SMR, which has recently been in the spotlight, has several advantages. However, it poses additional challenges in the areas of new design, digitalization, security, safety and safeguards. Among them, security refers to measures to protect nuclear materials and facilities from unauthorized access, theft, or destruction. Safeguards refer to measures to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The relationship between security and safeguards is complex and constantly evolving. In general, security measures are designed to protect nuclear materials and facilities from physical attack, while safeguards are designed to track and monitor the movement of nuclear materials and prevent them from being used to create nuclear weapons. In some areas security and safeguards work in complementary ways, and in other areas they conflict. But ultimately, finding a balance is what is effective and efficient. In conclusion, although the security and safeguards of SMRs have different key objectives, they are closely related and must be implemented comprehensively and consistently to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities, the public, and the environment. In this paper, we investigate how the safety and safeguards of SMR are currently being researched and analyze what difficulties there are when assuming that they are operated as a single interface.

Small modular reactors (SMRs) are getting attention as an alternative to fossil fuel power stations due to versatile application and carbon dioxide reduction. Although various types of advanced reactors are being developed, water-cooled SMR will be first deployed on a commercial scale. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and regulatory bodies are trying to identify safeguards issues of water-cooled SMRs as the first priority. IAEA begins to develop a safeguards plan by asking for the facility’s specification in a given format, a design information questionnaire (DIQ). Then, IAEA periodically performs safeguards activities such as design information verification (DIV) and physical inventory verification (PIV). In this sense, we utilize research and power reactor DIQ for water-cooled SMRs (NuScale, SMART, i-SMR and KLT-40S). Most of the questions are answered with open information. For undisclosed answers, pressurized water reactor (PWR) features are described. Safeguards issues in water-cooled SMR originate from core modularization. As the nuclear material flows are diversified, the number of safeguards measure will be increased while staff are reduced in SMRs. Instrumentation for safeguards should be developed to reduce worker’s fatigue level. Intensive arrangement of fuel assemblies may also need unique devices to secure their visibility or detectability. A transparent floor with a surveillance system or advanced Cherenkov viewing device may be adopted to enhance containment and surveillance. Meanwhile, some questions could be more elaborate regarding safeguards. First, question #38 cannot confirm the time of occurrence of weapon-grade plutonium for reactor operation. Second, the answers in questions #46 and #49 are primitive to identify a place to generate an undeclared fissile material. Therefore, the current DIQ should be revised to get a detailed burnup report and spatial distribution of neutron flux.

Nuclear Material Accountancy (NMA) system quantitatively evaluates whether nuclear material is diverted or not. Material balance is evaluated based on nuclear material measurements based on this system and these processes are based on statistical techniques. Therefore, it is possible to evaluate the performance based on modeling and simulation technique from the development stage. In the performance evaluation, several diversion scenarios are established, nuclear material diversion is attempted in a virtual simulation environment according to these scenarios, and the detection probability is evaluated. Therefore, one of the important things is to derive vulnerable diversion scenario in advance. However, in actual facilities, it is not easy to manually derive weak scenario because there are numerous factors that affect detection performance. In this study, reinforcement learning has been applied to automatically derive vulnerable diversion scenarios from virtual NMA system. Reinforcement learning trains agents to take optimal actions in a virtual environment, and based on this, it is possible to develop an agent that attempt to divert nuclear materials according to optimal weak scenario in the NMA system. A somewhat simple NMA system model has been considered to confirm the applicability of reinforcement learning in this study. The simple model performs 10 consecutive material balance evaluations per year and has the characteristic of increasing MUF uncertainty according to balance period. The expected vulnerable diversion scenario is a case where the amount of diverted nuclear material increases in proportion to the size of the MUF uncertainty, and total amount of diverted nuclear material was assumed to be 8 kg, which corresponds to one significant quantity of plutonium. Virtual NMA system model (environment) and a divertor (agent) attempting to divert nuclear material were modeled to apply reinforcement learning. The agent is designed to receive a negative reward if an action attempting to divert is detected by the NMA system. Reinforcement learning automatically trains the agent to receive the maximum reward, and through this, the weakest diversion scenario can be derived. As a result of the study, it was confirmed that the agent was trained to attempt to divert nuclear material in a direction with a low detection probability in this system model. Through these results, it is found that it was possible to sufficiently derive weak scenarios based on reinforcement learning. This technique considered in this study can suggest methods to derive and supplement weak diversion scenarios in NMA system in advance. However, in order to apply this technology smoothly, there are still issues to be solved, and further research will be needed in the future.

