design information questionnaire (DIQ) and STR was created and sent to the IAEA. The DIQ is a collection of crucial questions regarding the application of safeguards to understand the characteristics of the reactor facility, and STR is a document referred to by IAEA inspectors during safeguards verification activities. The main contents of the STR consist of introduction, technological description of SMR, safeguards approach, conclusions and annexes. Through this study, it is anticipated to understand the technical requirements for safeguards implementation of SMRs in the design stage, and through the completion of the final report applying SBD with regards to the design of the SMART facility, it could be used as information material for future safeguard verification activities by IAEA inspectors.

In April 2015, the government of the Republic of Korea and the United States of America signed a new Nuclear Cooperation Agreement (NCA). Subsequently, in April 2016, the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission (NSSC) of the ROK and the Department of Energy (DOE) of the US signed the Administrative Agreement (AA) under the new Nuclear Cooperation Agreement. Accordingly, when Korea imports items subject to the Korea-US agreement, it is required to determine the inventory of imported agreement items and notify the United States of the inventory amount every year. In addition, when re-exporting an agreement item to a third country, prior consent of the original exporting country (USA) must be obtained. Nuclear companies that import items subject to the Korea-US Atomic Energy Cooperation Agreement must report their inventory to the government every year, but the standards and procedures for managing the inventory are not clearly stipulated in the national law. This makes it difficult for the government to verify the adequacy of the report submitted by nuclear companies, adding to the administrative burden on both the government and the companies. Accordingly, it is required for the government to establish and operate a system for history management system for import and export items subject to the agreement so that related information can be recorded and managed at each stage, such as first import of items to Korea, generation, disposal, and exports to third countries. This system provides history management functions such as initial import information record for items imported through import/export procedures according to administrative agreements, change of owned company due to domestic movement, deletion of inventory due to loss/disposal, deletion of inventory due to export or addition of inventory due to derived materials. Through this system, operators can easily manage agreement items, and the government can obtain reliable information on agreement items in close to real-time. In addition, when this system applies to exports of items subject to the agreement, the number of items subject to the agreement exported by Korea can be provided first so that the importing country can more quickly check the items subject to the agreement. It is expected to contribute to securing control of the items subject to the agreement and reducing concerns over nuclear proliferation.

The ROK conducts several export procedures, communications in connection with transfers; exchange of information on export plan, shipments, and receipt of nuclear materials, in accordance with bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements (NCA) and Administrative Arrangements (AA) signed with US, Canada, and Australia. Also, the inventory amount of items subject to NCA has reported annually. This study reviewed the export procedures and management methods for spent nuclear fuel subject to NCA. The re-transfer procedures start with obtaining consent from the original exporting country. It is impossible to retransfer nuclear material without consent, whether long-term or individual case-bycase. If the material has multiple obligations, prior consent from all of those countries is required. Therefore, it is necessary to clarify the foreign obligated materials correctly. In general, nuclear fuel is subject to multiple obligations of all countries through which the materials have passed during the front-end fuel cycle. Then the new obligations are imposed on those irradiated materials or their by-products after ‘used-in’ or ‘produced through the use of ’ equipment subject to NCA. For example, fuel assemblies manufactured under CANDU fuel fabrication equipment subject to ROK-Canada NCA or burned in nuclear reactors where US equipment is installed have obligations based on Canada or US agreements. In order to impose obligation to irradiated materials, the principle of proportionality is applied as stipulated in each Agreement. According to the AA between US and ROK, nuclear materials used in the equipment transferred under the Agreement and produced through them are differently controlled. After the cycle in the reactor with US-made equipment, uranium in the irradiated fuel is considered a material used in the equipment. So it would be appropriate to apply obligation proportionality according to its origin, regardless the US-made equipment. Meanwhile, the obligation under US NCA is given to the entire amount of produced plutonium in the irradiated fuel. Although the contribution to the production of fuel is to be discussed case-by-case basis in the case of Canadian obligation, applying a similar method is proper. Since the fuel is burned in the form of bundles or assemblies, it is impossible to separate the spent fuel into uranium and plutonium physically. However, as discussed above, to clarify the rights and obligations pursuant to Agreement and ensure accuracy in inventory management, the obligation codes should be imposed on irradiated fuel as not a single item but separated individual substance of materials. Moreover, when an obligation swap occurs for the irradiated fuel, its movement and combustion history should be considered to prevent confusion in confirming multiple obligations and implementing export procedure.

