The 1907 Hague Conference was the single ever global summit before WW I to critically evaluate the interaction of the worlds of law and diplomacy. Pivotal to its debate was the Russo-Japanese War which suggested no less than eleven out of its thirteen Conventions. The crystallization of fifty years of Western interference in the Far East, the war heralded the end of an Era, sealing the fate of the legendary Chinese and Korean empires and putting Japan on its course to imperialism. This paper recapitulates the historical options available to China, Korea and Japan, reviews causes and consequences of their separate stands, and evaluates their critical relevance to the Hague debate.

This article explores “the Japanese advantage”in the enforcement of ex ante contract commitments in comparison with the United States, arguing that ostensible convergence of Japanese and United States contract practice in on—going business relationships is based on very different assumptions and conditions. Writing in the early 1960s Takeyoshi Kawashima in Japan and Stewart Macaulay in the United States described prevailing views and practices related to business agreements. Their respective observations indicated a tendency in both countries to avoid formal, legally enforceable contacts. For over four decades scholars on both sides of the Pacific have tended view these observations as grounds for arguing for a convergence of contract practice. Recent research efforts have attempted to verify empirically such convergence. On closer examination, however, the conclusions reached by Kawashima and Macaulay rest on very different assumptions. For Kawashima the avoidance of formal contact appears to be based on a desire to avoid the enforcement of ex ante commitments by those who perceive that their bargaining leverage will remain intact throughout an on—going business relationship, thus enabling them to adjust unilaterally to changing circumstances. Similarly enforceable ex ante contractual commitments may also be viewed as less advantageous to those who may have the disadvantage in bargaining leverage at the time of the contracting to the extent that they perceive that they may gain greater ex post leverage. Macaulay, on the other hand emphasized the transactions costs of formal contracting and uncertainty of enforcement that reduced the efficacy of ex ante commitments. This article explores the predicates for both positions. It concludes that with respect to the concerns raised by Macaulay, Japan has a comparative advantage. Because of the organization and values of Japanese judges as well as the legal rules related to both excused non—performance as a result of changing circumstances, the legal rules favor greater certainty in the enforcement of ex ante commitments thereby supporting Kawashima’s foundational observations. Similarly, the greater uncertainty of enforcement as well as the flexibility of the legal rules on impracticability as well as contract termination in the United States justifies Macaulay’s conclusions. Japan’s loss of advantage in terms of effective formal enforcement of contract rights, it is argued, is counter—balanced by the strength of supportive mechanisms of private ordering.

The conditionality of human rights is a very provoking issue in international economic relations. It should be applied under the guidelines of legitimacy, legality, credibility, and proportionality. The EU is enthusiastic about human rights conditionality. However, it is hard to say that the EU’s program of human rights conditionality has worked well in practice. Some main multilateral economic institutions, which had been criticized for disregarding human rights concerns, have remained shy to human rights conditionality. As an increasingly emerging economic giant, China will be expected to have some sort of obligation to better respect, better protect and better promote international human rights. China can accept human rights conditionality in a moderate way.

China’s copyright regime, which American businesses have repeatedly complained is not sufficiently enforced, could be successfully encouraged through a cultural policy, as an alternative to a trade policy. Through a cultural perspective, the concept of copyright might not be as remote to China’s populace as was once believed, as people can no longer blame the influence of Confucianism or suppression of private property rights. This article explores the cultural policies of the United States and China to discover a way by which a copyright system can be inherently Chinese in nature, and therefore, more likely to be enforced.

From 1997 to 2007, in order to fight for its so-called “international room,”Taiwan continuously endeavored to try and squeeze into the Word Health Organization (Hereinafter referred to as the “WHO”). However, the outcome has always been disappointing for Taiwan due to the diplomatic endeavor of the People’s Republic of China. In 2007, the fight especially attracted the world’s attention because Taiwan bid for membership to the WHO instead of observer status for which it had previously been bidding. In fact, Taiwan’s request for WHO membership had a big impression on the world and the reason why Taiwan has had a great interest in the WHO is not to engage in meaningful participation within the WHO, as propagandized by Taiwanese authorities, but to eventually acquire recognition as an independent state.1 Although Taiwan has failed to achieve its goals for 11 years, accession to membership of the WHO has been, and still will be, a political goal pursued by Taiwanese authorities. The question is whether this goal can be backed from a legal perspective. It is submitted that the answer is“ No.”