Regulators conduct inspections and issue non-compliance notice, and it is necessary to examine whether this is equivalent a corrective order. A corrective order imposes binding obligations on a business, and violations of it can result in sanctions such as fines, license revocation, or suspension. Therefore, if it is a corrective order, it must go through procedures such as prior notification under the Administrative Procedure Act. However, so far, no such procedures have been followed when issuing non-compliance notice. There are three possible interpretations of it: 1) the issuance of a non-compliance notice is not a corrective order but a part of an inspection, 2) the issuance of a non-compliance notice is a corrective order but not a disposition, and 3) the process of hearing opinions and prior notification was carried out during the inspection. However, if it is a part of an inspection, it should be issued by KINAC or KINS, which is entrusted with the inspection, but it is issued by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission, and it is a disposition because it makes specific demands, and the corrective orders themselves have not gone through the procedure of hearing opinions. Therefore, in order for a non-compliance notice to be enforceable unlike a recommendation and to be issued by the Nuclear Safety and Security Commission instead of the inspection agency, the law should be amended and the procedure of prior notice and hearing opinions required by the Administrative Procedure Act should be carried out at the issuance stage.

Understanding the dispersion of xenon isotopes following a nuclear test is critical for global security and falls within the remit of both the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE). This paper aims to show if it is possible to discriminate the source of xenon releases based on the atmospheric dispersion of xenon isotopes using HYSPLIT. Using ORIGEN and SERPENT simulations, four released scenarios are defined with four different fractionation times (i.e., 1 hour, 1 day, 10 days, and 30 days) after a 1kt TNT equivalent 235U explosion event. These time-delayed release scenarios were selected to certify the possibility of mis-determining xenon release source. We use the Lagrangian dispersion model for atmospheric dispersion to predict the concentration distribution of xenon isotopes under each scenario. The model allows us to better understand how these isotopes would distribute over time and space, offering valuable data for real-world detection efforts. To our knowledge, there have been no researches on the analysis of xenon isotopic ratios considering atmospheric dispersion. In this work, we focused on the atmospheric dispersion using HYSPLIT to characterize the xenon isotopic ratios from nuclear tests. In addition, we compared the xenon isotopic ratios obtained from the atmospheric dispersion with those from ORIGEN calculations, which would be helpful to discriminate the source of the xenon releases.

Over the past decades, particle physics has made significant progress in characterizing neutrinos even if neutrinos have extremely small cross-section (~10-44 cm2), allowing them to penetrate any object. More recently, neutrino detection and analysis have indeed become valuable tools in various aspects of nuclear science and technology. Neutrinos are detected using various methods, including Inverse Beta Decay (IBD), Neutrino-electron scattering, and Coherent Neutrino-Nucleus Scattering (CNNS). For the detection of anti-neutrinos from nuclear reactor, the Inverse Beta Decay (IBD) is commonly considered with scintillators. Notable experiments in Korea, such as RENO and NEOS, have been conducted using the IBD method at the Hanbit Nuclear Power Plant since 2006. Additionally, the NEON experiment, which employs CNNS, which has a significantly larger reaction cross-section than IBD but its low-energy signal detection difficulty, has been ongoing since 2021. Based on the results of NEOS (2015-2020) the signal to noise is ~30 and IBD detection rate is ~2000 counts per day. The IBD event in nuclear power plants provides valuable information about reactor behavior. IBD count rates are in good agreement with the thermal power of the reactor. Furthermore, the neutrino energy spectrum can be used to estimate the fission isotope ratio of the reactor core, showing promise for obtaining reactor core information from antineutrino detection techniques. Neutrino detection in nuclear facilities provides valuable information about reactor behavior. However, as a surveillance technology neutrino detection faces challenges due to the very low cross-section, requiring efforts to overcome limitations related to detector size and signal acquisition time. In 2008, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) included neutrino detection in its Research and Development (R&D) program for reactor safeguards. In January 2023, the IAEA organized a “Technical Meeting on Nuclear Data Needs for Antineutrino Spectra Applications” to discuss the latest developments and research results in this field. In summary, the use of neutrino detection in the nuclear field, particularly for reactor monitoring and safeguarding, has advanced significantly. Ongoing research and collaboration are expected to enhance our understanding of neutrinos and their applications in nuclear science and technology.

