China’s OBOR Initiative charts a path for trade and investment cooperation between China and States along the OBOR. Indirect expropriation stands as a crucial issue for the successful implementation of the OBOR initiative. This mainly owes to the large size of investment projects and investment funds, scant regulation of indirect expropriation in the IIAs signed between China and OBOR States, and the diverse political and economic environments of these many States. This article examines the definition and identification standards of indirect expropriation under OBOR IIAs. It will also reveal that indirect expropriation is poorly defined and insufficiently identified in most agreements. It is argued that OBOR IIAs should be revised to regulate indirect expropriation in such three aspects as preambular declaration of host State regulatory freedom, definitional clarity of indirect expropriation, and guidance for its identification. This approach would facilitate a more stable investment environment and contribute to the success of the OBOR initiative.

United States litigation against China in the WTO will be ground zero for the new Trump administration’s aggressive trade policy. Five important facts must be highlighted to better understand the likely actions of the Trump administration. First, heightened judicial advocacy within the WTO will be consistent with both the Bush and Obama administrations’ aggressive use of the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Second, international judicial activism is squarely within the context of unfolding historical changes in international relations. Third, China hawks in the Trump administration will be competing with a number of countervailing forces in the White House, throughout the administration, and in the federal courts. Fourth, the US Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate global trade. However, much of this exclusive authority has been delegated to the president. Fifth, Trump considers trade as a zero-sum transaction, with a focus on the bottom line, to the exclusion of all else.

The interaction between GATT/WTO and legal regimes to combat climate change has experienced four important stages. First, both were created independently as two selfcontained legal regimes. Second, these regimes may potentially conflict with each other because climate change measures may violate the GATT/WTO rules. Third, if policies and measures are tailored well, the GATT/WTO and climate change legal regimes could be implemented simultaneously. Last, a shift to low carbon economy presses for close cooperation and mutual supportiveness between these two legal regimes. However, the multinational nature of these two legal regimes often delay or hamper global consensus on agenda for cooperation. This article argues that trade agreements as a regional approach have merits and advantages of pursuing harmonization and cooperation under the GATT/ WTO framework. Regional trade agreements can provide opportunities for a group of countries with concrete commitments and rules to cope with climate change beyond the possibility of the multilateral arena.

China’s foreign investment has been growing rapidly since 1990s. In this course, the first investor-state arbitration case raised by a mainland Chinese investor, Ping An v. Belgium, drew attention to an important issue – jurisdiction ratione temporis in successive international investment agreements. It is controversial in theory and practice as to whether the basic principle of non-retroactivity should apply to the dispute settlement clause in a successive agreement. This is especially true when tribunals are interpreting different kinds of jurisdictional clauses. This paper will take the Ping An Case as an opportunity to thoroughly analyze the issue of temporal jurisdiction in successive international investment agreements. Based on such analysis, this paper will also do reflection on relevant articles in China’s existing investment agreements, providing suggestions to China regarding the issue of jurisdiction ratione temporis, in an effort to make arbitration more certain and avoid possible dismissal, as occurred in the Ping An Case.

Collective Management Organizations’ lack of good governance and transparency is incompatible with the Extended Collective License (ECL). The ECL might be unfit for the digital world. National treatment for foreign rightsholders is not guaranteed. The ECL arrangement cannot pass the three-step test. The ECL in the draft of the third amendment of the Chinese Copyright Act may result in an unbalanced competition between Chinese copyright holders and foreign copyright holders. In the online world, the implementation of an ECL may be risk violating international copyright conventions. In light of not only China’s poorly established CMC but also Chinese CMOs’ lack of good governance, ECLs either should be put on hold (at least for now) or should only be exercised in special cases in which international copyright conventions permit the use of a non-voluntary licence. With regard to the possible abuse of ECLs, this article proposes the establishment of either mandatory international regulations or soft-law guidance.

On June 27, 2013, the World Intellectual Property Organization adopted the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled in its efforts to resolve the global book famine of visually impaired persons by providing a series of copyright exceptions that facilitate access of the visually impaired to copyright works. As a member country of the WIPO, China signed but has not ratified the Marrakesh Treaty. However, it is important that China implement the treaty provisions into its copyright law before submitting ratification to the WIPO. Chinese lawmakers are thus advised to incorporate provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty into the national copyright legislations. This article analyzes the reasons for the global book famine of the visually impaired, examines the key provisions in the Marrakesh Treaty, and provides recommendations to incorporate the provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty into the Chinese copyright laws and regulations.