After the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia continued to deploy military forces and equipment near the Ukrainian border in March and October of 2021, heightening the international crisis. On February 24, 2022, Russia began its full-scale invasion of Kyiv, the capital of Ukraine, with missiles and ground forces. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was accompanied by an urgent speech by Russian President Vladimir Putin on the day he would conduct a special military operation in Ukraine. Putin warned that Russia would seek to demilitarize Ukraine and retaliate immediately if foreign interference occurred. In particular, he stated that the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and exploitation of Ukrainian territory was unacceptable. Due to the current Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States has updated export controls and sanctions as of March 15. Extensive US export controls and sanctions recently imposed on some areas of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine have included industries such as defense, aerospace, energy, and finance. Executive Order EO14065 is issued to ban transactions with specific individuals and entities, including financial institutions. Additionally, Executive Order EO14066 has banned US imports of Russian oil, natural gas, and coal and new investments in the Russian energy sector. The EAR was revised to strengthen export controls on Russia and Belarus. The sanctions imposed include 48 major defense companies, 328 personnel, and the CEO of Sberbank, which produced weapons used in the attack on Ukraine. Companies are listed on the Sectoral Sanctions Identification (SSI) List, and individuals are listed on the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. Sanctions such as asset freezing and a ban on all financial transactions with Americans apply. In line with the international trend, Korea also declared its participation in sanctions against Russia. As of March 25, 2022, export controls have been strengthened by newly established items subject to catchall licenses related to Russia and Belarus. Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy (MOTIE) added Fifty-seven items to Annex 2-2 in the Notification of Export and Import of Strategic Items. Most of these sanctions are for dual-use items under the jurisdiction of MOTIE. However, as countries, organizations, and individuals who may be subject to catch-all licenses are included in the sanctions list, Nuclear Safety and Security Commission should also review catch-all licenses for Trigger List Items. These sanctions are expected to last for some time. Even though China and Russia are the Nuclear Weapon States, the US has strengthened export controls. This is likely due to the opacity of China and Russia’s export controls system and the lack of active implementation of UN Security Council sanctions. However, there is an aspect of protecting their technology. It seems that Korea should also pay attention to these changes in international trends and keep pace with the level of control in other countries.

Efforts for nuclear non-proliferation have continued since the development of nuclear weapons and the conclusion of the NPT Treaty. Nuclear proliferation requires materials, facilities, and human resources to make nuclear weapons, and it takes a medium to long-term time. There are many restrictions in the current system to obtain nuclear materials and facilities, so it is often done through illegal means, black markets, or confidential transactions. Methods have been developed to evaluate the nuclear non-proliferation regime to strengthen the non-proliferation and solve the problems. The IAEA and the United States DOE initiated the proliferation resistance evaluation in 1980. The DOE conducted the assessment in three main evaluation categories: materials, technical characteristics of facilities, and institutional barriers. In another nuclear non-proliferation evaluation study, some researchers evaluated three main types: current capacity, political situation, and international situation. Detailed indicators include economic capacity, industrial capacity, nuclear capacity, leader’s intentions, political structure, competitive relations, alliances, and international norms. Most of these evaluations are based on the situation at the time of assessment at the national level. Historical examples of nuclear proliferation are rare, and verification is also challenging. The Bayesian probability is widely used when the data is small, experiments are impossible, and the causal relationship is unclear. A Bayesian network is a combination of Bayesian probability and graphics. It is used throughout the industry because it can easily derive results according to causal relationships and weights of various variables, evaluate the risk for decision-making, and obtain changed results through data updates. In particular, to evaluate the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Freeman developed the Freeman network in 2008 and the Freeman-Mella network in 2014. Freeman explained in detail only the process of deriving variables, correlations, and probabilities of factors related to factors such as motivation, intention, and resources. It isn’t easy to view as an objective result value because it does not describe the academic background for path selection, motivation list, intention, and resource variable selection. However, the research was meaningful because he first used the Bayesian network for nuclear proliferation. Although some studies have been done at the macro level, there is no case of applying it in export controls, which is the beginning of the actual spread. Also, there is no quantitative value for factors for risk assessment. There is little data, and verification of causality is difficult, so if the Bayesian network is applied to export control and applied to actual implementation, it will help make decisions such as export license or export denial.