Most Small Modular Reactors currently under development are pursuing designs that can demonstrate flexibility in terms of construction and operation, and seeking to adopt innovative technologies to implement them, which is a very big challenge not only from the developer’s perspective but also from the regulator’s perspective. For the successful development of SMRs, it is necessary to move away from the existing prescriptive regulatory approach and exercise regulatory flexibility to sufficiently reflect design characteristics. The reason why SMR development is actively progressing around the world is to overcome the limitations of existing Light Water Reactors. Licensing advanced reactors such as MSR, VHTR, and microreactors requires a different approach from the existing conservative regulatory framework, taking into account changing regulatory environment. With the development of information technology and artificial intelligence, new types of threats are emerging, most of which are related to nuclear security. The IAEA, as well as leading countries such as the United States and Canada, require that safety, security, and safety measures be reflected in the early stages of design (Safety, Security, Safeguards by Design) and should be applied in the regulatory process. In addition, it is recommended to design a system that can achieve synergy effects by identifying in potential issues that may cause regulatory interference between safety and security (SSI, Safety-Security Interface). The competitiveness of SMR in the international market will be highly dependent on the degree to reflect the importing countries’ requirements. Since most SMRs currently under development do not have significant differences in safety goals, multi-purpose usability, etc., it is necessary to faithfully reflect the environmental factors necessary for SMR operation in the adopting country in the design. The major issues expected are mostly nuclear security-related rather than safety, and the physical characteristics of the site including the geopolitical conditions of the importing country must be taken into consideration. In this paper, the necessity of SMR nuclear security regulation and the way how to reflect the Security by Design on SMR will be presented.

A seal is one of the primary means of safeguards along with surveillance. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) uses various types of seals to verify the diversion of nuclear materials and is developing new seals according to the development of technology. Independent of the IAEA, ROK uses national safeguards seals for state-level regulation. A national safeguards inspector binds the nuclear material storage by combining a seal with a metal wire and checks the serial number of the RFID chip inserted in the seal with a reader. The Wolsong spent fuel dry storage facility has 14 modules, each with 24 seals, and thus a maximum of 336 national seals will be installed. Although dependent on the sealing method, it takes about 5 minutes to verify one seal. As such, a considerable workforce is required for verification, and both the IAEA and the ROK are currently conducting random inspections. In addition, there are cases where verification is impossible because old seals are damaged due to harsh environments and long exchange periods. Therefore, in this study, we analyzed cases in areas where sealing technology has been developed to improve the problems of the existing national safeguards seals. And we proposed a method for improving national seals by finding requirements of seals considering spent fuel dry storage facility characteristics. In international logistics, sealing is essential in product transport verification, terrorism prevention, and tariff imposition. Accordingly, the field of container sealing has been extensively developed, and the International Organization for Standardization (ISO) has regulated the mechanical requirements of the seal as ISO 17712 and the electronic requirements as ISO 18185. Mechanical seals include metal and plastic seals and metal seals include bolt seals, ball seals, and cable seals. In addition, there are various electronic seals, such as radio frequency identification (RFID), near field communication (NFC), infrared (IR). Recently, there has been a trend to use active seals that have a built-in battery and can implement various additional functions. Among the various seals, the main requirements for selecting seals suitable for dry storage facilities are as follows. First, use of a sealing tube longer than 10m should be possible. Second, it should have corrosion resistance so that it can be used for more than five years in the coastal area. Third, it must be a passive seal without a power supply. Fourth, it should not be overly costly. Finally, the seal verification time should be short. As a seal that satisfies these requirements, an electronic seal with application of the passive RFID method to the mechanical form of a metal cable seal is suitable. Since it is not an active seal, it is difficult to determine the time of breakage. Therefore, designing the seal such that the RFID is also damaged when the metal seal is broken will be helpful for verification. In this study, the requirements for national safeguards seals in dry storage facilities were defined, and measures to improve the existing national seals were studied. Field applicability will be evaluated through future sealing device design and demonstration tests.