This essay reviews the ‘All Okinawa’ anti-base movement, which has entered a new phase since November 2014. The Abe administration’s coercive measures to proceed with the relocation of the US Marine Corps Air Station Futenma to Henoko in Okinawa, have aroused strong opposition. Led by Governor Onaga and the All Okinawa Council, the ‘All Okinawa’ movement has integrated the civic opinions for opposing the construction of a new base at Henoko. Moreover, this movement has pursued the autonomy as a way of exercising the right of self-determination. In addition, it contains an ethnic minority movement that reestablishes the Okinawan identity in relation to Japan.

In a referendum held in 2016, Britain voted to leave the EU. Britain’s membership of the EU has been a difficult one. Unlike the other leading Member States of the EU, Britain did not seem to have a firm conviction that “ever-closer union” of the peoples of Europe is essential to the peace and liberty of Europe. In the wake of increased immigration and the recent refugee crisis, the British people chose to leave the EU in order to have their sovereignty and independence re-affirmed. It remains to be seen what will be the economic consequences of this largely political decision.

Absolute immunity means that a State cannot exercise legislative, judicial or executive powers over another State due to the mere fact that the latter is sovereign. Today, it is rejected by a considerable number of States which represent various legal systems. States argue that private acts of a State performed jure gestionis, apart from the conducts performed jure impreii, are justiciable. It can be asserted that the current State practice embracing the restrictive approach is the direction in which international law has been evolving. That said, States’ interests which led to the adoption of State immunity still continue to induce legislative bodies and courts to be cautious in formulating a broad exception to immunity for employment contracts, causing them to refocus on the question of whether the employment relationship is destined for governmental, public, or sovereign purposes.

The Sino-Philippine Arbitration on the South China Sea Disputes was over on July 12, 2016, with a Merits Award in Philippine favor. Beijing rejected this arbitration and abstained from submitting written and oral arguments. Taiwan actively engaged in the debate with the Philippines since July 7, 2015. Not deemed as representative of China, Taiwan was considered capable of clarifying the meaning of the U-Shaped Line it first published in 1947 when seated in Nanjing, representing China then. The biggest maritime feature in the Spratly Islands, i.e. Taiping Island (Itu Aba), has been occupied by troops from mainland China since 1946 and then from Taiwan since 1956. The legal status of Taiping Island was the key to success of Philippine Submissions. The factual information from Taiwan became vital. This paper examines Taiwan’s role in this arbitration and the degree to which it could actually speak for China at such legal proceedings.

This note aims to explore the Taiwanese position before and after the Permanent Court of Arbitration Award regarding the South China Sea dispute. The findings suggest that the new Taiwanese Authority, led by Tsai Ing-Wen, has taken a slightly different approach toward the South China Sea, compared to Ma Ying-Jeou’s administration. The new Taiwanese Authority makes no comment on the eleven-dash line claim, which, in turn, implies that its approach is closer to that of the American orientation. It is suggested that the South China Sea Peace Initiative, proposed by Ma Ying- Jeou’s administration, should be followed by Tsai’s administration. In addition, the recognition of the 1992 Consensus by Tsai’s administration will encourage mainland China to consider Taiwan as one of the key players in future South China Sea negotiations.

Following its jurisdictional decision in October 2015, the arbitral tribunal constituted under Annex VII to the UNCLOS issued its final award on July 12, 2016 in the South China Sea Arbitration case. It found overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines. This article comments on two of the flaws regarding the issue of jurisdiction arising from both preliminary and final awards of the case. It firstly calls into question the inconsistent standard adopted in identifying jurisdictional obstacles, and finds a projurisdictional bias in the Tribunal’s awards. It further analyses the fallacious approach of fragmenting the maritime delimitation disputes, and suggests the legal conundrum of status and entitlement of maritime features related to Sino-Philippine sea boundary delimitation should not constitute a separate dispute subject to legal proceedings. By purposefully downplaying jurisdictional obstacles and exercising powers on false disputes, the tribunal raises doubts to its legitimacy.