The cyber-attack on Natanz nuclear facility in Iran which called Stuxnet showed how cyber could affect the physical system. If cyber-attack on NPPs compromise digital I&C system, it may occur some malfunction on actuators and at worst, radioactive material released into the environment. However, it is hard to test the cyber security on operating NPPs because of the safety problems. So, it is necessary to develop a test-bed to test both the cyber security of NPPs and the effect of cyber-attack on NPPs. KINAC has been developing NPPs test-bed to evaluate the cyber security of NPPs, validate cyber security controls of licensee and train the inspectors. In this paper, the conceptual design of NPPs cyber security test-bed will be discussed. Actual I&C systems such as PLC (Programmable Logic Controller) and DCS (Distributed Control System) are essential for testing cyber security. Also, NPPs simulator is one of important part to evaluate or analyze the effect of cyber-attack on NPPs. Usually, NPPs simulator consists of software which contains nuclear model, thermal-hydraulic model, execution program and GUI and hardware which contains workstation, operator console, PC and large display panel. It provides very similar to actual NPPs to users. However, in case of conventional NPPs simulator, I&C part is implemented as a software, so it is impossible to test the cyber security. To solve this issue, in case of the NPPs cyber security test-bed, I&C part should be hardware and simulation code should be modified to connect the hardware I&C part and software simulator using the HIL (Hardware-in-the-loop) method. The main purpose of this NPPs cyber security test-bed is to utilize in NPPs cyber security regulation. So, KINAC is developing the test-bed with APR 1400 simulator model and KNICS PLC and DCS platform. These real hardware I&C system will be connected to hacker’s PC to test cyber security of NPPs. Also, the data set will be updated with real NPPs data set after the test-bed development finished. Furthermore, to give various analysis environment, archiving equipment that archive major plant process data, network packet between I&C systems and the like will be added. This NPPs cyber security test-bed combined the good points of conventional NPPs simulator and cyber security test-bed. It can test the cyber security of NPPs that conventional NPPs simulator cannot do. Also, it can evaluate and analyze the impact of cyber-attack on NPPs that cyber security test-bed cannot do.

The nuclear facilities sites handling radioactive materials are contaminated due to accidents or its activities. Since the experimental reactor was operated in Idaho, USA in 1951, nuclear power and its related activities were carried out in many countries. Thus, the legacy sites in which radioactive materials have been deposited are a matter of public concern. As a result of the operation of facilities related to the use of nuclear energy, it is faced with the restoration of the environment containing radioactive wastes. In particular, the activities carried out in the early years caused its contamination of the sites and areas with significant releases of fission products and natural radioactive wastes adventitiously or intentionally due to the lack of its technology and the unclear radiation risks. In addition, nuclear weapons tests conducted in the 1950s and 1960s and the Chernobyl power plant accident in 1986 caused radioactive contamination in the Pacific Ocean and extensive territories in Europe. Accordingly, the IAEA discussed the restoration of the contaminated areas at the conference on the radiation legacy of the 20th Century in terms of environmental restoration (RADLEG-2000) held at Moscow, Russia in October 2000 and its cases from the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were reported. Also, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) has discussed the potential issues on the legacy sites occurring radioactive materials and suggested that these sites should be managed in an open, transparent and consistent manner in order to build sustainable solutions with trust. However, there is currently no overall regulatory system for the management of legacy sites in Korea. The TRIGA Mark-II research reactor, which was commissioned in 1962, was decontaminated and dismantled in 1997. As such, it is necessary to consider the regulatory system related to the existing legacy site. Most of all, the legacy site management and regulatory standards of facilities that have operated in the past and are not currently operating or that deal with natural radioactive materials should be established. Also, the dismantling of NK’s nuclear facilities and management of related radioactive waste, particularly NK’s uranium mines and refining facilities particularly at Pyongsan and Bakcheon in NK are one of the key issue on the North Korea’s denuclearization. In this study, the international standards on the reuse of the legacy site after dismantling are analyzed, and its regulatory considerations used for domestic application are suggested.