This study aims to classify R&D activities related to the nuclear fuel cycle using the deep learning methodology. First, R&D data of the Republic of Korea were collected from the National Science & Technology Information Service (NTIS) for the years 2021, 2022, and 2023. We use keywords such as ‘nuclear,’ ‘uranium,’ ‘plutonium,’ and ‘thorium’ to find nuclear-related R&D projects in the NTIS database. Among the numerous R&D projects found through keyword searches, overlapping and medical-related R&D projects were excluded. Finally, 495 R&D projects conducted in 2021, 430 R&D projects conducted in 2022, and 296 R&D projects conducted in 2023 were obtained for analysis. After that, Safeguards experts determine whether the R&D projects are subject to declaration under the AP. The values of the content validity index (CVI) and content validity ratio (CVR) were used to verify whether the experts’ judgments were valid. The 1,218 collected and labeled data were then divided 8:2 into training and test datasets to see if deep learning could be applied to classify nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities. We use the Python and TensorFlow packages, including RNN, GRU, and CNN methods. First, the collected text information was preprocessed to remove punctuation marks and then tokenized to make it suitable for deep learning. After 20 epochs of training to classify the nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities, the RNN model achieved 97.30% accuracy and a 5.85% error rate on the validation dataset. The GRU model achieved 96.53% accuracy and a 9.06% error rate on the validation dataset. In comparison, the CNN model achieved 94.61% accuracy and a 2.57% error rate on the validation dataset. When applying the test dataset to each model, the RNN model had a test accuracy of 83.20%, the GRU test accuracy of 82.79%, and the CNN model had a test accuracy of 85.66% for the same dataset. This study applied deep learning models to labeled data judged by various experts, and the CNN model showed the best results. In the future, this study will continue to develop an optimum deep learning model that can classify nuclear fuel cycle-related R&D activities to achieve the purpose of safeguards measures from open-source data such as papers and articles.

Uranium extraction from seawater has been a topic of considerable interest over the past decades. However, Commercial facilities for uranium extraction from seawater have not yet been constructed due to its lack of economic feasibility. With the increasing demand for sustainable energy sources, there is a growing interest in eco-friendly uranium extraction methods. Despite this, the safeguards associated with these extraction techniques remain relatively under-researched, necessitating comprehensive studies that address both the economic feasibility and safeguards approach. The Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Central Research Institute is poised to elucidate the economic value of uranium extraction from seawater and embark on research to extract Yellow Cake from seawater on a laboratory scale. Given these advancements, it becomes imperative to consider the approach to safeguards. In this study, a comprehensive review was conducted to understand the relevant regulations that encompass both international obligations in partnership with the IAEA and domestic guidelines, specifically the Nuclear Safety Act. Emphasis was placed on a detailed examination of the IAEA’s comprehensive safeguards agreement and its additional protocol, focusing on deriving the necessary regulatory timings, subjects, and methodologies for effective reporting and verification. We reviewed the safeguards guidelines and the IAEA policy to confirm the international non-proliferation obligations. The study also reviewed the impact of the State-Level Approach promoted by the IAEA and its implications on state-specific factors and evaluations of state technological advancement. Additionally, the regulatory aspects of extracted uranium as an internationally regulated material under the Nuclear Safety Act were critically assessed. In conclusion, this study explains the international and domestic regulatory considerations for uranium extraction from seawater. Ultimately, this study will provide valuable understanding for policymakers, researchers, and practitioners involved in uranium extraction from seawater. Additionally, we expect that this study will contribute to establishing the safeguards approach and regulatory framework for the commercialization of uranium extraction from seawater in the ROK.

Among the public notices of the NSSC, five notices related to safeguards, including “Education of Nuclear Control, International Regulatory Materials, Preparation of Regulation of NMAC (Nuclear Material Accounting and Control), the National Inspection of NMAC, and Reporting of International Regulatory Materials” The regulations on the National Inspection of NMAC have remained the same since some revisions were made on December 26, 2017, raising the need to revise the public notice due to changes in the domestic and international safeguards regulatory environment. Accordingly, this paper analyzes the public notice of the National Inspection of NMAC and proposes the revision direction. The regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC comprises sections such as Purpose and Definition, Types - Scope - Frequency of the National Inspection, Notification of the National Inspection’s plan, and Management of Violation. Appendices include the contents of the violation table, explanations regarding types of violations, and various forms related to the National Inspection, which are attached separately. IAEA mentioned that ROK was selected as a pilot country for the Improved SLA (State-Level Approach) project starting in November 2020. IAEA explained that a quantitative and standardized methodology was adopted and developed for this purpose. As a result, the Unannounced Inspection at LWR facilities will transition to the Random Interim Inspection. Additionally, the Physical Inventory Verification in CANDU facilities will increase to once a year per reactor. This status will change the frequency and intensity of inspection at domestic nuclear facilities. Furthermore, domestically, there is an ongoing trend of continuous growth and diversification of nuclear facilities. In light of the changing domestic and international safeguards environment, it is necessary to set a direction for revising the regulation regarding the National Inspection of NMAC that was partially amended in 2017 to align with the current status. Firstly, due to the increased burden on operators resulting from the increased number of IAEA inspections following the application of Improved SLA, there is a need to streamline the National Inspection of NMAC frequency to enhance overall regulatory efficiency. Furthermore, the definition section should also be revised to include matters related to the regulation to reflect the current reality accurately. Considering the operation and name changes of new domestic nuclear facilities, there may be a need to add or modify computer input codes. While pursuing the revision of regulations regarding the National Inspection of NMAC, an analysis of the need for revision of other regulations related to safeguards should also be conducted, and directions should be set. Through this process, improving the regulatory framework that forms the basis of safeguards can help prevent confusion among operators and promote regulatory efficiency. We can better cope with these changes by proactively adapting to the rapidly changing domestic and international nuclear environment.