In March 2014 the Myanmar Hluttaw, or Parliament, enacted the Myanmar National Human Rights Commission Law, which provided a statutory basis for a national human rights body in Myanmar. The Myanmar government declared to the United Nations Human Rights Council that the Enabling Law was compliant with the United Nations Paris Principles that set international standards for national human rights institutions. Despite the claims of the Myanmar government, however, critics charge the Enabling Law is insufficient, with detractors claiming the law leaves the MNHRC with anaemic powers incapable of advancing human rights. This paper responds to such issues by conducting an independent evaluation of the MNHRC Enabling Law under the Paris Principles. In doing so, the analysis treats the Enabling Law as a case study demonstrating how the Paris Principles can be exercised by third parties as the UN-supported international standards for national human rights institutions.

The space environment is unique. Natural decay of debris therein is much slower than pollutants in other environments, so that removal is difficult and expensive. Despites the voluntary implementation of mitigation guidelines, the amount of debris has surged in the last two decades due to increase and diversification of space actors, and the continuing militarization of space. Active Debris Removal has thus become a promising responsive scenario. This article examines key legal barriers to the implementation of removal, such as the lack of legal definition of space debris, ambiguities surrounding the jurisdiction and control over space debris, liability for possible damages caused in removal, and implications for space arms control. It further proposes that more comprehensive registration of space objects, an international catalogue of space debris and an international fund for removal should be promoted. Also, international cooperation should be enhanced to cope with space debris, while space arms control should be strengthened.

Global warming is a result of human influence. However, little has been done to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to a ‘safe’ level. An important factor for such dismal state of affairs is that the international community has emphasized far too much on the State-centric approach to combating climate change. The international legal regime does not directly control major emitters or MNCs. This article recognizes the atmosphere as a part of the global commons and the atmospheric absorptive capacity as the common heritage of mankind. Therefore, the international community can pave the way to link global climate change regime and MNCs. Those common interests of the international community can be protected when MNCs turn their production processes green, by redirecting their investment into green technology, and try to alter the negative status quo.

Advanced telecommunication technologies enable us to employ new methods for judicial acts in the national civil procedure, such as facilitating evidence through a video-link system. However, before implementing these methods in the national proceedings for cases with foreign elements, it is necessary to elucidate the relationship between sovereignty and judicial acts of courts, including the validation of these new methods. This is because judicial acts by courts are considered to fall within the purview of the exercise of sovereignty from a Japanese perspective. From the analysis on Japanese state practices to date, it is recognized that Japan has strictly abided by the principle of territoriality under public international law. Nevertheless, reconsidering the meaning of sovereignty, Japan can adopt a more liberal and tolerant policy. In particular, Japan can become more tolerant of other countries’ judicial acts, which may be conducive to the better delivery of justice in transnational civil and commercial dispute settlements.

The Chinese toxic milk scandal raised tremendous global concerns about food safety in China. To repair the tarnished reputation of domestic food production, Chinese authorities focused on compulsory food safety liability insurance. Unfortunately, the introduction of compulsory food safety liability insurance in the Food Safety Law of the PRC has been delayed by the disagreements of Chinese legal scholars. Chinese legal scholars have examined the legitimacy of compulsory food safety liability insurance in China mainly from the standpoint of domestic laws. The valuable insight of international laws has been ignored by them. This article attempts to fill this research gap by scrutinizing the Chinese endeavor of launching compulsory food safety liability insurance through the joint perspective of public and private international law. It further demonstrates that the ideology of human rights of public international law has already penetrated into the body of broadly-interpreted private international law.

The recent surge of multijurisdictional IP disputes and increase in non-binding soft laws have made scholars cast doubt on the sustainability of public international law and the validity of the current IP legal system. Private lawyers may now think that they do not have to pay keen attention to public international law any longer when providing legal advice to their clients, particularly MNCs. This study makes a concise description of today’s legal environment in the field of IP, focusing on the emerging legal norms of transnational law, particularly in the context of its interplay with public international law. With respect to this, the ongoing and even heightened roles of public international law will be discussed. Finally, a typology is suggested using exponents to express intensity of State sovereignty to facilitate understanding on the relationship between public international law and other categories of law.