Since the commercial operation of Kori unit 1 in 1978, nuclear power has provided cheap, stable and clean electricity in South-Korea. For decades, the discussion about the spent fuel management has been dominated and the government is responsible for on-going research and development (R&D) related to long-term spent nuclear fuel management. The effective management of spent fuel should be applied from the early stage of the R&D process to licensing phases with the step-by-step evaluation system. As part of follow-up efforts after the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Nuclear Promotion Commission and Nuclear Safety Commission were divided in function as an independent agency for enhancing national nuclear safety and security, which aims to protect the public and environment from undue radiological hazard. The national spent fuel project must have a vibrant program for spent fuel management. Due to the nature of these projects, the establishment of a ‘conformity assessment’ system that collects the opinions from the licensing organisations on the results of research projects from the initial R&D stage should be applied advertently in order to efficiently conduct research projects and enhance public confidence. For the government-led project for spent nuclear fuel management, the adequacy and applicability of its technology R&D as well as its sustainability that includes financial, social and environmental performance measures should be evaluated in each stage. The institutionalisation arrangement, so called ‘conformity assessment system’ for the development of a national spent nuclear fuel management plan and related technology should be developed. This study aims to propose the basic principles for the introduction of the conformity assessment system: (1) national management responsibility, (2) spent fuel management project scope, (3) its management main principles, (4) project implementation system, (5) final management project scope and securing financial resources.

Liquid-fueled Molten Salt Reactors (MSRs) do not contain their fuel in assemblies. It is then not possible to perform traditional item counting and visual accountability of the salt fuel. These facilities are closer to bulk accounting facilities, such as reprocessing plants, and require inventory determinations based on measurements of the actinide content of salts. This can be problematic due to the difficulty of sampling and the destructive analysis of actinide-containing molten salts. Some problems arise from the unique combination of high temperature and high radiation environments present in molten salt fuels. Another challenge is the continuous change in the isotopic concentration of fuel salts due to burn-up, conversion, plating out, and online chemical processing. There is a potential for fuel stocks outside the reactor containment vessel in on-site salt processing. In terms of proliferation resistance of 233U-232Th fuel cycle, the nuclide 232U is an important nuclide in thorium fuel cycle from the standpoint of proliferation resistance, because its daughter Thallium (208Tl) is a strong gamma (2.6 MeV) emitter. The hard gamma ray is not only barrier from to nuclear material theft, but also an effective means of detecting lost fissile material. However, there is a theoretical weakness in obtaining pure 233U at the core of the initial two weeks with a concentration of 232Pu less than 1,000 ppm. Therefore, Pu separation process is one of the most sensitive parts in online reprocessing facility. The decision to use a fertile blanket should also be based on proliferation risk considerations in addition to operational parameters. MSRs can be designed without a separate fertile blanket, which should be considered. In the case of the MSFR, even if fertile blankets are used, the production of 232U is large enough to make difficult the utilization of blankets for proliferation purpose. For the liquid-fueled MSRs without fissile materials separations, many of the observations from the previous section apply, except salt processing is minimized. The reactors will still need some method of estimating total actinide content. These reactor designs reduce proliferation risk for the reactor by not separating any actinides during operation.