The KINAC resident inspectors are responsible for conducting on-site regulatory and intergovernmental support tasks related to safeguards, physical protection, and cybersecurity in each NSSC regional office. In nuclear material accounting and control, resident inspectors primarily perform tasks such as national inspections and technical support for IAEA inspections. However, with the increasing cases of non-compliance with the advance notification procedure by operators, there is a growing need for improvement in the role of resident inspectors in on-site regulation. In response to this situation, the safeguards division in KINAC has analyzed and improved the on-site check procedures of resident inspectors at LWR facilities. The existing procedure outlines the process where resident inspectors receive the advance notification documents submitted by operators and utilize them as a reference for conducting weekly checks during the overhaul period when IAEA surveillance cameras are installed. Additionally, according to the attached forms specified in the procedure, resident inspectors are required to submit the check results report to the director of the safeguards division in KINAC every week and to the NSSC every month. The inspection items include checking the execution and changes of advance notification, verifying unnotified matters, discussing other issues, assessing the integrity of things such as the operational status of IAEA surveillance equipment, and so on. On April 13-14, 2023, the Safeguards division organized a two-day resident inspector’s work-sharing workshop to discuss improvements in the on-site check procedures of resident inspectors at LWR facilities. During the workshop, a comparison and analysis were conducted between the existing procedures and actual on-site activities. Unnecessary tasks such as advance notification document reception and monthly reporting were eliminated, and the focus was shifted towards emphasizing essential tasks. The opinions of resident inspectors were taken into account to derive directions for improvement. The existing procedure was applicable only during Overhaul periods for resident inspectors. It has been improved by removing this limitation, allowing its use during routine times. Furthermore, the procedure has been enhanced by clarifying its purpose, scope, users, and definitions of terms and specifying responsibilities and authorities. Unnecessary terminology has been eliminated. Remarkably, the definition of advance notification has been detailed, and the reporting of check results has been simplified through weekly task reporting. The Safeguards division in KINAC has strived to enhance the efficiency and simplification of on-site regulatory activities for resident inspectors at LWR facilities by improving their on-site check procedures. These improvement activities are expected to aid resident inspectors in effectively performing a wide range of tasks, including safeguards, physical protection, cybersecurity, and government support. In the future, it will be possible to continue refining the on-site check procedures by sharing the results of using the procedure in meetings and gathering various opinions from resident inspectors.

The Agency needs to maintain a solid and reliable foundation for recruited inspectors by providing practical training at commercial nuclear power plants. The Comprehensive Inspection Exercise (CIE) is a basic training which consists of a simulation of a Design Information Verification (DIV) Visit, a Physical Inventory Verification (PIV) at a nuclear power plant, including Complementary Access. The basic curriculum includes a pre-course session, auditing exercises, fresh fuel (bundles and assemblies) measurements, spent fuel (bundles and assemblies) measurements, verification of design features, as well as nuclear material flow. ROK has been holding the lightwater reactor (LWR) / heavy-water reactor (CANDU) training course (CIE) from 2010 every year with about 2 weeks curriculum through MSSP (Member State Support Program). LWR and CANDU are operated by KHNP. To efficiently carry out the safeguards, IAEA receives the contribution through the ROK support program and implement R&D for the nuclear material inspection. ROK has been supporting and contributing total 22 tasks to IAEA in-cash and in-kind. Among them, this training provides for a course on safeguards verification activities at CANDU and LWR facilities. This course offers inspectors a unique opportunity to understand diversion scenarios and to familiarize themselves with instruments specifically used at CANDU and LWR facilities (OFPS and DCVD), as well as spent fuel dry storage transfer verification activities and dry storage dual sealing arrangements. KINAC performs PoC (Point of Contact) on behalf of NSSC and coordinates work between IAEA and KHNP. Additionally, KINAC first discusses with KHNP that can host light-water reactors and heavy-water reactors with KHNP at the beginning of each year. In order to hold a successful training, ROK plans and carries out a lot of process including agenda, accommodation, equipment movement, logistics and so on in consultation with the IAEA and facilities.

