On June 27, 2013, the World Intellectual Property Organization adopted the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons who are Blind, Visually Impaired, or otherwise Print Disabled in its efforts to resolve the global book famine of visually impaired persons by providing a series of copyright exceptions that facilitate access of the visually impaired to copyright works. As a member country of the WIPO, China signed but has not ratified the Marrakesh Treaty. However, it is important that China implement the treaty provisions into its copyright law before submitting ratification to the WIPO. Chinese lawmakers are thus advised to incorporate provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty into the national copyright legislations. This article analyzes the reasons for the global book famine of the visually impaired, examines the key provisions in the Marrakesh Treaty, and provides recommendations to incorporate the provisions of the Marrakesh Treaty into the Chinese copyright laws and regulations.

Collective Management Organizations’ lack of good governance and transparency is incompatible with the Extended Collective License (ECL). The ECL might be unfit for the digital world. National treatment for foreign rightsholders is not guaranteed. The ECL arrangement cannot pass the three-step test. The ECL in the draft of the third amendment of the Chinese Copyright Act may result in an unbalanced competition between Chinese copyright holders and foreign copyright holders. In the online world, the implementation of an ECL may be risk violating international copyright conventions. In light of not only China’s poorly established CMC but also Chinese CMOs’ lack of good governance, ECLs either should be put on hold (at least for now) or should only be exercised in special cases in which international copyright conventions permit the use of a non-voluntary licence. With regard to the possible abuse of ECLs, this article proposes the establishment of either mandatory international regulations or soft-law guidance.

China’s foreign investment has been growing rapidly since 1990s. In this course, the first investor-state arbitration case raised by a mainland Chinese investor, Ping An v. Belgium, drew attention to an important issue – jurisdiction ratione temporis in successive international investment agreements. It is controversial in theory and practice as to whether the basic principle of non-retroactivity should apply to the dispute settlement clause in a successive agreement. This is especially true when tribunals are interpreting different kinds of jurisdictional clauses. This paper will take the Ping An Case as an opportunity to thoroughly analyze the issue of temporal jurisdiction in successive international investment agreements. Based on such analysis, this paper will also do reflection on relevant articles in China’s existing investment agreements, providing suggestions to China regarding the issue of jurisdiction ratione temporis, in an effort to make arbitration more certain and avoid possible dismissal, as occurred in the Ping An Case.

The interaction between GATT/WTO and legal regimes to combat climate change has experienced four important stages. First, both were created independently as two selfcontained legal regimes. Second, these regimes may potentially conflict with each other because climate change measures may violate the GATT/WTO rules. Third, if policies and measures are tailored well, the GATT/WTO and climate change legal regimes could be implemented simultaneously. Last, a shift to low carbon economy presses for close cooperation and mutual supportiveness between these two legal regimes. However, the multinational nature of these two legal regimes often delay or hamper global consensus on agenda for cooperation. This article argues that trade agreements as a regional approach have merits and advantages of pursuing harmonization and cooperation under the GATT/ WTO framework. Regional trade agreements can provide opportunities for a group of countries with concrete commitments and rules to cope with climate change beyond the possibility of the multilateral arena.

United States litigation against China in the WTO will be ground zero for the new Trump administration’s aggressive trade policy. Five important facts must be highlighted to better understand the likely actions of the Trump administration. First, heightened judicial advocacy within the WTO will be consistent with both the Bush and Obama administrations’ aggressive use of the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Second, international judicial activism is squarely within the context of unfolding historical changes in international relations. Third, China hawks in the Trump administration will be competing with a number of countervailing forces in the White House, throughout the administration, and in the federal courts. Fourth, the US Congress has the exclusive authority to regulate global trade. However, much of this exclusive authority has been delegated to the president. Fifth, Trump considers trade as a zero-sum transaction, with a focus on the bottom line, to the exclusion of all else.

China’s OBOR Initiative charts a path for trade and investment cooperation between China and States along the OBOR. Indirect expropriation stands as a crucial issue for the successful implementation of the OBOR initiative. This mainly owes to the large size of investment projects and investment funds, scant regulation of indirect expropriation in the IIAs signed between China and OBOR States, and the diverse political and economic environments of these many States. This article examines the definition and identification standards of indirect expropriation under OBOR IIAs. It will also reveal that indirect expropriation is poorly defined and insufficiently identified in most agreements. It is argued that OBOR IIAs should be revised to regulate indirect expropriation in such three aspects as preambular declaration of host State regulatory freedom, definitional clarity of indirect expropriation, and guidance for its identification. This approach would facilitate a more stable investment environment and contribute to the success of the OBOR initiative.