The Republic of Korea (ROK), as a member state of the IAEA, is operating the State’s System of Accounting for and Control (SSAC) and conducting independent national inspections. Furthermore, an evaluation methodology for the material unaccounted for (MUF) is being developed in ROK to enhance capabilities of national inspection. Generally, physical and chemical changes of nuclear material are unavoidable due to the operating system and structure of facilities, an accumulation of material unaccounted for (MUF) has been issued. IAEA developed statistical MUF evaluation method that can be applied to all facilities around the world and it mainly focuses on the diversion detection of nuclear materials in facilities. However, in terms of the national safeguard inspection, an evaluation of accountancy in facilities is additionally needed. Therefore, in this research, a new approach to MUF evaluation is suggested, based on the Guide to the Expression of Uncertainty in Measurement (GUM) that an evaluation of measurement uncertainty factors is straightforward. A hypothetical list of inventory items (LII) which has 6,118 items at the beginning and end of the material balance period, along with 360 inflow and outflow nuclear material items at a virtual fuel fabrication plant was employed for both the conventional IAEA MUF evaluation method and the proposed GUM-based method. To calculate the measurement uncertainty, it was assumed that an electronic balance, gravimetry, and a thermal ionization mass spectrometer were used for a measurement of the mass, concentration, and enrichment of 235U, respectively. Additionally, it was considered that independent and correlated uncertainty factors were defined as random factors and systematic factors for the ease of uncertainty propagation by the GUM. The total MUF uncertainties of IAEA (σMUF) and GUM (uMUF) method were 37.951 and 36.692 kg, respectively, under the aforementioned assumptions. The difference is low, it was demonstrated that the GUM method is applicable to the MUF evaluation. The IAEA method demonstrated its applicability to all nuclear facilities, but its calculated errors exhibited low traceability due to its simplification. In contrast, the calculated uncertainty based on the GUM method exhibited high reliability and traceability, as it allows for individual management of measurement uncertainty based on the facility’s accounting information. Consequently, the application of the GUM approach could offer more benefits than the conventional IAEA method in cases of national safeguard inspections where factor analysis is required for MUF assessment.

In compliance with the amended export control of strategic items and technology in Jan. 2014, KAERI should pay attention to the export control of ITT (Intangible Technology Transfer). To control an ITT (Intangible Technologies Transfer) effectively and efficiently, the Korean government encourages the R&D institute and universities obtaining the ICP (Internal Compliance Program) from the relevant authority, MOTIE. This means that the exporters can control the ITT by themselves, because the exporters know very well the counterparts of the trading and the exporting items and technologies. In fact, ICP is for export control of dual-use items and technology in Korea. However, KAERI has tried to obtain a license from the authority, MOTIE. In an effort to do so, KAERI completed enacting a new internal self–regulation for export controls in 2016, and proceeded to apply for an ‘AA’ license of ICP in 2017 and obtained the ICP license in 2018 and re-obtained the license in 2021 from the MOTIE. In light of KAERI’s case, to obtain the ‘AA’ license of ICP is one of the best methods to increase the ability of export controls. As of now, there is no R&D institutes sponsored by the Korean government to obtain the ‘AA’ license of ICP except KAERI. KAERI can provide the actual methods as a standard case to the R&D institutes in Korea for obtaining an ‘AA’ license of ICP. According to the internal regulation of KAERI for export control, KAERI implemented an inner self-audit for export control in Nov. 2022. This is the first real self-audit for export control at KAERI. The main purpose of the self-audit is to check the transfer management of ITT and the relationship of relevant office through the interview of the staffs in the ICP organization. KAERI self-audit planed specifically and implemented for the achievement of the basic principal of selfaudit. The specific contents of this self-audit is as follows - The interview of the relevant offices: physical protection office, manpower planning office, manpower management office, nuclear education and training center, technology transfer office and international cooperation office, nuclear control and management office - Building the self-audit checklist considering the characteristics of each office - The confirmation of the inner procedure and the status of management on the export controls Through the interview of the relevant office, KAERI checked the inner procedure and the status of management on the export controls and tried to provide the supplementary measures of each relevant offices. The followings are the main results of the inner self-audit implemented in Nov. 2022. - Generally, the staffs know the meaning and relevant regulation such as foreigner’s management and the intangible technology transfer - Each office reflects the necessities of export controls on the relevant regulation and procedures and make DB for the proper duty. However, there is no indication for export controls on the DB - In the case of foreigner’s temporary visit for simple work and site tour, there is a difficult situation not to be able to check all the visitors by checking the denial lists - If necessary, KAERI may build the TFT (Task force Team) for the efficiency of export controls - Others

As drones expand beyond military purposes to the private sector, the level of use of drones in various fields is increasing. However, the world was shocked by the attempt to attack with a drone equipped with a C4 bomb in the US and the attempt to assassinate a head of state using a drone in Venezuela. Drone threats to domestic nuclear power plants are also increasing due to the expansion of drone use, terrorist threats, and North Korea’s invasion of drones. Overseas, various drone threats to nuclear power plants have occurred. In October 2014, French electricity company Electricite de France confirmed that it had observed unauthorized drones over seven nuclear power plants across France. A drone threat occurred at the Savannah River Site (SRS), a U.S. Department of Energy facility that processes and stores nuclear materials. In 2016, eight drones were observed by security personnel. In 2016, a drone flew over the cooling tower of the Liebstadt nuclear power plant in Switzerland, and publicly shared the filmed video on YouTube. In July 2018, Greenpeace activists intentionally crashed a drone into the outer wall of the spent fuel building in Boughey, France. In January 2019, they used drones to drop smoke bombs and release videos at Orangeo’s nuclear facility containing irradiated fuel. In January 22, Sweden saw drones flying over three nuclear power plants. Drone was also seen at the Forsmark nuclear power plant on Friday and at two other Swedish nuclear power plants in Oskarshamn and Ringhals on Monday. Anti-drone technology to counter the threat of drone terrorism is also developing. Anti-drone technology detects, tracks, and identifies illegal drones to neutralize them. Various technologies such as radar, EO/IR cameras, Lidar, sensor, and RF scanners are being developed for drone detection. Depending on the detection technology, it has advantages such as detection distance and remote control drone detection. However, there are also disadvantages, such as obstacles, weather condition, and the inability to detect drones that do not transmit signals. Methods such as jammer, capture, and destruction have been developed for incapacitation technology. While it has advantages such as stability and portability, it has disadvantages such as limited use and damage to the surroundings. Accordingly, it is necessary to draw realistic measures to defend against the threat of nuclear power plants by paying constant attention to the various detection, identification, and neutralization anti-drone systems that continue to evolve.

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) has been exporting weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to the volatile Middle East and Africa. It is expecting that military illicit activities would isolate DPRK economically, as it has been placed on multiple sanctions lists, including UN sanctions, multilateral export control regime sanctions, and country-specific sanctions. However, DPRK funds its WMD programs through various sanctions evasion activities. DPRK’s primary sanctions evasion activities include obtaining foreign currency, acquiring dualuse or restricted technology, smuggling, and money laundering, which are global in scope. This study analyzes the sanctions evasion activities used by DPRK to acquire economic, material, and technological resources for its WMD program and devises ways to disrupt these evasions effectively. First, the international community should strengthen export controls by encouraging states with weak export control regimes to join international organizations and conventions to limit DPRK arms and technology exports. Second, states should improve their intelligence gathering and analysis capabilities by sharing information on DPRK’s evasion activities and working together. This will help identify and counter DPRK’s evasion techniques and networks. Third, the international community should strengthen cooperation on DPRK’s evasion efforts. This can be done by strengthening cooperation with states and entities that enforce international sanctions and by working with relevant agencies such as customs, immigration, and police to track and interdict the movement of funds and assets used for evasion. Fourth, publicize DPRK’s illicit activities and apply diplomatic pressure. Diplomatic pressure can lead to more states and entities to enforce sanctions. In conclusion, these strategies are expected to deter DPRK’s illicit activities; but to sanction DPRK effectively, it is essential to continue to adjust and refine the strategies in response to DPRK’s evolving sanctions evasion efforts. The results of this research are expected to prevent WMD proliferation through DPRK by blocking or reducing the risk of sanctions evasion.

The Korea Institute of Nuclear Nonproliferation and Control (KINAC) conducts outreach to promote and educate regulated entities on the export control regime’s purpose, importance, and implementation. Outreach activities help to reduce regulatory blind spots and minimize domestic and international penalties for non-compliance. The need for outreach is growing as domestic and international policies are changing rapidly, and the scope of export regulations is expanding due to increased exports of nuclear power plants. In order to explore the long-term development direction of outreach activities, we will analyze the trends of nuclear export control and the outreach activities of related organizations. Here are some key trends in nuclear export controls. In recent years, countries worldwide have been reorganizing their supply chains for critical industries, focusing on their own and friendly countries, and strengthening their trade policies in security aspects such as export control and technology protection. Following the trend of international sanctions against Russia, the Korean government has implemented domestic export control measures similar to those of the international community, such as blocking the export of strategic goods to Russia. In addition, the number of strategic goods classifications and export licenses has been increasing as Korea promotes the export of new nuclear power plants. In line with carbon neutrality, it is expected to revitalize and diversify nuclear energy-related export businesses, such as joint research on fourth-generation nuclear power plants and SMRs. Finally, the scope of exports is expanding from ‘goods’ such as existing nuclear reactors to ‘technology’-oriented transfers. The means of technology transfer are diversifying with the development of information and communication technologies such as cloud services, email, video conferencing, and large-capacity removable storage devices. Next, look at the outreach activities of nuclear export control organizations. The Korean Security Agency of Trade and Industry (KOSTI) is an organization that implements export controls on dualuse items. It puts much effort into one-on-one consulting services with companies and has established and operated various online training programs. It also actively utilizes online promotional materials such as card news and videos. The export control agencies of major countries have a common trend of expanding outreach to research institutions, providing export control guides tailored to the characteristics of each field, holding annual seminars and conferences, and operating educational programs

In recent times, drone technology has been rapidly advancing and becoming increasingly popular. Furthermore, there has been an increase in the number of crimes and terrorism cases targeting national facilities using drones. This study aims to categorize the types of drone threats that could pose future risks to nuclear power plants. For this study, we are investigating domestic and foreign drone terrorism cases and identifying the specifications of drones used. It has been confirmed that products from Chinese DJI companies have frequently appeared as commercial drones used in terrorism. This suggests that conversion of general commercial drones into weapons can be effectively utilized for terrorist activities. There is an elevated risk of terrorism involving multiple small drones. Nuclear power plants must also devise protective measures against a large influx of drones. Additionally, it is predicted that North Korea is developing drones equipped with return technology through GPS-based autonomous mission flights. North Korea’s drones are presumed to have been converted from Chinese drones (SKY-09P, UV10CAM, etc.). According to the analysis based on the weight and size of the drone, drones weighting less than 150 kg and wingspan of less than 3 m are used for terrorism. To effectively detect drones, it is necessary to implement measures such as integrating and deploying various equipment to compensate for equipment limitations (radio waves, radar, video, sound, etc.). In the case of long-distance flight, a number of fixed-wing drones capable of autonomous mission flight and long-distance flight were used. North Korea’s drones use GPS-based autonomous mission flights, so it is necessary to prepare drones that do not transmit RF signals to detect them. Both RF signal detection and GPS jamming should be carried out, with GPS jamming taking precedence, even in the case of fixedwing drones. The results of this study could contribute to enhancing the level of physical protection of nuclear power plants.

The ROK government has developed the Nuclear Export and Control System (NEPS) to implement export control activities. Although it was launched in 2008 as a system that can work with classification, licensing, nuclear material approval, government-to-government assurance, complying with nuclear cooperation agreement (NCA) handled through official documents. In order to enhance systematic management for items subject to NCA, KINAC developed a new module for the procedure (hereinafter referred to as “NCA module”) and opened it in 2022. This paper presents the module’s development background, key features, and current operation status. The NCA module prioritizes functional expansion and flexibility, distinct from other tasks for the following reasons. First, the export control duties of classification, export license, and approval for NM are based on domestic law, leading to predetermined target items, application forms, and processes that change only through statutory amendments. In contrast, the implementation of NCA has numerous procedural variables, varying across countries in scope, content, and procedures. Therefore, if the function is over-standardized, there would be many exceptions that the system cannot resolve in practice. Second, the existing NEPS process entails a one-time decision or approval for each application, while the implementation of the agreement encompasses four related procedures for each item: prior notification, written confirmation, shipment notification, and receipt confirmation. Even some steps may be omitted depending on the case. The other difference is the working process. The implementation of NCA must be initiated from the government, so the existing methods, beginning with the licensee filling a form, cannot be adopted as it is. The NCA module has adopted a new reference numbering system to resolve these challenges. It enables the creation of multiple procedures under one reference number on an item to expand the tasks and make it possible to omit some steps or to reflect case-by-case concerns in each stage. It also provides a consolidated view of multiple notifications related to a single item, ensuring to deal with even long-running tasks without missing any obligations until the final procedure. Moreover, some of the data in the NCA module is extensible by allowing users to manage the list themselves. For example, the system can respond to new agreements by allowing users to add and modify codes that distinguish counterparty countries. As a result, the current NCA module accommodates a variety of implementation scenarios, including split shipments, the procedural omissions, and the modification of additional counterparties, offering enhanced flexibility and adaptability.